Cold War, Hot Ice:
International Ice Hockey, 1947-1980

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This article explores international hockey among the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia between 1947 and 1980. The nature of this hockey competition, shared U.S.-Canadian antipathy to the Soviets, and Czechoslovakian hostility to the Soviets after 1968 illuminated both the apparent strengths of Communist regimes and the latent strengths of Western democracies and provided important clues to the eventual outcome of the Cold War. In this context the article examines such events as the never-acknowledged plane crash that devastated the leading Soviet hockey club in 1950, the 1957 and 1962 world tournament boycotts brought on by the Hungarian invasion and the Berlin Wall, the bitterness of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian games after 1968, the 1972 “Summit Series” pitting Canadian professionals against the Soviet national team, other détente-era contests matching Soviet and North American teams, and popular American response to the 1980 Olympics at Lake Placid.

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PUBLICITY FOR DISNEY’S 2004 FILM MIRACLE identified the United States Olympic hockey team’s surprising gold medal at Lake Placid in 1980 as “the greatest moment in sports history.” This, of course, is a debatable claim. Even devotees of hockey might argue that a bigger moment occurred in September of 1972, when Paul Henderson scored the series-winning goal for Team Canada in the final minute of the final game of the historic “Summit Series” matching the Soviet national team against all-stars from the professional National Hockey League. Olympic hockey at Lake Placid, however, was important because it capped more than three decades in which international hockey illustrated the depth of Cold War rivalries, reflected the characteristics of the nation-states involved, highlighted Western concerns about the East bloc’s totalitarian systems, and advertised divisions within the Communist bloc. The Lake Placid tournament occurred at a time when the final outcome of the Cold War appeared very much in doubt: Communist bloc nations seemed to benefit from the same competitive advantages in international sporting contests against Western adversaries that they enjoyed as closed, totalitarian societies in Cold War geopolitical conflict with open, democratic societies. Much as Prussian military strategist Karl Maria von Clausewitz proclaimed war a continuation of politics by other means, for the United States, Canada, the USSR (Soviet Union), and Czechoslovakia, international ice hockey between 1947 and 1980 was the continuation of Cold War politics by other means.

For the Soviet Union, international ice hockey provided an opportunity to win recognition in an endeavor in which there was no established Russian tradition. Building a system of “collective hockey” from the ground up and creating a perennial world champion was a genuine accomplishment for Communism. Because Soviet hockey teams won important propaganda victories against Western adversaries, Soviet authorities saw their hockey players “at the leading edge of ideological struggle . . . in the role of ideological warriors.” That the Soviets, with international approval, used players properly characterized as professionals in amateur tournaments while the law-abiding Canadians could not use their best players triggered resentment in Canada. As a democracy with concern for human rights, Ottawa had its own reasons for unhappiness with Soviet Communism. In addition, Canada had long dominated world competition in hockey, the sport that provided one of the chief ways Canadians built a distinctive national identity. As early as 1949 Canadians recognized that sports “had grown into events of political importance,” with diplomat and future Prime Minister Lester Pearson noting that “[i]nternational sport is the means of attaining triumphs over another nation.” The Americans had been Canada’s primary challengers during its period of international dominance, but United States hockey fell into a decline after 1960 that made the 1980 gold medal more stunning. American decline in hockey during these years, especially in comparison to the Soviets, paralleled the United States’ apparent geopolitical decline in the same period. For Czechoslovakia, close alliance with the Soviets did not win popular approval, and hockey became an outlet for Czechoslovakian frustrations and a rare opportunity to achieve “victory” over their ally, especially after the Soviet invasion in August of 1968.

This article will identify and explain some of the main Cold War connections between politics and ice hockey, starting with developments in the early Cold War, proceeding through the contradictions and complexities of the détente period, examining the
controversy over the East bloc nations’ use of “shamateur” athletes, and culminating with a discussion of the Soviet gains and American decline both in hockey and international politics by 1980 that gave the Lake Placid victory such resonance for Americans, even those who ordinarily paid little attention to the sport.


Geopolitical issues interacted with international hockey almost from the outset of the Cold War. In 1947, Prague hosted the world championships and the host Czechoslovakian team won the tournament. At the time Czechoslovakia remained a democratic nation, albeit one with a strong Communist presence in the government and close ties to the Soviets. Czechoslovaks had learned a hard lesson at the 1938 Munich conference at which the British and French had tried to “appease” Hitler by disregarding their treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia and permitting the Germans to annex the Sudetenland. As historian Donald Kagan has observed, the British and French had “sought to achieve peace at the expense of a small and weak nation that had put its trust in the nations who threw it to very ferocious wolves to preserve, so they thought, their own safety.”7 Determined not to be thrown to the wolves again by unreliable Western democracies, post-war Czechoslovakian leaders sought close connections with Josef Stalin that would provide Soviet guarantees of Czechoslovakian security while assuring democratic government and Czechoslovakian control of internal affairs. President Eduard Beneš sought to realize in Czechoslovakia the vision that American President Franklin Roosevelt had for all Eastern European nations: a freely elected government friendly to the Soviet Union that assuaged Stalin’s security concerns. Before February of 1948, Stalin tolerated Czechoslovakian democracy and governments with non-Communists in crucial positions.

That changed following the U.S. offer of Marshall Plan assistance to all of Europe. Stalin saw American dollars as bait to lure Eastern European nations into closer economic ties with the West that would lead to closer political ties and erode Soviet influence in an area he believed vital to his security.8 In Czechoslovakia, a complex series of events culminated in a February 1948 Communist coup and the subsequent death by defenestration of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Because he was also the son of Czechoslovakia’s first president, many in the West looked upon Masaryk’s death as a vivid symbol of both the end of Czechoslovakia’s democratic promise and the brutality with which the Soviets would control Communist nations in Eastern Europe.9

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia occurred on the eve of the 1948 winter games in St. Moritz, where American hockey demonstrated the messiness that can be part of open, democratic societies: two American hockey teams arrived in St. Moritz, both claiming to be the U.S. Olympic team.10 One was organized by the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) and recognized by the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC); the other was organized and recognized by the United States Amateur Hockey Association (AHA). The two teams grew out of a dispute between the AHA and Avery Brundage. The latter was an American and long-time International Olympic Committee (IOC) official who served as IOC president from 1952 until 1972; he was a devotee of pure amateurism who aroused controversy in the Olympic movement because of what critics called his dictatorial methods.11 He believed the AHA was insufficiently rigorous in its application of amateurism so
he encouraged the AAU to send a team and backed it in the dispute. Meanwhile, the AHA had the respect and backing of the governing body of world hockey, then known as the Ligue International de Hockey sur Glace (LIHG). Complicating matters, the IOC sided with the USOC and the AAU team; the St. Moritz organizers sympathized with the LIHG and the AHA.12

