Gifts of Corruption?

Ambiguities of Obligation
in the
Olympic Movement

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We had all sorts of little gifts for the International Olympic Committee members. For members who like golf, we got Greg Norman to sign caps and gloves and photographs. Sir Donald Bradman signed cricket bats and posters. Dame Joan Sutherland signed books for the opera lovers. Evonne Goolagong signed photos for the tennis lovers. We gave Henry Adefope a gardening book. For others we had Olympic coins. We had wattle brooches for a lot of the wives. We delivered baskets of Australian produce to every member in their hotel room with an invitation to visit our hospitality suite.

Rod McGeoch, chief executive officer of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Bid Company. ¹

I know that you know that, when I give you a gift, I know that you will reciprocate.

Pierre Bourdieu. ²

Late in 1998 allegations of largesse and munificence rocked the International Olympic Committee (IOC).³ The allegations precipitated a major crisis that continued well into 1999 and spawned several internal and external inquiries. While the different inquiries reached consensus about the need for reform, and, in particular, the way the IOC selects cities to host Olympic games, they disagreed about the cause of the crisis. Disagreement arose over the practice and function of giving and receiving

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gifts in the Olympic movement. The IOC inquiries defended gift giving and receiving as normal etiquette and custom: the external inquiries criticized the practice as inherently fraught with expectations of reciprocation and obligation. The IOC inquiries viewed gift giving as a form of private exchange among family members; the external inquiries analyzed gift giving within the context of a highly competitive bidding process for a multi-billion dollar event. According to the IOC inquiries, gifts engendered hospitality and nourished friendship; the external inquiries blamed gift cultures for excessive and immoral behaviour. The IOC inquiries conceptualized gifts as symbolic exchanges; the external inquiries cast gifts as cold calculations shrouded in euphemism. Thus, despite broad agreement about the need for reform, the IOC and its critics proposed radically different solutions. The IOC’s answer was simple: weed out the handful of “bad apples” who had abused their position, and tighten the guidelines and rules pertaining to giving and receiving gifts. Critics demanded a complete overhaul of the IOC, including elimination of gift exchange with its inherent biases, preferences, privileges, exceptions, and exemptions. They demanded a more transparent and democratic bidding process based on mercantile relationships of commodity exchange where buyers (cities) and sellers (IOC members) enter into contractual relationships unfettered by hypocritical social bonds.

These debates over gift giving in the Olympic movement ratify much of the theoretical literature on the function and role of the gift in social life and in the constitution of social relations. In the classic sociological text on gift exchange, Marcel Mauss observes that while gifts are “in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous,” they “in fact” involve “obligation and economic self-interest.” Mauss’s claim provides an important starting point for those who associate gift giving with corruption. Others theorists, however, are less categorical. While recognizing obligation as a mark of the gift between close friends and relatives, Maurice Godelier suggests that there is an absence of “calculation.” Still others caution against viewing gift relations from a purely self-interested perspective. Pierre Bourdieu argues against ignoring genuinely generous exchanges and of applying the “logic of consciousness” based on profit calculations to every transaction between giver and taker. Indeed, Jacques Godbout notes a “remarkable frequency” of “non-reciprocal unilateral gifts” in Western society that includes blood and organs, charity, and gifts to children. Such examples lead contemporary theorists to question corruption models of the gift. John O’Neill warns that the obligation and reciprocity inherent in gift giving does not necessarily constitute anomy. O’Neill ascribes this latter notion to liberal ideology that he claims exaggerates the problems of excess. Gift exchanges, he says, “only appear excessive” from the standpoint of a society whose “contract basis limits trust, time and solidarity.” According to O’Neill, in the historical process of supplanting tradition-based gift economies, supporters justified the superiority of contract economies in terms of “the rule of reason over madness (excess)” and “the rise of individualism over tribalism and collectivism.”

Regardless of their starting position, all theorists agree that gift giving is an extremely complex process of exchange. The French social anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss describes it as a highly “skilful game” in which givers and receivers perform complex manoeuvres--both conscious and unconscious--in order to achieve
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Bourdieu observes that givers and receivers tend to employ dissimulation to deny the truth of their collaboration and their exchange. “Making the open secret [of the gift] explicit,” Bourdieu explains, “is taboo.” He identifies a host of objective social mechanisms embodied in each agent which make the very idea of divulging that secret sociologically unthinkable (saying for example: ‘let’s stop pretending that reciprocal exchanges are generous gifts, that’s hypocritical,’ and so forth).” Similarly, Bourdieu notes that practically all societies insert a time interval between the gift and the countergift, the function of which is to “create a screen . . . allowing two perfectly symmetrical acts to appear as unique and unrelated acts.”

This article applies these theoretical insights to an analysis of the gift culture in the Olympic movement and to an evaluation of the reforms proposed by the different inquiries. Focusing on the Sydney 2000 bid, it draws attention to the complex social-psychological and sociological aspects of gift exchange. With respect to the proposed reforms, the article cautions against embracing those based on mercantile contractual relationships that exclude gifts. Not only are they laden with pitfalls, they are grossly unrealistic: we have been “immersed from childhood in a universe where gift exchange is socially instituted in dispositions and beliefs.” In short, gifts are essential to nurturing and nourishing social relationships.

The Gift in Olympic Culture

According to its communiqués, the IOC awards the Olympics to that city which best conveys the humanist ideals of sport, and which demonstrates that it can mount a technically competent and financially successful games. Unfortunately, considerable evidence suggests that these are secondary criteria. As Griffen Bell, the former United States Attorney General who conducted an inquiry into Atlanta’s bid, told Congress, votes are “not necessarily cast on the merits.” The Inquiry Commission, appointed by the IOC to assess the suitability of cities bidding for the 2000 games, “ranked” Beijing fourth although it was the overwhelming favourite in a two-horse race with Sydney. The secret to winning an Olympic games, the veteran strategists of the failed Brisbane (1992) and Melbourne (1996) bids, John Coates (president of the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and Phil Coles (one of two IOC members in Australia), told the Sydney Olympic Bid Company (SOBC), is to recruit a lobby team of “hospitable and friendly” people who can “get on well with IOC members.” Rod McGeoch, chief executive officer of SOBC, quickly digested their advice. “I learned early on,” he recalls, that “it was not just making friends with members--if we wanted to win their vote, we would have to build really strong bonds with them.” Enter the gift: “if friends make gifts, gifts make friends.”

