CARTESIAN AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: 
THE RADICAL SHIFT AND ITS MEANING FOR SPORT

Klaus V. Meier 
Assistant Professor of Physical Education 
State University College at Brockport, New York

Is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body, by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains or control the planets in their orbit, this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension.

David Hume (8:pp. 76-77)

I

The significant task of elucidating and resolving the problem of the interdependence of mind and body, as even a cursory glance at the history of philosophy attests, presents a plethora of intriguing and intricate difficulties, thereby demonstrating the insight and veracity of Hume's assertion.

The recent literature of the philosophy of sport, in part, has addressed itself to anthropological inquiries investigating the nature and structure of man. In particular, the question of the relationship of mind and body and its applicability, or manifestation, in sport has been actively pursued. (1; 23; 28:pp. 33-42; 31:pp. 37-57) Unfortunately, philosophical efforts concerned with the problem of embodiment and sport have often produced expositions replete with imprecise statements, contestable assertions and, at times, unsupported or simply erroneous conclusions. It thus appears appropriate to investigate anew the basis of contemporary perceptions of the ontological structure of man and, subsequently, to clarify some of the essential components of man's engagement in sport in relation to the formulated parameters.

The systematic theory of the relationship between the human body and the human mind developed by Rene Descartes provided philosophy with a conception of man with which it has struggled for more than three centuries. It is therefore necessary to scrutinize the labours and achievements of this renowned philosopher. Following the investigation of Descartes, the phenomenological anthropology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty will be delineated in considerable depth. The insights and information derived from Merleau-Ponty's work, including his significant criticism of Cartesian and ensuing mechanistic anthropologies, will provide a contemporary philosophical alternative for the resolution of the mind-body problem. Finally, the meaning of the radical shift in the characterization of the nature of man will be analyzed specifically in relation to man in sport. At this stage it will be necessary to criticize certain philosophy of sport expositions deemed to be inadequate in light of the analysis conducted within this study and, also, to provide
an orientation perceived to be more adequate. In summary, this study addresses itself to the investigation of three themes: first, Descartes' philosophical work on the nature of man, particularly his formulation and attempted resolution of the mind-body problem; second, Merleau-Ponty's delineation of a phenomenological anthropology analyzing the same topic; and third, the meaning of the radical shift in the two ontological structures for man's engagement in sport.

II

Descartes sought to develop a foundation for science that would avoid the presuppositions and inadequacies of Scholasticism and possess the rigorous certainty of mathematics. Only through an extension of mathematical procedures to the investigation of things in the natural world could clear, certain, and final knowledge be attained. "Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo had prepared the ground for this interpretation, and their scientific successes overwhelmingly proved the reliability of their methods." (6: p. 223) Human reason was thus to be the key to the knowledge and secrets of nature and the universe.

Descartes' deliberations began with the formulation of, among other procedures and techniques, the process of "radical doubt" and the doctrine of "clear and distinct ideas." It was his contention that indubitable knowledge could be attained only if the process is based upon some absolutely certain bit of information with subsequent knowledge, equally certain, systematically derived from it.

After ridding himself of all opinions and presuppositions which he formerly accepted, including all the products of his own experience, plus the traditions and beliefs that permeated his environment, Descartes attempted to discover a cornerstone for his method. His means of approach was that of "radical doubt"; that is, he proceeded to cast doubt on everything that could possibly be doubted.