After considerable contention, the AHA team played in the games, but the IOC announced that it would not recognize the hockey tournament as an official Olympic competition.13 Eventually, the IOC reversed its position and decided to recognize the hockey tournament as part of the Olympics, although it still refused to recognize the AHA team as an official participant.14 Some measure of IOC honor was salvaged when the Americans dropped their final game, to Czechoslovakia, which knocked them down to fourth place and prevented a battle between the IOC and Swiss organizers over whether the Americans could receive medals. Bitterness over the episode, however, appeared to linger: years later, official USOC materials listing all American competitors and results from past Olympiads included from the 1948 winter games only the AAU hockey team, along with a note that the team “did not compete” because of a “[d]ispute over team eligibility.” The official USOC record did not include any reference to the hockey team that actually represented the United States in 1948, nor did it mention that the dispute was driven entirely by the Americans themselves.15

That AHA team that played in St. Moritz also saw the early stages of the Czechoslovakia coup. Their pre-Olympic tour included games in several Czechoslovakian cities. During the tour, the players traveled around the country in Masaryk’s private railroad car, and the foreign minister spoke with his American guests individually. One morning the American and Canadian teams were summoned to their hotel lobby and were whisked out of the country by the Royal Canadian Air Force as the crisis deepened.16

While that 1948 U.S. team saw international political events first hand, direct parallels between politics and sport were clear in a couple of events in the Soviet bloc in 1950. The Soviet Air Force club directed by Vassily Stalin, son of dictator Josef Stalin, was one of the elite Russian teams before a 1950 airplane crash killed most of its players. Rather than publicize the disaster and honor the deceased pioneers of Soviet hockey, however, Kremlin officials merely assembled a replacement team built around survivor Vsevolod Bobrov, the legendary Soviet soccer and hockey player who had overslept and missed the ill-fated flight.17 When the Soviet Air Force club was next scheduled to play, this replacement team took the ice and was announced as the Soviet Air Force club. Unwilling to publicize anything that could “make the forces of world imperialism rejoice,” the Soviet government never officially acknowledged this event.18 In sport as in so many other aspects of society, the truth did not always bear a close connection to the pronouncements of the Kremlin.19

Hockey also demonstrated the nature of Communist regimes in 1950 in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks had won the 1949 world hockey championships but were denied the opportunity to defend their title in London in 1950 because the Prague regime feared that players would defect, although the official explanation was that the British government had refused to grant visas to members of the Czechoslovakian media.20 Not only was the team prevented from competing in the world tournament, but seven members of the team were later tried on criminal charges of planning to flee the country.21
Prague’s fears that its top athletes might defect were not a mere figment of the regime’s collective imagination: shortly after the hockey team was kept home from the world tournament, Aja Vrzanova, the Czechoslovakian female world figure skating champion, defected to the West following the world championships in London.22

Geopolitics again intruded on international hockey following the Soviet Union’s triumphant debut in Olympic hockey at Cortina in 1956. The Soviet defending champions hosted the 1957 world championships in Moscow. 23  Months before the championships were to open, however, the Soviets invaded Hungary and later executed Hungarian leader Imre Nagy in response to his proclaimed intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and pursue a neutralist foreign policy.24  In November of 1956 Canada announced that it would not send a team to Moscow for the world championships.25  Switzerland and other Western democracies joined in the boycott.26  Although neutral like the Swiss, Sweden participated in the tournament and emerged victorious against the depleted field. The United States actually had a national team touring Europe in hopes that the international federation would move the tournament to Sweden; it was finally announced on the eve of the tournament that the Americans would join the boycott.27  While they missed the world tournament in 1957, American hockey players finally got to visit the Soviet Union in 1959. As a reminder of recent Soviet achievements in science and space, the Americans were served a luncheon at tables where the centerpieces were models of the man-made satellite Sputnik that the Soviets had successfully launched in 1957 while the U.S. space program was foundering.28

Hockey played a slightly different role in furnishing a rare example of superpower détente at the 1960 winter Olympics. In a period of U.S.-Soviet relations marked chiefly by conflict and rivalry, the Squaw Valley Olympics saw hockey players from the two countries socialize “like frat brothers” and build friendships that would endure for decades.29  One U.S. player said of the Soviets, “They’re real friends. They don’t talk about Communism. Like us, they talk about hockey—and girls.”30  On the final morning of the games, Soviet captain Nikolai Sologubov visited the U.S. locker room before the third and final period of the U.S. game against Czechoslovakia to encourage his American friends (and suggest that they use oxygen, which was not against Olympic rules). After the Americans rallied to win, much was made in the United States of “Solly” and his sportsmanship, although most Americans missed out on the real motivation for Solly’s suggestion: because the European hockey championship was determined by European nations’ order of finish in the final Olympic standings, the victory by the United States over Czechoslovakia that morning clinched the European crown for the Soviets.31

International politics again intervened in the hockey world championships in 1962 when the United States hosted the tournament in Colorado. Because Western nations did not recognize the government of East Germany, any East German traveling to the West needed authorizing documents from the Allied Travel Office run by the Americans, British, and French in West Berlin. As retaliation for the Communists’ construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the Allied Travel Office stopped issuing the necessary documents in all but a very limited number of cases. The East German hockey team that was scheduled to participate in the world championships was not one of those cases. Without the necessary documents from the Allied Travel Office, the East German team could not even apply
for visas from the U.S. State Department. Thus, they were unable to come to the United States to compete in the tournament.32

This ban on travel met with international criticism. The IOC called the exclusion of East Germans from the world hockey championships (as well as from a contemporaneous world skiing event in France) “inexcusable violations of Olympic principles.”33 In sympathy with their Communist brethren, the Soviet and Czechoslovakian teams boycotted the tournament.34 The Soviets petitioned the world hockey federation (by then known as the International Ice Hockey Federation, or IIHF) to decertify the tournament so the winner would not be recognized as the world champion.35 The Czechoslovaks asked the IIHF to move the competition to a country to which all participants could travel and offered to host the tournament themselves with Prague as a host city. 36 The IIHF declined both entreaties, and the tournament went ahead in Colorado; neutral Sweden again emerged as the world champion from a depleted field. The governments in Prague and Moscow were in agreement about this boycott of the 1962 world championships, but their relationship would not always be marked by such amity.

Relations were not always harmonious among NATO allies, either, but the Western democracies were able to manage their differences more respectfully than their Communist rivals. When the French announced their intention to withdraw from NATO’s unified command, the Americans and other allies negotiated to remain on workable terms with France and integrate its military efforts into the defense of Western Europe.37 This contrasted sharply with the Soviet treatment of Hungary in 1956. The Soviets faced even bigger challenges in Czechoslovakia in 1968, where the liberalization of “Prague Spring” occurred under a government wishing to liberalize while remaining both Communist and within the Warsaw Pact. This attempt at “socialism with a human face” threatened an openness the Soviet leadership feared would spread to other Eastern European nations and might lead ultimately to the end of Communist control there. As was the case in Hungary in 1956, Moscow again sent tanks and troops into an allied nation.38

Following the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia, political relations between Moscow and Prague improved, but the Czechoslovakian people felt hostility for their Soviet allies that manifested itself in international hockey competitions. At the 1969 world hockey tournament the Czechoslovakian team defeated the Soviet Union twice.39 The first victory triggered celebrations in Prague; the second brought celebrations that turned into riots. Soviet barracks were attacked, and the Prague office of Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline, was ransacked. Some among the demonstrators chanted, “Long live Mao!” a display of veneration for China’s Communist leader unlikely to endear them to Soviet occupiers at a time of escalating Sino-Soviet tension.40 Angered by this outpouring of anti-Soviet feeling, the Soviet military cracked down even more tightly in its effort to control the Czechoslovaks.41 This only heightened Czechoslovakian hostility toward the Soviets.