There was certainly nothing voluntary, disinterested, or spontaneous in the gifts SOBC officials gave to IOC members. On the contrary. “If you want to get their vote,” Coates admitted at the height of the Olympic scandal, “you have to ask them and you have to create some sense of obligation to you when they go into the room.” SOBC officials expended considerable energy choosing “creative” gifts, that is, gifts carefully chosen with the interests and personality of the IOC members in mind. “The trick.” McGeoch revealed, “was to find . . . something simple that they would really
like,” gifts that would “mean a lot” to the individual. In the case of Paul Wallwork, the IOC member in Western Samoa, simplicity and imagination meant regularly delivered rugby videos. Other bidding committees were less subtle. As part of his strategy to bring the winter games to Nagano, Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, president of the Japanese Olympic Committee, arranged a US$20 million “donation” to the Olympic museum in Lausanne, a pet project of Juan Antonio Samaranch, the president of the IOC. Equally blatant was the Beijing Olympic Bid Committee. It gifted the IOC museum a priceless national treasure, a 2200-year-old terracotta soldier from the Ch’in tomb. Irrespective of their precise approaches, serious bidding cities clearly conceived their gifts in terms of obligation, reciprocation, and self-interest.

Is the obligation inherent in the gift really tantamount to corruption? The Special Bid Oversight Commission suggested so. Appointed by Bill Hybl, president of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), to review the circumstances surrounding the selection of Salt Lake City as host of the 2002 Winter Games, it charged the Salt Lake City Olympic Bid Committee (SLCOBC) with “provid[ing] things of value to IOC members in an effort to buy their votes.” Even more damning was the Oversight Commission’s view that the “closed nature of the IOC” and “the absence of ethical and transparent financial controls in its operations” were directly responsible for the gifts of corruption. While admitting that “improper transaction[s]” always involve “a giver and a taker,” the Oversight Commission laid the blame firmly at the feet of the IOC which it said had “invented” a gift culture.

The IOC defended the practice. Gifts, it said, nurture intimacy and maintain “familial” ties. The initial Ad Hoc Commission, established by president Samaranch in December 1998 to investigate allegations of bribery by IOC members, reported “an international practice and custom of giving gifts within the Olympic movement” and that it had become “almost a matter of protocol.” “Whatever one may think of the custom,” the report continued, it does not involve impropriety: “It is simply a matter of courtesy . . . If gifts are received, IOC members are in a somewhat awkward position. It is difficult to refuse or return a gift without risking that the donor will be insulted. Nor is it polite, having received an unsolicited gift, to ask how much it may have cost.” The second IOC Ad Hoc Commission, appointed in February 1999 to examine subsequent allegations of corruption, referred to different cultural perspectives and dismissed what it called reflex reactions that associate gift giving with impropriety: “gifts viewed as improper in some parts of the world are looked upon with a totally different perception in many other areas.” As well as playing down the bribery allegations—at one point Samaranch said that they had been exaggerated—the IOC also attacked its critics. The IOC commissioners castigated the Board of Ethics of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SLOCOG) for creating “wrong public perception[s]” of excess. All fault, the commissioners concluded, lay with bidding cities that resisted IOC guidelines on the grounds that “they should be free to promote their candidacies in any manner they considered appropriate.” In short, “they resented the IOC’s attitude and intervention, which struck them as paternalistic.”

Of course, the IOC, as the guardian of Olympic morality, has a responsibility to define and enforce its standards of gift exchange irrespective of individual customs.
and norms. On the other hand, George Mitchell, the chairman of the Special Bid Oversight Commission, who charged the IOC with being “unnecessarily defensive” and “inaccurate” when it claimed that its members were “victims of predator bid cities,” ignored some compelling evidence. Cities did prey on IOC members. Sydney lord mayor Frank Sartor admitted that SOBC officials “prostituted” themselves “to try to get one more vote.” He even called the Hotel de Paris, Monaco, where IOC members stayed in 1993 on the eve of the vote for the 2000 games, the “Brothel de Paris.”

Strategy documents from several aspiring host cities revealed that bid committees specifically targeted IOC members from the third world, particularly Africa. During the 1990s serious candidate cities raised gift giving to new levels, in a process that the Special Bid Oversight Commission called “gift creep.” After losing the 1998 winter games to Nagano, Salt Lake City immediately launched a fresh bid for 2002. In its new campaign SLCOBC replaced general goodwill gifts with valuable personal gifts including health care, employment, education, shopping sprees, luxurious accommodation, lavish hospitality, and cash.

Nor can the IOC claim total innocence. It led bidding cities into a highly competitive process, replete with pomp and hauteur. Intense competition encouraged cities to ply IOC members with gifts. Not surprisingly some were seduced. David Sibandze, the IOC’s member in Swaziland, travelled between bidding cities “complaining” about his large mortgage; Jean-Claude Ganga, the IOC’s member in Congo, was known in some quarters as the “human vacuum cleaner.”

Others, while less mercenary, were equally opportunistic. Wlodzimierz Reczek, the IOC member in Poland, expressed his desire to support Sydney, but only under “certain conditions.” Financial assistance for Polish athletes sat at the top of his list.

Rejecting all charges and insinuations of connivance, the IOC pointed to rules introduced from 1991 onwards that it said were designed to curb excesses. Initially it imposed a US$200 limit on the value of gifts and then banned all gifts other than souvenirs. It limited to one the number of visits that a member could make to a candidate city and the duration to 3-5 days (based on distance travelled). Lastly, it prohibited lavish exhibitions, receptions, and entertaining. Bidding cities tell another story. McGeoch implies that the IOC made little effort to police the rules that bidding cities knowingly abused. “We felt,” he confessed, that Sydney “could live comfortably within the new rules—with a bit of give and take!”

Toronto, Manchester, Athens, and Melbourne—losing cities in the race for the 1996 games—submitted reports to the IOC highly critical of the gift culture. One participant at the meeting to present the reports to Samaranch, remembered the president’s nonchalance as he flicked through the pages of the cities’ submissions: “At the end he said, ‘thank you,’ and it was time for dinner.”

The IOC left the door ajar and bidding cities had no qualms about pushing it wide open. While Lamine Keita, the IOC member in Mali, spent only five days in Sydney, enroute he stayed two nights in Paris and one in Singapore; returning home he spent one night in Hong Kong, one in Bangkok and four in Paris. Similarly, after leaving Sydney, Dame Mary Glen-Haig, one of the IOC’s members in Britain, stayed three nights in Perth and three in Singapore. Although IOC rules prohibited candidate cities from visiting IOC members in their home countries, McGeoch gloated that “this
did not mean it was impossible for us to visit a member in their own country; if there was a valid reason to be in a country, one could hardly not see the local IOC members. And we could always find a valid reason.” But SOBC’s decision to send Phil Coles to Paris for four months to duchess and lobby fellow IOC members hardly constituted a “valid reason.” While SOBC argued that Coles’s position as an IOC member entitled him to visit his peers and colleagues at will, and thus legally circumvent bidding city guidelines, Tom Sheridan, appointed by the New South Wales minister responsible for the Olympics to investigate whether Sydney had breached IOC guidelines, rightly concluded that the Paris base “contravene[d] the spirit” of IOC rules.