Through the methodological application of this procedure, Descartes arrived at the "absolute" he sought as the starting point for his new science:

But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something...I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it. (4:p. 150)

From this "undoubtable" anchor, Descartes proceeded to establish that the essence of his nature was to be a being that thinks:

I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it very evidently and certainly followed that I was; on the other hand if I had only ceased from thinking, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for thinking that I existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and
that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this 'me', that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter, and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (4:p. 101)

Although the validity of Descartes' progress from the cogito to the doctrine of sum res cogitans is certainly open to legitimate inquiry and spirited debate, for present purposes it is essential to note the products of his deliberations to this stage. The soul or mind is characterized as a self-conscious, spiritual, thinking substance, entirely distinct from the body, and possessing no qualities of matter or extension. "Descartes' method locked consciousness up in itself; consciousness for him, was consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness is isolated, walled-in and existed without the body." (16:p. 181)

Through a variation of Anselm's ontological argument, Descartes proceeded to retrieve God from the limbo of doubt and through His essential attributes prove the existence of the natural, physical world. The perfection of God assured Descartes that He could not be the cause of any error and, therefore, Descartes' clear and distinct conception of the second substance in the world, matter, as extended and non-conscious was deemed to be true and accurate.

The two substances, mind and body (matter), exist independently of one another, but both depend on God. Matter, as extended being does not possess the attributes of thought, consciousness, self-movement, or feeling. Extension is related to space; space is declared infinitely divisible, therefore, all bodies are divisible; the smallest parts are still further divisible. The division and union of parts of matter lead to the formation of different forms of matter, still extended and divisible further.

Descartes applied the distinction between mind and body to the entire organic world including animals and the human body. His anatomy and physiology was well in line with his celestial and terrestrial mechanics. According to Descartes, behaviour, the physiological account of the mechanisms of the bodily aspects of sensation and motor movements, was completely explainable by reference to and the utilization of the laws of physics and chemistry; particularly those concerned with matter and motion. He stated that animal behaviour, for example, is as determinable by the stimuli received by the animal's body as the response of one billiard ball is determined by the stimulus imparted to it by another. The sole differentiating characteristic of an animated body from inanimate matter is simply the degree of "...complexity in disposition and function of its parts and greater heterogeneity among its constituent corpuscles." (11:p. 156)

In accord with such assertions, Descartes forwarded a rather strict mechanistic physiological analysis of the human body. He regarded the body of man to be as mechanical as a watch, although, since it has been"...made by the hands of God it is incomparably better arranged, and possesses in itself movements which are more admirable, than any of those which can be invented by man." (4:p. 116)

I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin, that though there were no mind in it at all, it would
not cease to have the same motions as at present, exception
being made of those movements which are due to the direction
of the will and in consequence depend on mind. (4:p. 195)

In summary, Descartes concluded that man is composed of two distinct
substances--body and mind--the essential attributes or characteristics of
which differ radically. The body is viewed as an unthinking, extended, ma-
terial substance; the mind is a thinking, unextended, immaterial substance.
The body is an unconscious machine, conforming to the un
waving and rigid
laws of nature; the mind (the true "essence" of man) is a conscious and
free substance not susceptible to or dominated by the mechanical laws of na-
ture. The two substances are thus perceived to be totally distinct and in-
dependent.

The postulation of such an extreme bifurcation of mind and body, of
course, elicits immediate difficulties. Despite the apparent impossibility
and indeed logical preclusion of any interaction between two such dissimilar,
demarcated, and mutually exclusive substances, conscious reflection on lived
human experiences indicates that perhaps the distinction is not absolute. Al-
though occasional, specific human activities may be performed unconsciously
and mechanically, through reflex action for example, selected components of
conscious perception such as sensations of pain and sound, appetites of hunger
and thirst, and the elicitation of emotions and passions challenge significant-
ly the dualistic structure, through the implication of an intimate union be-
tween mind and body.