Long-time NHL veteran Mark Howe, a member of the 1972 U.S. Olympic team, watched the Soviet-Czechoslovakia battle at Sapporo and said years later, “To this day, I’ve never seen a hockey game more brutal than that. The Czech goalie must have broken five sticks over Russian players.” Late in the game, with the Czechoslovaks facing an insurmountable 5-2 deficit, one of the Czechoslovakian defensemen took possession of the puck in the Soviet zone. Instead of trying to score, he fired it at the Soviet players’ bench in a gesture of frustration and malevolence.42
This hostility to the Soviets among the people of Czechoslovakia was not unique in the Communist bloc. Hockey even illustrated this in the case of Romanian national team member Ion Tiriac: better known as a professional tennis player and manager, Tiriac had also been a member of the Romanian national hockey team since he was fifteen. Tiriac claimed that during one game he injured a Soviet opponent with a body check so vicious that other Soviet players went after Tiriac until he broke his stick over his knee, wielded the broken ends like spears, and effectively challenged all of his Soviet antagonists to a fight. Anecdotes like these were not just entertaining stories of angry athletes from underdog hockey teams: they revealed a deeper and more widespread discontent with their nations’ ties to Moscow that had to concern Kremlin military planners. The Western democracies could be confident that their people supported their membership in NATO and connections to the United States, but in the event of a crisis the Soviets would have to worry about insolence if not outright sabotage among the people of their allies.

Hockey and the Complexities of Détente (1969-1979)

Not long after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia introduced new hostility to that allied relationship, the superpowers inaugurated a period in which they attempted to improve relations and manage their rivalry peacefully. The United States and the Soviet Union sought a relaxation of tensions known as détente. That it was a French word with no precise translation into English or Russian captured the ambiguities of the period. Diplomatic accomplishments included a joint Apollo-Soyuz space mission, U.S.-Soviet trade agreements, limits on strategic arms and missile defense systems, a statement of “Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” and the Helsinki Accords that legally recognized the post-World War II boundaries of Europe and committed signatories to protect human rights. In the cultural realm, détente brought previously unthinkable exchanges, which carried over into sport. An extended visit to Moscow by Murray Williamson, coach of the 1968 and 1972 U.S. Olympic hockey teams, helped lead to dramatic improvement by the U.S. team as well as considerable goodwill. Contact between officially amateur Soviet teams and North American professionals also became common. Hockey’s finest détente moment may have come on December 31, 1975, the night of arguably the single greatest game in hockey history: a 3-3 tie in the legendary Montreal Forum between the perennially powerful Montreal Canadiens, who that spring would win the first of four consecutive Stanley Cup championships, and the top team in the Soviet elite league, Moscow’s Central Army Club.

Despite these contributions, détente brought mixed blessings. Its defenders argued that it promised a future of more cooperative relations between the United States and the Soviets, or at least reduced the risk of apocalyptic confrontation. Critics countered that détente involved American concessions in the interests of peace that were not matched by reciprocal Soviet restraint. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev suggested as much when he told the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976, “Détente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it abolish or alter, the laws of class struggle. . . . We make no secret of the fact that we see détente as the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction.” During the period of détente, the combination of ideological
imperatives and Cuban efforts brought Soviet support for Communist revolutionaries, especially in Africa, that appeared to undercut Moscow's promises of restraint.\(^5\)

Détente hockey also illuminated a potential risk to smaller nations: that the superpowers, in easing tensions between themselves, might cooperate in ways that hurt their respective allies. On the final afternoon of Olympic hockey at the Sapporo games in 1972, the American players watched the showdown between the Soviets and Czechoslovakia in which the Czechoslovaks had a chance to claim the gold medal. Rather than rooting for the underdog Czechoslovaks in their battle against America's chief Cold War rival, though, the Americans cheered for the Soviet Union: not only had their coach's extended visit to the Soviet Union contributed to a certain camaraderie among the Americans and Soviets, but a Soviet victory over Czechoslovakia would give the United States the silver medal.\(^51\) In this way, Sapporo was the mirror image of Squaw Valley in 1960, where on the final morning the Soviets were hoping for an American victory over Czechoslovakia.

Hockey became a major avenue of détente largely at Canadian initiative. Because the Soviets and the Canadians both excelled at the game, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau believed hockey was a logical avenue to closer Soviet-Canadian ties. The diplomatic possibilities were a driving factor behind the eight-game “Summit Series” in 1972 that pitted the Soviet national team against a squad of Canadian NHL all-stars.\(^52\) Of course, there were complications: Canadians (aside from French Canadians) often played a physical brand of hockey that pushed the limits of the rules and offended Europeans; this, of course, could undermine diplomacy. Ottawa already had seen examples of backlash against their style of hockey at the 1960 winter Olympics in Squaw Valley. The Canadian ambassador to Stockholm reported the “ignominious and abrupt end” brought to “the placid surface of Swedish-Canadian relations”\(^53\) by the Canada-Sweden hockey game at Squaw Valley, which the New York Times called “a rough game marked by a fist fight” in which two Swedish players were injured.\(^54\)

Increasing the likelihood of undiplomatic behavior in Soviet-Canadian hockey were the stakes for the Canadian professionals: they were under intense pressure to uphold both national honor and professional credibility. Ice hockey is the Canadian national game, with an importance to that nation that is difficult to explain to non-Canadian audiences. Without a commonly shared national culture, or even a common language, ice hockey was one of the few things that could unite both French Canadians and Anglophones. Canadian players in the “Summit Series” were quoted as saying the series was “bloody war” and that it pitted “our way of life against the communist way of life.”\(^55\) The “bloody war” aspect of the series was perhaps most apparent when Canada’s Bobby Clarke slashed Soviet star Valerii Kharlamov across the ankles, injuring him and reducing his effectiveness in the final three games of the Series.\(^56\) (It came out decades later that Clarke had been instructed by an assistant coach to neutralize Kharlamov in this way.)\(^57\) These hockey games, then, were effectively a good will tour in which hosts and guests beat each other with clubs. After the Soviets posted three wins and a tie in the first five games, the Canadians rallied to win the final three games and the series, 4-3-1. Paul Henderson scored the game-winning, series-clinching goal with only thirty-four seconds remaining in the final game. Arguably, there was something for everyone in this outcome: Canadians could boast that they had restored their national honor by winning the series, while the Soviets could
claim the razor-thin margin showed they were the equals of the Canadian professionals. Meanwhile, critics of violence in Canadian culture could claim the Canadians were “obviously outclassed in terms of skill and sportsmanship” in the early games and only improved their fortunes through “bullying and intimidation tactics” that involved “hacking and clubbing the Soviet players like seal pups.”