Phillip Walter Coles, IOC Member to Australia

In one sense the IOC’s attempts to apportion blame to bidding cities constitutes a de facto acknowledgment of the bribery allegations (the expulsion of members confirms this point). Nonetheless, the accusations, counter-accusations, and slanging distracted from the complex, often paradoxical, social relationships engendered by gift exchanges. New York Times reporter Kirk Johnson captures this game well in his account of the relationship between Tom Welch, the head of SLCOBC whom Johnson describes as the “pre-eminent giver of gifts and cash,” and Jean-Claude Ganga, the now disgraced former IOC member in the Congo whom Johnson calls “the pre-eminent taker.” The relationship that bound the pair, Johnson reminds us, was “far more complex than the dry text of ledger sheets and investigative reports have suggested.” According to Johnson the two men “circled one another, sometimes like adversaries or haggler, sometimes like friends:”

In one letter to Mr Welch from his home in Brazzaville . . . Mr Ganga wrote of the war that was tearing his country apart . . . and [he] asked that Mr Welch try to pressure the United States government into a formal condemnation of the killings. [In] another exchange of letters . . . Mr Ganga complained that he couldn’t afford to fly to Montreal to attend a wedding, and then after a $4,700 check was sent, wrote back with effusive thanks: “as the saying
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Goes, a friend in need is a friend indeed." 38

Jean-Claude Ganga, IOC Member to the Republic of Congo

The Sydney 2000 bid further illuminates the complexities and ambiguities of gift exchange. More importantly, it demonstrates the importance of contextualizing gift giving and receiving. What distinguished Sydney from most other bidding cities were the dual roles played by Phil Coles who served as an IOC member and a key strategist for Sydney. Unable to separate these roles, he emerges as the embodiment of a corrupt gift culture.

Gifts at Work: Sydney, “Mr Olympics” and the “Bondi Battler”

SOBC called its lobbying program, modelled on Atlanta’s successful bid for the 1996 games, the “let’s be friends” campaign. Like family, another term widely bandied within SOBC, friendship connotes sincerity, goodness, loyalty, and honour. Both terms helped legitimize the gift culture: true friends and family assist, rather than buy off, each other. 39 John Coates arranged for Nomsa Sibandze, the daughter of David, to enrol in an Advanced Certificate in Home Economics at Meadowbank College, Sydney. The AOC paid Sibandze’s course fees; SOBC paid her immigration fees and treated her as a VIP upon her arrival in Sydney. She spent the first ten days in a hotel. 40 Explaining his gift, Coates said that he had known David for ten years and that they were both members of the Olympic family. 41

Coates’s actions support Mauss’s view that self-interest and calculation are integral components of gifts. Calculation saturated his relationship with Sibandze:

He is president of Swaziland’s National Olympic Committee as well as being the country’s IOC member. I am the father of six children and I hope that one day my contribution to the Olympic movement can be acknowledged by one of my kids studying overseas. Isn’t this what the Olympic family is all about? 42
The support for Sibandze clearly breached IOC rules: “candidate cities, as well as third parties acting for them . . . are forbidden to give IOC members--as well as their blood relations--direct benefits other than souvenirs.” Ironically, Coates had publicly applauded the introduction of this rule. 43

Coates was not alone. Calculation appears in every act of SOBC “friendship.” Even the birthday-cards McGeoch sent IOC members were calculations. He admits that he sent the cards on the instructions of Gabor Komyathy, one of two professional lobbyists employed by SOBC. Praising Komyathy’s attention to detail, McGeoch said that he was “very good with ideas about how to appeal to particular members . . . He would often remind me of their birthdays or the anniversary of their membership of the IOC and arrange small dinner parties with key people.” 44 Of course, the mere presence of professional lobbyists further weakens SOBC’s claims that it sought to foster genuine friendships. SOBC paid Komyathy A$180,000 and A$200,000 to the other lobbyist, the Egyptian-born, Toronto-based Mahmoud el-Farnawani—who promised to deliver six Arab votes. The two lobbyists travelled extensively and enjoyed the same red carpet treatment as the IOC members they accompanied on their trips to Sydney. 45

No doubt Dana and Nicholae Voinov, the daughter and son-in-law of Alexandru Siperco, the IOC member in Romania, felt special when their “friends” in SOBC arranged for them to migrate to Australia and when these same friends “created” a job for “Nick” in the New South Wales State Rail Authority. These gifts, too, were pure opportunism. SOBC officials urged government ministers and bureaucrats to make “a favourable decision on the couple,” which they said was “crucial” to obtaining the Romanian member’s vote for Sydney. They also noted that Siperco was “close to Lausanne” and able to “influence” other IOC members. 46

Gifts raise questions about motives and interests. While the Olympics, the archetypal hallmark event, 47 offers sufficient incentive to give gifts, John Coates sought more than the glory reflecting off the stage of the world’s premier sporting pageant. A Sydney games, the president of AOC recognized, presented a golden opportunity to financially secure Olympic sport in Australia against the funding whims of federal governments. “You don’t ever have political independence, true independence, unless you are financially secure,” Coates once warned, referring to government pressure exerted on Australian athletes to boycott the 1980 Moscow games. 48 To this end, “Mr Olympics,” the sobriquet investigative reporter Ali Crombie gave Coates, was prepared to do “whatever it takes.” 49 Among other things, this included establishing a special Sports Commission within the Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG)--of which Coates is senior vice-president--as a vehicle to control all policies pertaining to the organization of the Games. Under the terms of its contract with the IOC, the AOC would have received 90 per cent of the profits from the 2000 Games. Of course, there is no guarantee that Sydney will return a profit, a point Coates knew only too well. The Sports Commission thus sold the AOC’s profit rights to an extraordinarily naive New South Wales government for A$100 million, to be paid from the government’s share of television rights. At the time of writing SOCOG still needs some A$150 million to reach its budget of A$2.55 billion. Needless to say, the Sports Commission declines to assist. 50
On the eve of the ballot for the 2000 host, Coates once again demonstrated that he was prepared to do “whatever it takes.” Adding up all the promises he estimated that Sydney was still four votes shy of victory. Without consulting his colleagues in SOBC, Coates offered more gifts to Charles Mukora, the IOC member in Kenya and president of the Kenyan Olympic Association, and Francis Nyangweso, the IOC’s member in Uganda. Six months earlier, as president of the AOC, Coates signed cooperation agreements with eleven African countries. Under the terms of these agreements Australia offered training facilities and coaching assistance, regardless of the outcome of the 2000 bid, and additional assistance if Sydney won the 2000 Games. Now desperate, Coates offered Mukora and Nyangweso a further US$5,000 for seven years (1994-2000). While pre-games training facilities and coaching for foreign athletes, SOBC’s biggest gift, arguably benefited Olympic sport, responsibility for sport aid lies with the IOC through its Solidarity Fund.