Descartes was, of course, cognizant of experiences of the forementioned
nature, indeed, in the Sixth Meditation he asserts that the interrelationship
of mind and body is intuitively obvious by means of man's possession of clear
and distinct ideas concerning their union:

There is nothing which this nature teaches me more expressly
(nor more sensibly) than that I have a body which is adverse-
ly affected when I feel pain, which has no food or drink when
I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst and so on; nor
can I doubt there being some truth in all this. Nature also
teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc.
that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel
but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so
intermingled with it that I seem to compare with it one whole.
For if that were not the case, when my body is hurt, I who am
merely a thinking thing, should not feel pain for I should
perceive this wound by the understanding only, just as the
sailor perceives by sight when something is damaged in his
vessel; and when my body has need of drink or food, I should
clearly understand the fact without being warned of it by con-
fused feelings of hunger and thirst. For all these sensations
of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than
certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the
union and apparent intermingling of mind and body. (4:p. 192)

In addition to these selected "confused modes" of self-consciousness,
numerous other occasions attesting at least a "quasi-substantial" union of
the mind and body may be readily forwarded. In some sense, for example, it
is surely legitimate to assert that the mind possesses the ability to consciously suppress or redirect sensual appetites. Also, particular mental states, such as excitement or elation, appear to manifest noticeable changes in the cardiorespiratory system and in the degree of intensity of the performance of physical activities.

To explain consciously directed or volitional action, Descartes readily acknowledged that the body deviates from its mechanical procedures of performance at "the direction of the will," which in turn depends on the mind. (4:p. 195) Such occurrences can only be intelligibly comprehended through the postulation of some form of structural intercourse of unity of composition, if not of nature.

The admission that the mind indeed consciously influences the motions of the body, and conversely is affected by its physiological states or activities, clearly demonstrates the basic difficulty of Cartesian dualism: namely, how can an extended material substance be influenced by a spiritual substance that has no extension and therefore no spatial location for interaction? In other words, how can radically distinct substances form a substantial union?

In an attempt to respond to this difficulty, Descartes stated that the mind is indeed connected to the body, however, the nature of this interaction is, at the very least, obfuscated. Attuned to the necessity for the explanation of mind-body interaction, and fully aware of the constraints of his ontological edifice, Descartes couched his response in such general, imprecise, and non-specific terms as "occasion" or "spontaneous occurrence."

Descartes asserted that man experiences a basically unexplained "primary notion" of the interrelationship of mind and body which, although only obscurely comprehended by the understanding, is very clearly known by the senses. He further claimed that the mind is connected to the entire body, but not in a spatial or extended sense since it does not possess attributes of material entities. Precluded by his conceptions of matter and mind from advocating a direct meshing or strict causal relationship between the two, Descartes is forced to postulate that the mind and body are so related that "...the state of mind then existing, may be the 'occasion' of the ensuing physical change that occurs in the body" or vice versa. (11:p. 156) In perception, for example, the bodily action on the mind is the "...occasion or stimulus which determines the mind to produce the sensation out of itself at this particular moment rather than any other." (29:pp. 81-82)

Despite the utilization of, at times, deft linguistic manipulations, the essential difficulty remained unshaken. Descartes attempted to solve it by asserting that the interaction of the mind and body is limited to one central and specific location. He stated that although the soul radiates throughout and "is in each member of the body," (4:p. 293) it exercises its functions most particularly in one certain part of the body--the pineal gland, situated near the top of the brain and the apparent convergent or terminal of all nerve systems. (4:p. 345)

Through its diverse manipulations in the pineal gland, the soul regulates and thrusts forth "animal spirits," (subtle and exquisitely refined parts of the blood, flowing to and from the brain through the arteries and nerves almost like "air or wind"), to direct the movements of the body's limbs. (4:p. 333)

The choice of the pineal gland as the locus of the elusive connection and incarnation of the substantial union of body and mind, wherein the mind
can exercise control of the body's movements and conversely be affected by the animal spirits agitated by physiological change, was certainly ingenious if not accurate. However, it was also "regarded as signally unfortunate" even in Descartes' own day. (7:p. 144) The reason for this reaction, of course, was that the introduction of animal spirits, even of a highly rarified and special nature, was simply a matter of procrastination. The frustrating question of how there can be interaction between a substance that is purely spiritual and a substance that is purely material remained to be answered. The pineal gland, rather than providing a solution, appears to be simply an attempt at a "metaphysical tour de force".