Further limits on the détente-era good will tours were on display in Philadelphia’s Spectrum on January 11, 1976. If the memorable tie between the Central Army Club and Montreal on December 31, 1975, showed the promise of hockey as a form of détente cultural exchange, the Central Army club’s subsequent game with the defending two-time Stanley Cup champions, the Philadelphia Flyers, advertised the darker side of détente hockey. As part of that tour the Central Army Club had also whipped the New York Rangers (where they were taunted by one spectator who yelled, “Wait ‘til you get to Philadelphia”) and beaten the Boston Bruins. In Philadelphia, they met a Flyers team known as the “Broad Street Bullies,” a squad of purportedly limited talent known for intimidating and subduing opponents with physical play and fisticuffs. There was a clear contrast between the brawling of the Bullies and the smooth precision of the Central Army.

The clash of styles took place as promised, with the Flyers thumping the Central Army, 4-1. The victory was the result of Flyers coach Fred Shero’s tactical brilliance. Shero, praised after the game by his Soviet counterpart as a “very progressive coach,” was the son of Russian émigrés who grew up in Winnipeg and read Russian novels “to learn about the country my people came from.” Armed with his knowledge of Russian culture and his study of international hockey, Shero came up with a strategy: he recognized that the Soviet approach was to use their passing and maneuvers outside of the offensive zone to get opponents out of position, and then pounce; his Flyers refused to fall into that trap, instead waiting for the Soviets to go on the offensive whereupon they physically punished the visitors. Philadelphia so dominated play that they not only won the game, 4-1, but outshot the visiting Soviets by an especially lopsided 49-13 margin. Their accomplishment, however, was obscured by complaints that the Flyers played what the Soviets called “animal hockey.” A little more than eleven minutes into the game, when the Flyers already were outshooting their visitors, 12-2, the game was interrupted when Soviet coach Konstantin Loktev called in his goaltender to protest that no penalty had been called on Philadelphia’s Ed Van Impe for knocking Soviet star Kharlamov to the ice. This led the referee to call a delay of game penalty against the Soviets, which in turn led the Soviets to leave the ice in protest and threaten to quit the game.

Soviet susceptibility to capitalist inducements was on display during subsequent negotiations to resume the game: the Soviets were threatened with the loss of the money they were to be paid for completing the tour if the Central Army club refused to finish the game with the Flyers. After the Central Army returned to the ice and the Flyers completed their whipping, criticism rose against the Flyers’ performance. Washington Post writer Robert Fachet, in a column tagged “Détente Takes a Beating from Broad Street Bullies,” protested that “[w]hat should have been one of the greatest hockey games ever had instead become merely another shabby incident in the tarnished history of international sport.” Legendary New York Times sportswriter Dave Anderson penned a column entitled “A Hockey Lesson for Dr. Kissinger” in which he claimed, “The triumph of terror over style could not
have been more one-sided if Al Capone’s mob had ambushed the Bolshoi Ballet dancers.”67 In contrast, noted sportswriter Roger Kahn praised Shero’s coaching and wrote that he and Anderson “simply did not see the same hockey game.”68

While some Americans cheered and others were appalled, Soviet spokesmen naturally were outraged by the Flyers’ overt violence. A Soviet children’s magazine featured a cartoon depicting the Flyers as giant monsters in hockey uniforms wielding large clubs instead of hockey sticks.69 For their part, the NHL players denounced the more carefully concealed illegalities of the Soviet players; the Flyers’ Bob Kelly said of the Soviets, “All they do is spear you, hook you, kick you.”70 The Los Angeles Times ran a picture of Flyers’ star Bobby Clarke with blood streaming down the side of his face from a wound inflicted by a Soviet skaters’ stick.71 In fact, the whole episode served as a demonstration of the confusion surrounding détente: many Americans were outraged by the treatment accorded visiting Soviet Army personnel by a group of Canadians working out of Philadelphia. Meanwhile, the violence of that Philadelphia contest, and the earlier Central Army clash with Boston, limited the goodwill component of the tour.

**Soviet “Shamateurs” and the Common Western Response**

Canadian and American players agreed on more than simple hostility to Communism. Both also criticized the Communist bloc’s use of “shamateur” athletes: players who received state subsidies for full-time training, often while officially serving as military officers, yet retained their amateur status because they were not technically being paid for playing their sport.72 Legendary Soviet hockey star Boris Mikhailov later said, “I went from a private to lieutenant colonel but didn’t do any Army stuff.”73 To strengthen its hockey program the Moscow regime could use a range of inducements, including coercion, to ensure that the best players were being developed from young ages and were fully motivated. In the economically inept Soviet system the state lavished what material trappings it obtained on the athletes who won Soviet propaganda victories in Olympic and world championship competition.74 Moreover, domestic league schedules were structured around world and Olympic tournaments and opportunities to play North American professionals.75 Interaction between its military and its sports program involved two of the strongest components of Soviet society working together to create a Potemkin village on an international scale. The propaganda benefits to the Communist bloc for these efforts were substantial. Soviet hockey stars became well known in the West: for example, in 1972 the Minnesota North Stars offered to pay Soviet authorities $1 million for star forward Kharlamov,76 and in the 1980s the Montreal Canadiens reportedly sought to acquire legendary goaltender Vladislav Tretiak.77 Olympic athletes in other sports also showed Communism in a very favorable light and won admiration in the West, notably Soviet gymnast Olga Korbut, Romanian gymnast Nadia Comenci, and East German figure skater Katarina Witt.

Western complaints about East bloc “shamateurs” actually predated the Soviets’ application to join the Olympic movement in 1951. When the IOC began receiving indications in the late 1940s that the Soviets and their satellites might ask to join, IOC President Sigfrid Edström and Vice President Avery Brundage wrestled with how to handle the question. When Brundage became IOC president in 1952, it remained a problem. De-
spite the IOC’s concern over “state amateurs,” its leaders were reluctant to exclude a major bloc of nations; it opposed “political discrimination” and did not want to take sides in the Cold War. Accordingly, the Soviets were permitted to join the IOC and began competing with great success at the 1952 summer Olympics and the 1956 winter games.

Brundage’s response to complaints about Eastern bloc athletes varied over the years. Before the Soviets even joined the Olympic movement he cautioned that Soviet bloc athletes “certainly are not amateurs.” At other times he compared full state support with athletic scholarships at American universities or groused about the corporate sponsorship of Western amateurs. He sometimes encouraged Americans to pay more attention to amateur athletics rather than focusing so much on professionals. In 1972 Brundage conceded, “Even though [Soviet hockey players] are unpaid, they are professionals. It is wrong, and we are trying to change our rules to meet the situation.”