Of course, one must also ask the same questions of Mukora and Nyangweso, and indeed Sibandze. What were their motives and interests? Did they acknowledge their obligations and repay the gifts? Secret ballots mean that one can only speculate. Mukora says that he viewed Australian assistance as an opportunity to improve the lot of impoverished Kenyan sport. It was his “duty,” he believed, “to get as much money as possible from rich countries.” Sibandze had a “bad reputation” for insincerity within the Olympic movement. Some officials suspected that he pledged his vote to both Beijing and Sydney and he seemed to confirm their suspicions when he suddenly departed voting proceedings after the second of four rounds. Yet, if he did vote once for each city in rounds one and two then technically he met his obligations and repaid the gifts? Nyangweso has remained silent. Perhaps the former major general who served in Idi Amin’s army thought it wise to keep a low profile. In 1973 he warned the people of Bugisu district that his troops would “destroy completely” any village sheltering “guerrillas.” He made the threat as part of a campaign of terror, organized by the Ugandan government, against its opponents. Interestingly, Nyangweso’s past did not perturb Coates who described him as “a very close friend,” adding that critics should separate the private, professional, and sporting lives of those in the Olympic movement.

Somewhat surprisingly, Coates’s actions largely escaped official and public censure. Instead, Phil Coles shouldered most of the blame for SOBC’s breaches. Coates was more articulate, and aggressive, but as the scandal intensified he also showed dexterity by dispensing with the euphemisms, so characteristic of gift cultures, and explaining his actions as astute politics:

We didn’t win [the bid] on the beauty of the city and the sporting facilities we had to offer and we were never going to because, while that is important to the developed national Olympic committees, while that is important to the forty national Olympic committees who will win medals at the games, it isn’t important to those who will have a couple of representatives in a couple of sports.

It was a clever and successful strategy. Prominent Australians rushed to his defence. Former Olympian John Konrads, for example, thought it was “a brilliant way of doing
business,” arguing that Australia is “privileged” and the bid provided “the resources to help underprivileged athletes.”

By contrast Phil Coles appeared lost and bewildered under the glare of public scrutiny. Unlike Coates, Coles had immersed himself totally into the world of the gift-dispensing largesse and hospitality to fellow IOC members and bathing in the lavish hospitality afforded by bidding cities (notably Salt Lake City and Atlanta)--and seemed incapable of extricating himself from its seductive character. As a giver, for example, Coles accompanied most IOC members who took “side trips” while visiting Australia to appraise Sydney’s credentials. Destinations included luxurious resorts on the Gold Coast and Lizard Island, and at Port Douglas and Cairns. But it was his behaviour as a receiver that brought his downfall.

Coles escaped the attention of the first IOC inquiry and only came to public prominence after SLOCOC’s Board of Ethics report mentioned that he had visited Salt Lake City four times in contravention of IOC rules that permitted just one visit. The report also criticized him for treating his visits “like vacations.” Coles dismissed the allegations as “spurious.” He insisted that he “only visited Salt Lake City once during its candidature” for the 2002 games and that those later trips combined “holidays” and meetings with Salt Lake officials to discuss the organization of their respective Games. “In respect of these post-bid visits,” he added, “I paid for all the airfares for myself and my family.” Colleagues initially supported his version. Sandy Hollway, chief executive officer of SOCOG, insisted that he’s “a good bloke ... basically a very honest bloke.” “Anyone who knows Phil Coles,” declared John Coates, knows “he’s hardly the gravy train type, he’s the battler from Bondi, I can tell you.”

Investigations continued, however, and produced equally adverse findings. The second IOC Ad Hoc Commission found that Coles visited Salt Lake City five times between 1990 and 1997 and that he accepted hospitality worth more than A$60,000. On two occasions he took his partner and her two children. They stayed at expensive hotels and enjoyed a recreational program that included a Super Bowl game in Miami, a National Basketball Association All-Star game, and skiing at an exclusive Utah resort. His Salt Lake City hosts paid for everything from ski pants and jeans to luxury accommodation, even tips to the housekeeper. Indeed, the “Battler from Bondi’s” own hand confirmed his presence aboard the gravy train: “We had an absolutely fabulous time and loved every minute of it,” Coles wrote in a thank you letter to one of his hosts, “Who could ask for more--warm and friendly people, wonderful hospitality, basketball, skiing, snowmobiling! It was just the greatest fun. One complaint, however, your food is too good and we ate too much.”

Even in the face of such damning evidence, Coles still refused to concede impropriety. Of course, in the world of the gift this is hardly surprising. Firstly, there is no immediate reason why a person who had hosted a member of his “family” (Niels Holst-Sorenson, the IOC’s member in Denmark) to the French Open tennis tournament, would consider it inappropriate to enjoy similar hospitality (at an All-Star basketball game, a Super Bowl, and a ski resort) from other “family” members. Secondly, as Bourdieu reminds us, givers and receivers--and Coles was both--tend to employ dissimulation to deny the truth of their collaboration and exchanges. Such is
the power of this self-deception that on one occasion Coles blamed the scandal on a
witch-hunt conducted by his enemies: on another, he said that he wanted “to sit down
in a reconciliation-type meeting” with his detractors.

The IOC Ad Hoc Commissions recommended the expulsion of six members and
that nine others, including Coles, receive warnings. The Commissions’ justifica-
tions explicate the IOC’s leniency. “Expulsion of a member,” the first report noted,
“does not necessarily imply that he or she is corrupt.” “Members whose expulsion is
proposed,” it continued, “are not accused of any crime or offence: they are men and
women who certainly have made mistakes, but should not be stigmatized.” How,
then, did the Commissions grade these “mistakes?” Not surprisingly, political, rather
than moral, considerations guided the commissioners. As one expellee, Paul Wall-
work, the IOC’s member from Western Samoa, put it, “we are dispensable and
expendable.” “We don’t make too much noise, not like somebody from your country
or Europe,” Wallwork told the Australian media. “Not like Phil Coles,” he “comes
from a major country with a city organizing the Olympic games for next year. How
can you possibly remove a person like that,” Wallwork asked? Coles, however, also
enjoyed the full confidence of many fellow IOC members. “Mr Coles is a man I
appreciate,” explained Jacques Rogge, the IOC’s member in Belgium; both had
served as chefs de mission in 1980 at the politically tense Moscow Games.