III

The influence of Descartes' philosophy was enormous. Enamoured by the thrust, mode, and content of Descartes' writings on the nature of man, a significant number of his contemporaries and followers attempted to transcend the major obstacle to be confronted in his theory, namely, the mind-body problem, through the postulation of sundry solutions. A very brief discussion of some of the ensuing systems will perhaps prove beneficial for the purposes of the present study. It must be noted in advance that some of the formulations to be mentioned entailed very radical forms of dualism, indeed, more severe than that forwarded by Descartes (it will be remembered that he did acknowledge a basic union of mind and body although he could not clearly delineate it). In this sense, it appears legitimate to state that Descartes advocated a position considerably more moderate than that which is frequently subsumed under, and associated with, "Cartesian philosophy" today.

One manner in which the dualistic nature of man could be supported was through the doctrine of parallelism; parallelism called on Divine intervention in the minutest detail to coincide physical and mental aspects of behavior. The absolute idealism of Malebranche postulated another solution, namely, the elimination of matter as an independent reality and stated that mind is supreme. Hobbes and the materialists reversed this position and stated that only matter possesses reality and therefore mind cannot be accepted as an independent substance. Spinoza declared that both thinking and extended substances are not separate but merely attributes of the single independent substance, God.

Although all of the postulations previously enumerated are certainly worthy of review and critique, limitations of space preclude such an effort. However, one system, mechanistic physiology, because of its continued contemporary support will be briefly delineated.

The ideal of a purely mechanistic doctrine, with all its ensuing implications for the establishment of the concept of the physical universe, came to dominate the European scientific community. From its first framing, with a reasonable degree of completeness, it has guided scientists since the seventeenth century.

Descartes' view of the body-machine working under the strict dictates of mechanical laws, which govern even the flow of animal spirits through the nerves, led to attempts to completely explain human behavior through utilization of these laws. Since the mind or soul has no extension, no visual appearance, and is not observable by any of the senses, the mechanists
sought to avoid confusion and obscurity by rejecting any such entity and stating that such a formulation is an unverifiable hypothesis and thus to be discarded. Several of Descartes' hypotheses, including his recognition that some outward actions of the animal body, adapting to its environment, are causally independent of volition and uncontrolled by it, made it possible for physiologists in the two succeeding centuries to explore the possibilities of biological mechanism and develop in detail our present conception of 'reflex action'. . . . it may be allowed that his views of reaction and glandular activity were its forerunners. (11: pp. 286-287)

The movement of limbs in man by contraction, expansion, extension and flexion, together with variable characteristics involving chemical reactions, were all postulated by the mechanists to be reducible to explanations of expansion and contraction in inanimate bodies; in other words, by the mechanical laws of nature. The materialists argued that since the living organism is for all intents and purposes, including all its significant features, a machine, and a machine by definition and practical experience does not contain any substance that one could call mind or soul, therefore, there is no reason to attribute such a substance to the living organism. (10: p. 92)

Pirenne (24: p. 46) illustrated Descartes' conception of human action and contrasted it with the completely mechanistic representation. The Cartesian hypothesis takes the following form: a) receptors--nervous system--CONSCIOUSNESS--nervous system--effectors. Sensations are produced in consciousness by the nervous system, and any changes in the effector system is determined by consciousness. The mechanistic scheme avoids any mind-body problems by disregarding consciousness altogether. This scheme may be represented as follows: b) receptors--nervous system--effectors. The link between the system and any reference to consciousness is, of course, directly negated. This explanation sees man in a way similar to the automatic pilot of an aeroplane; the complete behavior of man is accountable in terms of "neuro-physiology, neuro-anatomy and physics." The mind, consciousness, or soul, are simply not met within this type of a scheme.