Brundage made this admission during the Sapporo games, to which the Canadians refused to send a hockey team to protest the unfairness of international hockey. After the 1969 world championships, at which Canada’s amateur entry finished fourth, Canadian officials wanted the IIHF to revise its rules and conduct an “open” world championship to which countries could send their best players regardless of whether they were classified as amateur or professional. Realizing Canada’s importance to the IIHF, members reached agreement in 1969 on a formula that would permit the Canadians to include some minor league players on its team. Later in the year, however, the Soviets wanted the issue revisited because of concerns that competing against professional teams might get them disqualified from the 1972 Olympics. This was an understandable fear, since Brundage reportedly had been threatening such consequences for competing against professionals. With the issue reopened, the IIHF at its 1970 meeting reversed the earlier agreement and renewed the ban on all professionals. In response, Canada withdrew from the IIHF, forfeiting its scheduled hosting of the 1970 world championships in Winnipeg and skipping Olympic hockey in 1972 and again in 1976. Only in 1980 would Canada submit another entry in Olympic hockey. The Canadian team at Lake Placid put up a strong showing against the Soviets before losing 6-4. But Canada missed the medal round and finished an unsatisfying sixth after decisively losing a consolation playoff to Czechoslovakia.

In ice hockey, as in the Cold War, Americans and Canadians found considerable common ground in their dealings with the Soviets. Canada and the United States did not have a perfect confluence of interests and at various points in the post-1945 period there was considerable tension in their relations. Despite this, the Canadians championed democracy and human rights and saw the Soviets as a threat to both. Accordingly, Canada, like the United States, was a member of NATO and permanently stationed military forces in West Germany to help defend Western Europe. Complications in Canadian-American relations, such as those in the Kennedy-Diefenbaker years and the Nixon-Trudeau period, paled in comparison to tensions between the two dominant powers in international ice hockey in these years, the Soviet Union and their fraternal socialist comrades from Czechoslovakia.

American Decline—On Ice And Off (1960-1980)

The American hockey triumph at the Lake Placid Olympics resonated even in parts of the country where people knew nothing about hockey. It had this impact because so
many things were going so badly for the United States. From its position of international pre-eminence at the end of World War II, the United States by 1980 appeared to be in steep decline, economically, politically, militarily and diplomatically, as well as in international ice hockey.

Although time and the intervening collapse of the Soviet Union have obscured this, in 1980 the United States looked to many observers like the weaker of the two superpowers; in 1981 Mexican President José Lopez Portillo told a U.S. diplomat that the United States could not defeat the Soviets in the Cold War.85 Americans were reeling from defeat in Vietnam, which was part of a trend in which eleven new Communist regimes took power around the world from 1975 through 1979.86 While American friends were falling, the Soviets’ Cuban allies were aggressively sending tens of thousands of troops to bolster fledgling Communist regimes in Africa. Events in Angola illustrated the contrast between Soviet assertiveness and American paralysis. With three factions vying for power in the former Portuguese colony, Congress prohibited any United States involvement there. The Cubans, meanwhile, supplied sixty thousand troops to aid a pro-Soviet group and received logistical support from the Soviets. Those looking at Angola might have reached the same conclusion as an African diplomat who surveyed a similar situation in the Horn of Africa and told an American journalist, “We have learned that there is only one superpower.”87 (In the wake of the confrontation between the Philadelphia Flyers and the Central Army club, a Chicago Tribune political cartoon showed a hockey game in which Flyers’ players were beating up Soviet players while one spectator said to another, “If we sent the Flyers to Angola, we’d have that mess over with in a week.”)88

The United States suffered greater public humiliation over the hostage crisis begun when Iranian militants seized American embassy personnel in November of 1979. The Iranians still held these hostages during the Lake Placid games, and the U.S. government appeared powerless in its inability to secure their release. By contrast, the Soviets dealt with their Middle Eastern troubles by invading Afghanistan, displaying a ruthlessness that suggested unchallenged strength. There was little in February of 1980 to suggest that Afghanistan eventually would become an interminable quagmire, the Soviets’ Vietnam. Instead, complete Soviet victory looked inevitable in yet another example of Soviet power and will that the United States could not match.

America’s international position was undermined by its economic troubles. The United States was wracked by a combination of high inflation and high unemployment that according to traditional economic theory could not coexist. Surging oil prices encouraged by the policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) worsened America’s economic position. OPEC’s success in using oil as a weapon to influence Western policies during and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War had led to further OPEC torment of the Americans following the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978. The American inability to respond to OPEC’s actions further suggested U.S. weakness. While OPEC’s policies injured the United States’s struggling economy, increasing world petroleum prices permitted the Soviets to trade their vast oil resources for hard currency.

The economic gains made by West Germany and Japan between the late 1940s and 1980 only made the American situation seem worse. At the end of World War II, the United States had an unrivalled global economic position under circumstances that made
it all but inevitable that dominance would not last. Insulated from the wartime destruction visited on much of the world, American farms and factories reached new heights of productivity in supplying the United States and its allies. In Europe, post-war ideological division of the continent and the resultant restrictions in the ordinary east-west trade hobbled recovery from wartime devastation. Despite the virtual inevitability of comparative American decline, U.S. economic blunders, misguided efforts at funding the Vietnam War, and the oil shocks of the 1970s combined to cause an economic decline that seemed far more ominous than the mere correction of a post-war aberration. Americans thought it particularly troubling that West Germany and Japan, which had rebuilt from rubble after World War II with American assistance, now appeared to outperform the United States economically and technologically, too. The great hockey city of Detroit dramatized the situation: once a symbol of American manufacturing prowess, U.S. auto manufacturers headquartered there struggled as Americans bought more fuel-efficient Japanese cars. One U.S. automaker, Chrysler, only averted bankruptcy through a government bail-out.

Adding to American troubles were alliance politics. The West Europeans and Japanese had long relied on U.S. power, including nuclear forces, to guarantee their security, but the Vietnam era had a deleterious effect on this arrangement. America’s commitment to Vietnam weakened its position in Europe and worried NATO allies. The entire venture raised doubts about American leadership and reduced U.S. attention to strategic nuclear forces permitted the Soviet Union to attain strategic parity with the United States and then to threaten to develop a strategic superiority. With the shifting nuclear balance reducing confidence in the U.S. deterrent, Western European and Japanese leaders were forced to consider the possibility that any American defense could actually ensure the destruction of their entire countries. As the Americans began to develop their détente policy, some U.S. allies also began to look for their own ways to improve relations with the Soviets. This opened possibilities for the Soviets to obtain consumer goods and technological expertise otherwise beyond their capacity. And this, in turn, could have strengthened the Soviets considerably in their Cold War confrontation with the United States.

Yet another factor contributing to the apparent American decline was the position of the military. Not only had the Vietnam War, problems in NATO, and Soviet strategic gains appeared to undercut American power, but the U.S. military was so badly funded and pay for soldiers, sailors, and airmen so low that news stories from the time discussed difficulties in retaining experienced military personnel and the economic struggle of military families who were so poorly paid they qualified for the food stamps subsidization program.

In February of 1980, then, the United States was burdened by economic troubles that had no end in sight, and it appeared weak in the face of Soviet strength, Arab and Iranian abuse, West German and Japanese economic strength, and allies’ worries. Consequently, the final outcome of the Cold War seemed very much in doubt when the United States team went on its unexpected run to gold in Lake Placid.