Wallwork certainly had legitimate grounds for complaint. The IOC expelled him
because his wife, Julia, from whom he was separated at the time, borrowed
US$30,000 from Tom Welch, head of SLCOBC. Julia repaid the loan and testified
that Paul knew nothing about the money. But the Ad Hoc Commission insisted that a
“loan granted ... to the wife--separated or not--of an IOC member is in itself an
improper act and creates at the very least the most serious appearance of conflict of
interest for a voting member.” The IOC expects, the report added, “that its members
abide by the highest ethical standards.” Yet, the IOC made no attempt to apply these
standards in any consistent manner. Coles’s behaviour was no less reprehensible than
Wallwork’s but the commissioners decided that the former had merely failed to
“exercise his best judgement.” Arguing that Coles took most of his trips after Salt
Lake City won the 2002 Games, the commissioners claimed that he could not possi-
bly have entered into a quid pro quo arrangement whereby he exchanged his vote for
reward. It was pure dissimulation.

But Coles had not escaped. Opponents in SOCOG still wanted him out: he had
shamed Sydney and his continued presence on the SOCOG board hindered its ability
to raise much needed sponsorship. However, SOCOG had no power to act unilater-
ally against Coles because he represented the IOC on SOCOG. The only way to
remove him from SOCOG was to force the IOC’s hand. Events had proved that Coles
was not totally immune to pressure. After learning that the IOC would issue an offici-

Al warning, he resigned from his position as director of international relations with
the AOC. “With hindsight,” he said, “I should have been more circumspect in my
actions. I’ve been careless.”

Coles’s opponents thus increased the pressure, alleging more wrongdoings. His
former wife, Georgina, informed the IOC that Phil had accepted jewellery worth
A$9,300 from a businessman associated with the 1996 Athens bid. “I never
received any ... expensive jewellery.” Coles baldly stated. Two days later the Sydney Morning Herald published a photograph of Georgina wearing the jewels in the company of her former husband.\textsuperscript{76} Worse followed. Precisely as the IOC Executive Board met to consider the jewellery allegations, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) announced that it had in its possession 400 pages of documents pertaining to Coles and the Sydney bid. Among the cache were notes hand written by Coles and his partner Patricia Rosenbrock describing the personal characteristics and foibles of IOC members including their honesty, affluence, wealth, shopping preferences, sincerity, trustworthiness, and racial prejudices. Many of the dossiers referred to Salt Lake City, the ABC’s source, which immediately led to speculation that Coles had sold confidential information for lavish hospitality. Coles denied selling the dossiers to Salt Lake, although he did refer to “a synergy--a sort of sister relationship--between Salt Lake City and Sydney.”\textsuperscript{77} The latter news dumbfounded McGeoch and the IOC’s other member in Australia, Kevan Gosper. “I simply don’t understand,” a confused Gosper said, “I’ve not been familiar with anything that suggests there was such a relationship.”\textsuperscript{78}

The dossiers dismayed several members of the IOC. “I find it regrettable,” said Pal Schmitt, the IOC’s member in Hungary, that Coles “would send personal information about other IOC members which seems to go beyond the expected diplomacy, including personal remarks which are not always favourable to us.” More forthright was Chiharu Igaya, the IOC’s member in Japan, who accused Coles of acting unethically and immorally.\textsuperscript{79} Yet, paradoxically, more members directed their anger at Michael Knight who released the documents to the public. He had already drawn the ire of some members, including Neils Holst-Sorenson and Dame Mary Haig. They accused him of playing politics by allowing Tom Sheridan to name them in his report without first giving them an opportunity to respond.\textsuperscript{80}

Citing lack of evidence, the IOC cleared Coles on the jewellery charges. But the dossiers divided the IOC Executive Board. Kevan Gosper demanded Coles’s resignation from SOCOG and favoured his expulsion from the IOC. Un Yong Kim, the IOC’s member in Korea (who also received an official warning), and Dick Pound, one of the IOC’s members in Canada and the chairman of the IOC’s Ad Hoc Commissions, refused to contemplate expulsion. “There is a comity of relationships” between bidding cities, Pound said, and they do trade information, including background files on IOC members. But it is largely “low grade psycho-babble that doesn’t amount to much.” Attempting to play down the significance of the dossiers, Pound asked, “what rule is alleged to have been breached?”\textsuperscript{81} Of course, this question merely conflates two different sets of social relationships, one based on formal legal criteria and the other based on tradition and custom.

After considerable delay the IOC’s Executive Board reached the compromise that two months earlier had been unacceptable: Coles could remain an IOC member on condition he resign from SOCOG. Within a matter of hours the executive board published its findings and decision: “Mr Coles ... has already been sanctioned” for his conduct with respect to Salt Lake City and the board has “taken note of ... [his] resignation from SOCOG.” The dossiers in themselves “d[o] not ... constitute a sanctionable offense. On the other hand, by not avoiding the disclosure of such notes, Mr Coles was guilty of serious negligence.” The board thus “maintain[s] the most severe
warning given to Mr Coles, add[s] a reprimand to this warning for serious neglect,”
and bans him from “member[ship] of any IOC commission or working group for ... 
two years.” <sup>82</sup>

It was, as the *Sydney Morning Herald* so aptly put it, a “grubby compromise” and 
one that “reeks of hypocrisy:”

Behaviour that disqualifies a person from sitting on IOC commissions and 
working groups for two years ... does not, apparently, disqualify that same 
person from IOC membership. There is no logic in this. If someone by his 
behaviour has disqualified himself from serving as an effective IOC mem-
ber, how can that person be considered eligible to remain an IOC member at 
all? The contradictions in the compromise and the hypocrisy that permeates 
it expose once again the absolute need for the IOC to conduct a 
root-and-branch reform of its structure and its rules of governance. <sup>83</sup>

Despite claims to the contrary, there will be no major surgery.

**Reforming the IOC?**

At its 108<sup>th</sup> session in March the IOC announced a number of reforms including 
the formation of an Ethics Commission and an IOC 2000 Commission. The former 
will formulate a set of ethical principles, including a Code of Ethics, for IOC mem-
bers and investigate subsequent complaints of breaches; the latter will examine and 
make recommendations on the selection process for host cities, and the structure of 
the IOC, how it chooses members and distributes its revenue. Members at the session 
also formally approved an earlier recommendation banning them from visiting bid-
ing cities and they agreed to confine their primary role to voting for one of two final-
ists chosen by a Selection College. (The College comprises the IOC president as the 
non-voting chairman, nine IOC members elected by the assembly, the chairman of the 
Evaluation Commission, a representative of the international federations, a represen-
tative of the national Olympic committees, and three athletes’ representatives. <sup>84</sup>)
Referring to the reforms, a gleeful president Samaranch declared a clean bill of health 
for the IOC: “This week the IOC has taken quick, decisive and unanimous action to 
put the activities of the past few months behind us. We promised to clean house. We 
did it. We promised reforms. We did it. We promised an Olympics united. It’s 
done.”<sup>85</sup>

Notwithstanding Samaranch’s confidence, symptoms of the crisis persisted in the 
form of the seemingly never ending Coles affair. They also appeared at the recent 
election of the host for the 2006 Winter Games. The 53 to 36 verdict in favour of 
Turin (Italy--a first time candidate) ahead of the fancied Sion (Switzerland--which 
received top marks from the IOC’s Evaluation Commission in its third bid). did not 
reflect an objective assessment of the Swiss city’s competence or its commitment to 
Olympism. The most plausible explanation for the result, that Swiss officials labelled 
“grotesque” and “ridiculous.” is that members wanted revenge on Marc Hodler, the 
IOC’s member in Switzerland, who they blamed for triggering the bribery scandal 
with his public allegations that Salt Lake City bought the 2002 games. “They wanted
to punish Switzerland,” Hodler mused, “and they have done it.”