The mechanistic conception of the working of the nervous system might be briefly described as follows: physico-chemical stimuli acting upon receptors determine excitations in these receptors. These excitations spread into the nervous system including the brain. They interact in the nervous system, in ways which must be very complicated and are as yet unknown, with static or dynamic changes having other origins. These changes include those due to stimuli which have ceased to act, as well as those due to events which affected only the remotest ancestors of the organism considered. (Thus the facts related to 'memory', 'habit', 'heredity', etc., are, theoretically at least, taken into account). Eventually, as a result of these interacting nervous activities, a certain spatial and temporal pattern of
excitation is transmitted from the nervous system to certain muscles and determines a definite behavior of the organism. (24:p. 47)

The mechanistic approach claims to be very logical and consistent; any unknowns are due to the lack of sufficiently sophisticated, powerful and diverse methods of investigation, not the hypotheses or structure of the system. It was partially in reaction to the immense support of and adherence to mechanistic-materialistic doctrines, in the form of the behavioural and physiological psychology of the last one hundred years, that new criticisms arose. The perceived inadequacies of these former approaches elicited new demands for further inquiry:

Physiologists who declare themselves materialists because they have never discovered the soul under the scalpel are in their capacity as physiologists, undoubtedly right. Without attempting to give a definition of the soul, mind, or consciousness, it may be argued that one of its main characteristics is precisely that it is incapable of being demonstrated in this way. (24:p. 46)

Many facets of human existence, particularly man's intentional interaction with the world, which were denied or conveniently ignored by mechanistic scientists, were re-introduced as legitimate areas of concern and investigation, albeit through new avenues and procedures. An extended discussion of one form of such a new enterprise, the phenomenological anthropology of Merleau-Ponty, will be the focus of the subsequent section of this study.

IV

The problem of relating mind and body in the manner attempted by Descartes may be artificially created. It is extremely difficult, if not a priori impossible, to meaningfully synthesize two elements which are postulated to be of such discontinuous and diverse natures into a functioning, complex whole.

The attempts to promulgate conceptions of man as composed of two radically distinct substances may be the source of fundamental error. If man is rent thusly asunder, a subsequent synthesis will be extremely difficult to conceptualize and, indeed, may be logically precluded. However, if the postulated bifurcation is perceived to be the major difficulty, the problem may be approached in an entirely different manner. Rather than defining and advocating an inherent dualistic distinction, a monistic approach which accounts for both consciousness and incarnation may be significantly more productive.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty dedicated his philosophic program to a significant extent, to resolving the Cartesian problem of how man can experience himself as incarnate through a rigorous and adroit phenomenological analysis of man's being-in-the-world and particularly through his phenomenology of the body.

Existential phenomenology in general, and the philosophical works of Merleau-Ponty specifically, are based on the tenet that "...the most decisive trait of human consciousness, coloring all its manifestations, is that it is
an embodied consciousness."

(15:p. 10) Existence furnishes the point of departure. Man's contingencies, his finiteness, and his being-in-the-world as a subject are thus perceived as the starting points. The Cartesian categories are opposed as presupposing too little and offering misdirection.

Man is viewed as an incarnate subject, a unity not union of physical, biological, and psychological events all participating in dialectical relationships. The motions and activities of the 'lived-body' are not distinct from consciousness; rather, consciousness is deeply embodied in them. Merleau-Ponty perceived man as a "body-subject" (incarnated consciousness)--a being-in-the-world concerned with his unfolding in the world. The existence of a disembodied, separate or distinct mind is denied. For him, body and mind are simply limiting notions of the "body-subject" which is a single entity or reality neither simply mental nor merely corporeal, but both, simultaneously.

This is a concrete indication that our concepts of 'mechanical bodiness' and 'spirit' are abstract and one-sided forms of thinking, which are unsuitable for expressing reality in a genuine way. The Cartesian categories may seem to be clear and distinct, but their clarity is a blinding light preventing us from seeing reality in its genuine condition. (13:p 29)

In his analysis of consciousness and bodily existence, Merleau-Ponty rejected any characterizations depicting man as being merely an intellectual interiority (the mind) or the simple seat of sensations (the extended body) or even a union of these types of being. He repeatedly asserted that the human body is not a mere thing or object subject to the inclinations of the mind, rather, it is a subject in itself, deriving its subjectivity from itself.