In international hockey, the United States had seen a similarly marked decline in its fortunes. When the American team won the gold medal at Squaw Valley in 1960, the gold was unprecedented, but the medal was not: 1948, with the confusion over two teams purporting to represent the United States at St. Moritz, was the only Olympiad at which a
U.S. team had competed without winning silver or bronze. During the 1952, 1956, and 1960 winter games, United States Olympic hockey teams won two silver medals and a gold; in those three Olympiads the Americans posted a 3-1-1 record combined against Canada and the USSR. Yet there was a sharp drop off after the gold medal in 1960. Only twice did the United States post a top-three finish in world hockey from 1961 through 1979: a third-place finish at the 1962 world tournament which the USSR and Czechoslovakia boycotted, and a surprising silver medal in the 1972 Olympic tournament that even the USOC called “extremely disappointing.”91 Four times from 1970 through 1974 the Americans did not even qualify for the top level of competition at world championships and were relegated to the B Pool. A particularly humbling example of these struggles occurred at the 1969 world championships. This was the tournament at which the Canadians finished a disappointing fourth and their reaction culminated in withdrawal from the IIHF; this was also the site of the two Czechoslovakian wins over the Soviet Union that triggered celebrations that brought serious political consequences for the Czechoslovaks. At that same tournament, the United States squad lost all ten of its games, starting with a 17-2 rout at the hands of the Soviet Union.92 John Mayasich, a hero of the 1960 Olympics who served as player-coach at the 1969 world championships, complained the American approach to international hockey was “ridiculous.”93

At the same time that the Americans were foundering, Soviet hockey power was growing. From 1963 to 1979, the Soviets won fourteen of seventeen world hockey championships and all four Olympic gold medals. During the 1970s, not only did the Soviets dominate international amateur competition, but they also won regularly against North American professionals. Although Team Canada triumphed in the eight-game “Summit Series” in 1972, the Canadians had to win the last three games, the final two in the waning moments, to secure the victory. In a series in which many Canadians had expected their team to win all eight games by routs, the close margin suggested that Canadian hockey superiority could no longer be taken for granted. In 1974 the two-year-old upstart league, the World Hockey Association, tried to build its credibility with a series pitting its own Canadian all-stars against the Soviet national team, but the Soviets won four games and tied three others, leaving a lone win for the WHA.

The situation got more complicated for Canada in 1976. In the winter of 1975-1976, the Central Army Club and Wings of the Soviet, the top two teams of the Soviet elite league, played four games each against leading NHL clubs in a tour that included the Central Army club’s previously mentioned games in Montreal and Philadelphia. Although the Central Army tied Montreal and lost to Philadelphia, the two Soviet clubs combined to win five of the other six games on their North American tour. The summer of 1976 saw the debut of the Canada Cup, a tournament played during the summer and featuring professional all-star teams from Western countries and the Soviet and Czechoslovakian national teams. Canada won the inaugural Canada Cup with a team some observers considered the finest Canadian team ever assembled including legendary players Bobby Orr and Bobby Hull.94

The ’76 Canada Cup strengthened arguments that Canada’s best were still the best in the world, but that argument took a beating during the lone Challenge Cup series, played in February of 1979. Just a year before the 1980 Olympics, NHL all-stars played a three-
game series against the Soviet national team. After splitting two close games, the Soviets routed the NHL all-stars 6-0 in the deciding contest, causing disgust particularly in Canada, where “[t]here really are some people who see this as a loss for democracy.”

In case anyone had missed the disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union in international hockey, the Soviet team thrashed the United States Olympians, 10-3, in the final pre-Olympic exhibition in Madison Square Garden just days before the Lake Placid games opened. In acting David to the Soviet Goliath less than two weeks later, the United States team played an underdog role that had long been popular among Americans but seemed more a lie than a cliché in the wake of Vietnam. The American effort in support of the Saigon government appeared to embody the worst of all possibilities: the Americans appeared as fight-picking bullies, but they were too weak to defeat a tiny, backward, Third World nation. Moreover, the litany of horrors from that war undermined American pretensions to moral virtue. The chemical defoliation of jungles, the damage done to traditional Vietnamese society by the Strategic Hamlet program, the massacre of civilians at My Lai, and other episodes in the war suggested the United States was suffering from a badly damaged moral compass. Against this backdrop, the nation rallied around what one reporter called a “rag-tag mélange of peach-fuzz kids and knock-around minor leaguers.” The unheralded kids won popularity by donning “U.S.A.” shirts and defeating the older, more experienced, more accomplished, heavily-favored Soviet hockey machine that had benefited from innumerable competitive advantages.

The 1980 United States Olympic hockey team gave a tangible outlet for expressions of patriotic resurgence and national unity that paralleled the collapse of détente. One middle-aged Pennsylvania man who witnessed the celebration at Lake Placid told the Chicago Tribune that many of the people waving American flags and chanting “U.S.A! U.S.A!” must have been among those burning flags just a few years earlier at anti-war protests. After years of apparent national decline, this resurgent patriotism had political ramifications for the presidential race that November between Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter and Republican challenger Ronald Reagan. Reagan campaigned as the unabashedly anti-Communist, muscular patriot in his race against the man who had preached national humility and disparaged America’s “inordinate fear of Communism.” Against this backdrop, in the words of long-time Yale historian Gaddis Smith, “Reagan rode to victory . . . on a prancing white horse of American patriotism.”

Conclusion

Providing an outlet for a renewed American patriotism that later influenced U.S. politics was just one way in which the Olympic hockey tournament at Lake Placid revealed the impact of more than three decades of political and sporting developments. The success of the American team seemed so remarkable because the Soviets had not only dominated international amateur hockey but also repeatedly made strong showings against the best North American professionals in tours that began as part of détente era attempts to reduce Cold War tensions. The frequent hostility in the hockey rivalry between the Soviets and the North Americans was one example of agreement among Western democracies in their opposition to the repressive Soviet system.

After 1980, ice hockey in the United States largely returned to its customary level of (un)popularity. There was no subsequent surge in international play to match the sense of
national resurgence captured in President Reagan's 1984 campaign slogan “America is back.” The U.S. Olympic teams at Sarajevo and Calgary both posted disappointing seventh-place finishes. American teams did not medal again at the world championships during the Cold War with the exception of the squad that took first place in the B pool in 1983, and even a potentially impressive second-place showing in the round robin portion of the 1984 Canada Cup was undermined by a 9-2 loss at the hands of Sweden in the semifinals. For the United States, parallels between hockey and the Cold War crested at Lake Placid and fell off thereafter.

For the Soviets, the years after Lake Placid saw a similar disconnect between their continued strength in international hockey and their geopolitical decline that culminated in their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the loss of their Eastern European satellites in 1989, and the final break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the same time that the Soviet Union began lumbering toward dissolution, its hockey team resumed its domination of Olympic hockey by winning gold medals in 1984 and 1988, and it also claimed six of eight world championships contested from 1981 through 1990. Moreover, even the Soviets’ defeats at the hands of Canada in the 1984 and 1987 Canada Cups required heroic effort by the Canadians in both cases.