The Turin decision also exposed deficiencies in the structure of the Selection College: hard lobbying enabled Turin to get six supporters on the selection panel, ensuring that it reached the final ahead of cities with better credentials.

Nor have the reforms addressed the IOC’s patriarchal kinship structure. Members still answer only to the IOC president who appoints them. Samaranch has personally selected nearly 80 per cent of current members who will hold their positions until retirement at age 72. He is accountable to no one and wields total power: he appoints members to the all-important working committees and has the authority to settle all procedural questions at IOC sessions. “There’s nothing in his style, his training, his history” to suggest that Samaranch supports structural change. On the contrary, argues New York Times reporter George Vecsey, he “tolerated a system of delegates beholden to him, who roamed the aspiring cities of the earth, going out with empty trunks, coming home with full trunks.”

If gifts are the bearers of a man’s biography, Samaranch has a long past. Vyv Simpson and Andrew Jennings report him perfecting the art of “making gifts” and “call[ing] in the favour” at a young age. They refer to his habit, begun in his early twenties, of hiring cortesanos—attractive young hostesses—in Barcelona nightclubs and making “gifts of them to his friends.” More recently, a former minister for health in Spain recounted feelings of bewilderment when Samaranch gave him a Longines watch after meeting IOC officials in Lausanne to discuss hospital facilities for the 1992 games: “He just came up to me and said, ‘Have a little souvenir.’”

The bribery scandals appear not to have diluted Samaranch’s penchant for recruiting potential allies, embracing opponents, and swelling his family. At the 108th session of the IOC he announced that the IOC 2000 Commission would comprise twenty-four members; the final number ballooned to 82 and includes assorted critics (Bill Hybl, Marc Hodler), debtors (João Havelange, Mario Vázquez Raña) and “personalities” (Henry Kissinger, Boutros Boutros-Ghali).

The proposed reforms did not stem criticisms. A few sponsors praised the IOC’s efforts, but most urged a harder line, as did former Olympic athletes and prominent members of the external inquiries. Speaking at the launch of Olympic Advocates Together Honourably (OATH), an initiative of the disillusioned Canadian gold medal swimmer Mark Tewksbury, Australian Olympic legend Dawn Fraser accused the IOC of “distanc[ing] itself from athletes. They can’t be touched, they are a body of their own, above the athletes and they forget about the athletes, the performers.”

They want to take an aspirin and call the doctor in the morning some time in the year 2000. Blaming Salt Lake City officials for entrapment of so-called hapless IOC members says many in Lausanne still don’t get it. In short, the IOC to date has not cleaned house, they have just begun to air out one small room.

Duberstein’s Special Bid Oversight Commission proposed a comprehensive
package of reforms including regular election of IOC members by national Olympic committees and prohibition of joint membership of the IOC and national Olympic committees or city bid committees. However, the Commission’s most radical proposal—subjection of the IOC to international law pertaining to public organizations—raises fresh questions about the very nature and ownership of the Olympics. The guardian of the games, the IOC, is registered as a private organization under Swiss law. Private status has enabled the IOC to avoid public scrutiny of its affairs and this, more than anything else, according to the Oversight Commission, contributed to an excessive gift culture. The Oversight Commission argued that the Olympic Games were a public good and that the IOC’s primary responsibility was fair and transparent management, especially with respect to choosing host cities and monitoring performance-enhancing drugs. Thus, in order to “truly level the playing field for all competing cities” and to “eliminate graft,” it recommended that the IOC be reconstituted as a public international organization. As such, IOC members would be designated public officials and would be subject to the anti-corruption laws of nation states. The framework for this process is the recently ratified Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Convention deems as criminal and extraditable offences, gifts, offers and promises—irrespective of whether they are accepted—made to officials of international public organizations with the intention of winning advantages in the conduct of international business. The Oversight Commission’s proposal is an obvious way to eliminate corruption, a point the IOC appears to accept. In September it wrote to the OECD requesting advice on how the Olympic movement might be governed by the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. If the OECD agrees, IOC members who solicit or accept bribes from bidding cities will face prosecution under anti-corruption legislation in the 34 countries that have signed the treaty.

Should the IOC completely redefine the relationship between itself and bidding cities as the Oversight Commission’s report implies—the Oversight Commission attributed the bribery scandals to exchanges of gifts in a “kinship” and “familial” network that breeds hypocrisy, dependence, and obligation. It then cleverly compared gift exchanges with mercantile exchanges that it said are based on rational and autonomous relationships. (Mercantile relationships allow us to trade and work with people whom we share no common values or interests.) Interestingly, Godbout calls mercantile exchanges “anti-graft devices” that “free” people by pulling them away from social bonds. But as the French social theorist makes clear, mercantile exchanges foster only secondary forms of sociality that emphasize people’s economic, political, and administrative functions. While the IOC’s credibility depends upon it eliminating the obligations inherent in gift cultures, this must not be at the expense of primary sociality—person-to-person relationships, comradeship, and friendship. Irrespective of the political realities, the ideological edifice of the Olympic movement, including the Olympic city bidding process, rests on primary sociality rather than cold secondary forms of sociality characterized by mercantile exchanges.

Although the Special Bid Oversight Commission made numerous references to social equality, fairness, and level playing fields, all of which supposedly characterize mercantile exchanges, suspicion exists that its proposals are part of an on-going coor-
ordinated campaign to re-establish American hegemony over the Olympic movement.\textsuperscript{100} Despite couching their testimony in moral parlance—Americans “deserve assurances that the IOC will conduct itself in a manner consistent with the same high ethical standards we would expect of athletes competing in the games, or judges judging the games”\textsuperscript{101}—most of those who gave evidence to the Senate Standing Committee on Commerce investigating the Olympic scandals referred to the need to protect American commercial interests. About 70 per cent of the IOC’s funding comes from the United States, nine of its eleven major sponsors are American, and American television provides the financial scaffolding that holds the Olympic movement together. But the USOC has little political control. A mercantile approach towards choosing host cities, introduced in the name of “eliminating graft,” would advantage American cities, with their greater purchasing power and closer links to key sponsors, in the race to host the Olympic games. The end result would be greater USOC political control over the Olympic movement.