From the Canadian perspective, Lake Placid was a disappointment and certainly not the most memorable Cold War hockey showdown. Not only would the 1972 “Summit Series” claim that honor, but the 1987 Canada Cup was a fitting final Cold War hockey confrontation between Canada and the USSR. It had a cast of stars from both Canada and the Soviet Union who became dominant NHL players in the 1990s, and high drama in which established superstar Wayne Gretzky and rising superstar Mario Lemieux led Canada to a dramatic comeback win in the best-of-three final series. At Lake Placid, though, the Canadians did have one often overlooked accomplishment. Before the U.S.-Soviet game Canadian coach Clare Drake commented, “If I were a gambling man, I’d bet on the Americans,” making him one of the few credible voices to predict the United States victory over the Soviets.

Czechoslovaks, who would bear the scars of the Cold War after the collapse of Communism, joined the Canadians in their disappointment at Lake Placid. Even though the Czechoslovakian team was led by the three Stastny brothers who later defected to the West and became NHL stars, Czechoslovakia lost to the United States and failed to reach the medal round. Thus, Lake Placid missed out on its chance at one of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian hockey confrontations that served as a means by which Czechoslovaks vented their frustrations with the Russians and sought some form of triumph over the Soviet forces that exerted such pervasive and unpopular control over their lives.

The legacy of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was visible even after the breakup of both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the 1998 winter Olympics at Nagano, the Czech Republic defeated Russia in the finals to claim the gold medal. By this time, professionals were permitted in the Olympics, and the Nagano games were the first held while the National Hockey League suspended play to permit its players to participate. One of the heroes of the Czech victory in that tournament was Jaromir Jagr. As a teenager, Jagr had been among the first players from the former Eastern bloc to play in the NHL without having to defect. In those Olympics and throughout his NHL career, Jagr’s uni-
form number was “68,” his tribute to his countrymen who had rebelled against Soviet repression of Czechoslovakia in 1968.105

Without the Czechoslovaks and Canadians in the medal round, the Lake Placid games lacked some of the fireworks seen at other international hockey venues in prior years. Still, Olympic hockey at Lake Placid, like international hockey at other venues between 1947 and 1980, was very much a continuation of the Cold War waged by different means.

1For an example of this promotion, see the advertisement for a Special Sneak Preview of the film, New York Times, 30 January 2004, sec. B, p. 18.

2For a challenge to once-conventional views that democracies were poorly suited to international conflict, see Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).


13Results from the Olympic hockey competition were reported as “unofficial” or “Non-Olympic.” See, for example, “Olympic Results and Standings,” *New York Times*, 2 February 1948, p. 22; 3 February 1948, p. 32; 4 February 1948, p. 29, all ProQuest.


16Telephone interview, Jack Kirrane to John Soares, 4 February 2004, notes in possession of author.

17“Russia’s Hockey Hall of Fame,” *Moscow Times*, 1 March 1997, no. 1159, article obtained via LexisNexis [hereafter LexisNexis].


20“Players Reported Seized: Trip Off, 4 On Czech Ice Hockey Team Said To Be Held,” *New York Times*, 15 March 1950, p. 2; “Czech Team Not to Visit London,” *Times* (London), 14 March 1950, p. 6. The British government reported that it had asked Prague to file the request for visas “in good time,” but the Czechoslovaks delayed their applications until shortly before their scheduled departure; still, the British processed the visas and had them ready for pickup at the British Consulate in Prague before the scheduled departure.


22“Czech Girl, World’s Title Skater, Elects to Stay in Exile in Britain,” *New York Times*, 20 March 1950, pp. 1+. From 1920 through 1968, the Olympic gold medalist was recognized as world champion. In 1972 and 1976, separate world tournaments were held. In 1980, 1984, and 1988, no world tournament was held, but Olympic gold medalists were not recognized as world champions. See Notes to “IIHF World Championships,” available at <www.iihf.com/iihf-home/history/all-medallists/men.html> [27 March 2008].


30Even Olympic hockey games pitting European nations against non-European opponents counted in determining the European championship. The loss to the United States on the final morning dropped Czechoslovakia to fourth in the Olympic standings. This became important when Canada defeated the Soviets that afternoon and knocked them down to third place in the Olympics; that result coupled with a Czechoslovakian win over the Americans would have given Czechoslovakia the European title.
34Soviet Union Move to Downgrade World Hockey Tourney Rejected,” New York Times, 8 March 1962, p. 38. The inability of East German athletes to attend events actually altered championships in other sports. The world skiing championships scheduled for Chamonix, France, were downgraded so that they were not actually an official championship event. The world weightlifting championships were moved from Hershey, Pennsylvania, to Budapest, Hungary. See “Chamonix Skiing Meet Loses Its World Championship Designation,” New York Times, 6 February 1962, p. 54, ProQuest; and “Weight Lifters Latest Affected In War of Visas,” Washington Post, 9 March 1962, sec. C, p. 4, ProQuest.
36For a quick introduction to France and NATO, see Charles Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO—Then and Now (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).
38Despite Czechoslovakia’s two wins against the Soviets, the USSR again emerged with the world championship: in a double round robin tournament Czechoslovakia also suffered two losses and the Soviets were awarded the title because of tie-breaking procedures. For more about this tournament, see Joe Pelletier, “Where Were You In ’69?: Czech Victory Surpasses 1972 Dramatics,” Hockey Research Journal 6 (2002): 66-67.
41Quoted in Allen, USA Hockey, 68; also see 1972 United States Olympic Book (New York: United States Olympic Committee, 1972), 260.

For a work that places détente in international perspective and deals with the difficulties American and Soviet leaders had with the on-going costs of a full-blown Cold War, see Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).


The 1972 U.S. team, which won a surprising silver medal, seemed to view the Soviet team as something to aspire to, rather than a bitter rival. For more on the 1972 U.S. Olympians, see Tom Caraccioli and Jerry Caraccioli, Striking Silver: The Untold Story of America’s Forgotten Hockey Team (Champaign, Ill.: SportsPublishing, 2006).

For readers unfamiliar with professional hockey in North America, the top professional league, the National Hockey League, awards the Stanley Cup to the winner of its postseason playoffs. The Cup is named for Lord Stanley of Preston, Canadian Governor-General in the nineteenth century, who donated the original cup to be awarded to the best hockey team in Canada.


Caraccioli and Caraccioli, Striking Silver, 44.

For academic views of this topic, see Donald Macintosh and Michael Hawes, Sport and Canadian Diplomacy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994); Morris Kurtz, “A History of the 1972 Canada-USSR Ice Hockey Series” (Ph.D. dissertation, The Pennsylvania State University, 1981); and Macintosh and Greenhorn, “Hockey Diplomacy and Canadian Foreign Policy,” esp. 106-108. Also see Scott Morrison, The Days Canada Stood Still: Canada vs. USSR 1972 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989). Several Canadian participants wrote about the series soon afterward. One of the more thoughtful was written by goaltender Ken Dryden, a Cornell alumnus who earned a law degree from McGill University while playing for the Montreal Canadiens. See Ken Dryden with Mark Mulvoy, Face-off At the Summit (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). Team Canada was coached by Harry Sinden, who had coached the Boston Bruins to the 1970 Stanley Cup championship and later served decades as the Bruins’ general manager. Sinden also had the distinction of being the captain of the 1960 Canadian Olympic team that the United States upset en route to its surprising gold medal at Squaw Valley. See Harry Sinden, Hockey Showdown: The Canada-Russia Series (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1972).