**Conclusion: Beyond the Gift?**

Analysis of the Olympic scandals leads to the unhappy conclusion that cold calculation and self-interest fuelled a corrupt culture of gift giving in the Olympic movement in the 1990s. The result has been a loss of public faith in the IOC and the Olympic movement. The IOC’s immediate task, then, is to restore public confidence in its ability to lead international sport, and to oversee the world’s largest and most important sporting pageant, including selection of host cities. To this end, the proposals put forward by the Special Bid Oversight Commission—especially the one that would make members directly accountable to clearly defined constituencies—offer an excellent starting point for the IOC 2000 Commission. While plenty of ammunition remains for sceptics who distrust the IOC leadership and for cynics who doubt the integrity of sports officials and Games’ organizers, the IOC’s commitment to abide by the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials is a positive move towards eliminating the culture of corruption.

Implicit in the Special Oversight Commission’s recommendations, however, was a view that the IOC should eradicate the gift culture on the grounds that it is inherently corrupt. But as John O’Neill reminds us, this position derives from a very specific and limited ideological perspective. Contemporary theorists of the gift, including O’Neill and Pierre Bourdieu, Maurice Godelier and Jacques Godbout, stress that gift cultures do not intrinsically sink into corruption. Indeed, in his recent resurrection of the gift as a critical form of social exchange, Godbout argues that gifts nourish everything at the heart of social relationships—surrender, forgiveness, renunciation, love, respect, dignity, redemption, salvation, redress, and compassion.\textsuperscript{102} The Olympic Games add at least some weight to these theorists’ positions. Notwithstanding the profits pursued by host cities and the material benefits they seek from fast-tracked urban development and renewal, the very act of hosting constitutes what Mauss calls “noble expenditure.”\textsuperscript{103} Host cities provide the stage upon which visiting nations display their cultures and they offer hospitality—meals, shelter, entertainment, and knowledge—to competitors, administrators, support personnel, spectators, and scribes. Tens of thousands of residents volunteer their services. Without the contributions of
40,000 volunteers, the Sydney Games simply would not take place. While volunteers experience feelings of obligation toward the people they help and to whom they give hospitality, they also insist that pleasure is one of their prime motivations. Godbout calls volunteering the “quintessential disinterested gift.” 104 Although host cities sell events as commodities. Olympian-spectator relationships are not mercantile, or utilitarian, exchanges between sellers and buyers. By conjuring exalted states of being and producing drama and excitement—all of which confer upon them a special status—Olympians transmit gifts to spectators. Nor are spectators “clients.” Most are “amateurs” whose attendance amounts to participation. Just as Olympians throw themselves into their “performance,” so they expect spectators to reciprocate—applaud, cheer, generate excitement and atmosphere, show gratitude. 105 Perhaps there is a case to be made for analyzing the Olympic Games as a form of gift. The idea should certainly appeal to supporters of Olympic idealism—once the IOC removes the taint of corruption.

Endnotes


3. In November 1998 a still unidentified person sent a copy of a letter marked “draft” from the files of the Salt Lake City Committee that successfully bid to host the 2002 winter Olympics, to a local television station. The letter, from David Johnson, the vice-president of the Bid Committee, informed Sonia Essomba, the daughter of a (now deceased) IOC member Rene Essomba (Cameroon), that the next payment toward her college tuition would be the last. On the back of persistent rumours that Salt Lake had bought the 2002 games, the story generated much local media interest. On 8 December Frank Joklik, president of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee, said that the Bid Committee had given “above-board humanitarian aid” to relatives of IOC members from the third world. Over the next few days, Marc Hodler, an IOC member in Switzerland, rejected Joklik’s description of the financial assistance which he called “bribery.” On 10 December the president of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, appointed a special Ad Hoc Commission to investigate the allegations and eight days later the Board of Ethics of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee launched its own inquiry. The Ad Hoc Commission published its report in late January 1999, but in the face of fresh allegations of impropriety, bribery, and corruption made by the Board of Ethics. Samaranch instructed the Ad Hoc Commission to continue its investigations. It released a second report in March. “SLOC cash to students under fire,” Salt Lake Tribune, 9 December 1999; “IOC to investigate Olympic payments,” Salt Lake Tribune, 11 December 1999; “Olympic scandal details unfold,” Salt Lake Tribune, 15 December 1998: Report of the IOC Ad Hoc Commission to Investigate the Conduct of Certain IOC Members and to Consider Possible Changes in the Procedures for the Allocation of the Games of the Olym-

4. The Olympic movement comprises the IOC, international sporting federations, national Olympic committees, games organizing committees, and committees from cities bidding to host the games. Olympic protocol dictates that the IOC embraces members of the latter as part of the Olympic family although most will entertain only a brief affair with the movement.

5. The bribery allegations prompted “external” investigations by the United States Olympic Committee, the United States Department of Justice, the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the New South Wales state government. American investigators initially focused on Salt Lake City but in May they shifted their attention to Atlanta’s successful bid for the 1996 Games. In a report presented to Congress in June, Billy Payne, president of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG), admitted minor infractions of Olympic rules. Congressional investigators dismissed Payne’s report as unsatisfactory and demanded amendments based on a thorough examination of files that ACOG officials had classified personal and refused to release. In mid-September Griffen Bell, a former United States Attorney General and a prominent member of the law firm that represented ACOG, submitted a fresh, and more damning, report to Congress. “Denials, stonewalling--and, finally, the details,” Atlanta Journal Constitution, 17 September 1999; Griffen Bell, Report to Congress, 16 September 1999. In early February Michael Knight, the New South Wales state minister responsible for the organization of the Sydney games, appointed Tom Sheridan, a former auditor general of South Australia, to investigate allegations of corruption by the Sydney Bid Company. Led by Senator George Mitchell, the United States Olympic Committee’s investigation--the Special Bid Oversight Commission--directed the strongest criticisms at the IOC; the Bell and Sheridan reports were little more than apologies for the Atlanta and Sydney bids respectively.


12. Bourdieu, Practical Reason, p. 94, 95, and 97. See also, Godbout, The World of


22. The Ch’in tomb is the burial place of Shih Huang-ti, China’s first sovereign emperor. Explaining the donation, Chen Xitong, chairman of the Beijing Olympic Bid Committee, said “we look upon the IOC as God—their wish is our command.” “$100m bribe to Olympics,” *Sun Herald* (Sydney), 14 March 1993.


34. Toronto complained of IOC members who “expect to receive gifts above and beyond what anyone would judge to be courteous and gracious. Cash, jewellery or other items easily converted to cash were hinted at on several occasions. We were surprised to discover on more than one shopping trip that the bid city host was expected to pay for all the purchases made by not only the member but the guests as well.” Pamela Williams, “The rings of ire,” Financial Review, (Australia), 5 March 1999.

35. Sheridan, Independent Examination, appendix H.


37. Sheridan, Independent Examination, p. 36. The Paris residence gave SOBC intimate access to nearly 40 voting members. In a decision that caused ructions in SOBC, Coles took his partner, Patricia Rosenbrock, to Paris. McGeoch initially refused to employ her, but Coates recognized her language and social skills and paid her an annual salary of A$40,000 from AOC funds. During her stay Rosenbrock made detailed notes on IOC members. As we shall see, these later surfaced in the public realm and caused a furore within the IOC. “Coles’s partner landed AOC Paris posting,” Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 1999.

38. Johnson, “Tarnished gold.”

39. Tom Welch, for example, insisted that he “never offered anything to get anyone to vote for [Salt Lake City].” He merely “support[ed his] friends and their causes.” Sullivan, “How the Olympics were bought.” Similarly, Billy Payne. the president of ACOG, said that “they [IOC members] were our friends” and that “we were proud to give those gifts [that exceeded the IOC’s $200 limit].” “Denials, stonewalling--and, finally, the details,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 17 September 1999.


42. *Ibid*.

43. “Games rort slashing to save $1m for Sydney,” *Australian*, 28 August 1991; Sheridan, *Independent Examination*, p. 38. The Australian government regularly helped SOBC circumvent this rule. For example, when the Paris embassy proposed sending three sports videos to the IOC’s member in Monaco, Mark Pierce, the charge d’affaires in Paris advised that “if there are problems in sending them in the name of the [AOC], we could send them on as an embassy gift.” “Diplomats accused of link to games-vote gifts,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 May 1999; “Australia used envoys to aid effort for games,” *New York Times*, 5 May 1999; “A final blast at Phil’s perch.” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 May 1999; “Coles: The ticking bomb,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 May 1999.

44. McGeoch, *The Bid*, p. 86.


46. Sheridan, *Independent Examination*, pp. 38-9; Ryle and Hughes. “Breaking China.” SOBC also attempted to secure employment for Mathias Tallberg, son of the IOC’s member in Finland, Hatem Mzali, son of the IOC’s member in Tunisia, and Raouf Scally, a relative of the IOC’s member in Algeria.

47. Michael Hall states that, “Major fairs, expositions, cultural and sporting events of international status which are held on either a regular or one-off basis. A primary function of the hallmark event is to provide the host community with an opportunity to secure high prominence in the tourism market place.” “The Definition and Analysis of Hallmark Tourist Events,” *Geojournal*, 19:3 (1989), p. 263.


49. Neighbour, “Blood Sport.” Some also accused Coates of seeking self-enrichment. Chris Davidson, director of campaign strategy for the Melbourne bid recalls feeling outraged by the fees Coates charged for advice: “I was disappointed when someone so entrenched in the Olympic movement and supposed to be imbued with the Olympic spirit would even consider charging us for a very valid bid to get the Olympic games.” Ali Crombie, “Mr Olympics chases his own gold,” *Business Review Weekly*, 16 April 1999, p. 89. See also Crombie, “An unlikely foursome,” p. 42.

50. Crombie, “Mr Olympics,” p. 85, 86, and 87. Responding to critics of the government’s “gift,” Michael Knight, the state minister responsible for the 2000 games,
matter-of-factly said, “they didn’t have to negotiate with John Coates, who is one of the toughest negotiators in the country.” Crombie, “An unlikely foursome,” p. 43.

51. Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

52. Sheridan, *Independent Examination*, pp. 41-2; Ryle and Hughes “Breaking China.”


60. Sheridan, *Independent Examination*, appendix H.

61. The Board of Ethics of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the Olympic


64. *Second Ad Hoc Commission*, pp. 19-23. According to the report Coles made the following trips: 1) 12-20 February 1993--“informal visit as a guest of Tom Welch.” Although technically before Salt Lake officially announced its candidature in September 1993, members had known since 1991 that the city would bid; 2) 28 January - 4 February 1995--candidature visit. This included a side trip to the Super Bowl in Miami; 3) 21 December 1995 - 4 January 1996 (after the 2002 vote was taken in June 1995)--skiing holiday with partner and her two children; 4) 1-9 February 1997--skiing holiday with partner; and 5) 19-31 March 1998--skiing holiday with partner. It later emerged that Salt Lake City also paid the hotel bills for Coles’s daughter and son-in-law during a visit to the area early in 1995. “Coles’s family had hotel bills paid: report,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 March 1999. See also, “Coles: Gold medal freeloader,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 February 1997.


68. The IOC voted on the recommendations at its 108th session. Expelled: Agustin Arroyo (Ecuador: 72 for, 16 against, 2 abstentions). Zein El Abdin Ahmed Gadir (Sudan: 86, 4, 0), Jean-Claude Ganga (Congo: 88, 2, 0), Lamine Keita (Mali: 72, 16, 1), Sergio Fantini Santander (Chile: 76, 12, 0) and Paul Wallwork (Samoa: 67, 19, 2). Warned: Phillip Coles, Louis Guirandou- N’Diaye (Ivory Coast), Willi Kaltschmitt Lujan (Guatemala), Un Yong Kim (South Korea), Shagdarjav Magvan (Mongolia), Anani Matthia (Togo), Austin Sealy (Barbados), Vitaly Smirnov (Russia), Mohamed Zerguini (Algeria). “IOC expels six members at 108th session,” IOC press release, 17 March 1999. Four other members resigned after being named by the Ad Hoc Commissions: Bashir Attarabulsi (Libya), Pirjo Haggman (Finland), Charles Mukora (Kenya), and David Sibandze (Swaziland).


72. *Second Ad Hoc Commission*, p. 23 and pp. 50-1. On the other hand, Bell’s report suggests that Wallwork was an opportunist; he used his Olympic connections to get his son admitted to the University of Michigan. Bell, *Report to Congress*, exhibit 1.


84. The IOC 2000 Commission will formulate recommendations for ratification at a special session of the IOC in December. Members have already approved some recommendations made by the Ethics Commission. They can no longer accept gifts other than those of “nominal value” in accordance with prevailing local custom. Other gifts must be passed on to the member’s organization. “IOC approves new rules on gifts,” *New York Times*, 20 June 1999.


95. Mitchell, *Special Bid Oversight Commission*, pp. 47-53. The OECD Convention stemmed from growing demands for transparency and the rule of law in international commerce. It recognizes that investors are no longer willing to risk capital in markets that do not uphold the rule of law.

96. “IOC releases letter to the OECD,” IOC press release, 1 October 1999. While acknowledging that OECD treaties apply only to nation states, the IOC claimed that its universal role, reputation, and agreements with intergovernmental organizations suggest that it has an “international legal personality.”