Robidoux, “Imagining a Canadian Identity Through Sport,” 221.

60 The Flyers are identified as a team of “purportedly” limited talent because the attention they drew for fighting overshadowed the skill of a number of their players. The ’75-’76 Flyers’ goaltenders included Bernie Parent, two-time winner of the Vezina Trophy for goaltending excellence, and Wayne Stephenson, who posted a 93-35-22 record in five seasons in Philadelphia. Captain Bobby Clarke was a three-time league most valuable player who led the league in assists that year. In a league in which a twenty-goal scorer is considered impressive and fifty goals is the mark of scoring greatness, those Flyers had a pair of fifty-goal scorers (Bill Barber and Reggie Leach, who led the league that season with sixty-one), and another who had scored fifty goals three years earlier (Rick MacLeish). Four other players had multiple twenty-goal seasons and scored nineteen or more that season (Gary Dornhofer, Don Saleski, Mel Bridgman, and Ross Lonsberry). Orest Kindrachuk tallied twenty-six goals and seventy-five points that winter. Other players who were part of the Flyers’ championship run but departed before the Central Army game included twenty-scorers Bill Clement and Simon Nolet, and Bill Flett, who scored forty-three goals in ’72-’73. Even two of the ’75-’76 Flyers known for their physical play topped the twenty-goal mark at some point in their Flyers’ careers (“Battleship Bob” Kelly and Dave “The Hammer” Schultz). “Modern Player Register” in Dan Diamond, ed., *Total Hockey: The Official Encyclopedia of the National Hockey League*, 2nd ed. (New York: Total Sports Publishing, 2000), 833-1781.


65 Herman, “Russians Stage Walkout”; Kahn, “The Flyers and a Hero Named Shero.”


68 Kahn, “The Flyers and a Hero Named Shero.”

69 The cartoon, which appeared in *Комсомольская Правда*, was picked up by the Associated Press and appeared with the article, “Soviet Press Castigates Flyer Tactics, Referee,” *New York Times*, 14 January 1976, p. 47, ProQuest.


71 See picture captioned “BATTLE CASUALTY,” *Los Angeles Times*, 12 January 1976, sec. 3, p. 1. Of course, the Soviets had no love lost for Clarke after his attack on Kharlamov during the ’72 Summit Series.

72 For an academic view of media presentations of the Soviets in the West, see Iri Cermak, *Seeing Red: Mediasport Discourses of Soviet Olympic Hockey* (Seattle, Wash.: Canadian Studies Center, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1997).


Brundage explained, “One of the basic principles of the Olympic Movement is that there shall be no discrimination against any country or person because of race, religion or politics.” *Olympic Games 1960: Squaw Valley, Rome*, ed. Harald Lechenperg (New York: A.S. Barnes and Co., n.d.), 5.

Quoted in Senn, *Power, Politics and the Olympic Games*, 92. A lengthier excerpt from Brundage’s letter to then-IOC President Edstrøm, dated 7 December 1950, reads: “From all reports the best Russian athletes are State proteges with all sorts of special concessions and rewards. They certainly are not amateurs. . . . According to Communist philosophy, every person and everything is subservient to the State. It is impossible, therefore, to find a NOC in any Communist country that is not under complete State control. If we conform to fundamental Olympic principles and follow our rules and regulations we cannot possibly recognize any Communist Olympic Committee.”


These details, and more, are found in Macintosh and Greenhorn, “Hockey Diplomacy and Canadian Foreign Policy.”


For more about Canada’s often-overlooked contribution to NATO defenses in West Germany, see Sean M. Maloney, *War without Battles: Canadian NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997).

Diefenbaker and Kennedy disliked each other personally but had substantial differences in Diefenbaker’s distrust of the United States and of Kennedy’s efforts to influence Canadian policy, and Kennedy’s concern about Diefenbaker’s tepid support during the Cuban missile crisis and his uncertain military posture more generally. Tension entered Canadian-U.S. relations during the Trudeau-Nixon years largely because of economic issues, with ‘Trudeau’s diplomatic recognition of Beijing also a factor. For a concise introduction to Canadian-American relations see Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).


91It was the tournament itself and not the U.S. hockey team’s showing that was criticized in the USOC’s 1972 official report; the biggest complaint was the absence of the Canadians. 1972 United States Olympic Book, 447.

92This score (and other U.S. results) found in “USA Hockey All-Time Rosters and Results” produced by USA Hockey, copy in possession of author.


94Hull, who had signed with the rival World Hockey Association, and Orr, who had been injured, had both missed the historic 1972 Summit Series. For a quick introduction to the Canada Cup tournaments, see “International and ‘Open’ Events: NHL Players and Teams Versus European Opponents Since 1972,” in Diamond, Total Hockey, 505-507.


97For an academic view of Lake Placid, see Craig Nickerson, “Red Dawn in Lake Placid: The Semi-Final Hockey Game At the 1980 Winter Olympics as a Cold War Battleground,” Canadian Journal of History of Sport 26 (1995): 73-85. Although the U.S.-Soviet game is commonly understood as a semifinal, it technically was the second of the three round robin games the United States played in the medal round. In a format that was only used in ice hockey in 1980, 1984, and 1988, medal round play was conducted on a round robin basis, with games already played in the preliminary round counting in medal round standings. Because the United States and Sweden qualified for medal round play from the Red Division, their tie game played ten days earlier, even before the Opening Ceremonies, counted as a medal round game. No matter who won the U.S.-Soviet hockey game on Friday, February 22, the Americans were going to play Finland on Sunday morning, February 24. For more, see John Soares, “The ‘Semi-Final That Wasn’t’: When the USA Stunned the USSR at Lake Placid,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies 16 (2007): 93-97.


99Carter’s often-quoted, seldom understood passage was delivered in a speech at the University of Notre Dame in 1977. Frequently used as evidence of Carter’s naïveté or insufficient vigilance in opposing Communism, Carter was actually discussing changes that already had been made in the way the United States dealt with potential allies. He told his audience at Notre Dame, “Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of [C]ommunism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I’m glad that’s being changed.” Jimmy Carter, “Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame.” 22 May 1977, in U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1977 ), Jimmy Carter, 1977, 1: 956.


103Peter, Marion, and Anton Stastny were among the leaders scorers for Czechoslovakia at the 1980 Olympics and later starred for the Quebec Nordiques in the NHL. Following Czechoslovakia’s breakup, Peter Stastny was one of the key members of the first Slovak national team to compete in Olympic hockey at Lillehammer in 1994. His son, Paul Stastny, was a freshman on the University of Denver team that won its second straight NCAA hockey championship in 2005.
Czechoslovakia, of course, split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which began sending separate hockey teams to the 1994 Olympics. Russia was the most powerful nation, politically and in hockey, that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union, but a number of other hockey playing nations from the former USSR have appeared in the Olympics, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Ukraine.