"To say that the soul acts on the body is wrongly to suppose a univocal notion of the body and to add to it a second force which accounts for the rational significance of certain conducts." (18:p. 202) According to Merleau-Ponty, man is a fundamental unity, a single mode of being, both difficult to describe and to analyze.

Similarly to Marcel, Merleau-Ponty raised significant questions concerning the appropriateness of such statements as "I have a body" or "I use my body." He emphasized the peculiarity and inappropriateness of conceiving of one's body as an object or implement. "The body is more than a commodious instrument that I could do without: my body is myself, the man who I am." (26:p. 49)

The manner in which man lives his body from the inside presents a sharply different perception than the objective body which is externally observed through the delimited scope of the anatomical and physiological sciences. The lived-body is not an object which man possesses, rather it is man and man is his body. Man's mode of insertion into the world is the body; it is his foundation in existence. It is "...the constantly irrevocable manner in which I insert myself in reality." (30:p. 164) Thus, it may be seen that "being a body" is a radically different characterization than "having a body" or "using a body."

However, there is a specific sense in which man does indeed "use" his body as an instrument, but certainly not in the same sense as he uses, for example, a hammer or a chair. (34:p. 81) Since the human consciousness and the human body may be described as inexorably inseparable—that is, consciousness is primordially embodied in the world—the body is man's means of perception.
of, and action upon, objects and the world. The body is not simply another object in the world, rather it is "an anchorage in the world"; it is man's mode of communication and interaction with it.

Before proceeding with the analysis of the "body-subject", it is necessary to note parenthetically that the rigid Cartesian conception of the mind-subject as a distinct and superior substance somehow controlling the body-object has been perceived to be erroneous and replaced by a structure deemed more appropriate; the mind-body problem, rather than being logically insurmountable, may thus be more readily resolved.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the investigation of an incarnate consciousness, projecting itself in the world and fully immersed in its perceptions and experiences, necessarily elicits ambiguity. No longer can the account of man and reality be delineated with total lucidity, a claim championed in any idealistic orientation which maintains that consciousness is completely disparate and separate from the extended, material body and the world.

In *The Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty stated:

> I have no means of knowing the human body other than that of living it, which means taking up on my own account the drama which is being played out in it, and losing myself in it. I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one's own body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the experience of the body or the body in reality. (19:pp. 198-199)

Ambiguity, rather than lucidity, is an integral component of the manifestation and essence of human existence. The numerous, diverse perceptions and meanings of embodiment; the lived experience of "the chiaroscuro of the body"; (13:p. 46) and the open dialogue with the sensible world--are precisely the occurrences which must be investigated and not rejected because they shock and irritate "all those who pursue the ideal of 'hygienic' thinking" (13:p. 45) or Cartesian doctrines of "clear and distinct" ideas.

It is important to note, with Bannan, that it would be erroneous "...to endow ambiguity with an excessively negative or irrational sense. What it conveys is not incoherence but the intimacy of the relation of one's existence with one's world and attributes." (2:p. 79) A precise and distinct description of man's being-in-the-world would be simply an abstraction of the mind lacking concrete reality. Human existence, because of the distinct nature of incarnate consciousness, is obfuscated and therefore ambiguity arising in its investigation is simply proof that the analysis has not departed from reality.

Human existence and the experience of the lived-body cannot be fully elucidated or deduced from a priori grounds or from physical science, but rather, man's mode of inhabiting the world, his being-in-the-world, must be approached in a different manner to avoid distortion and inappropriate reduction.

Thus, an analysis of the man's incarnation and the body cannot be achieved by recourse solely to objective thought. Man is an opaque and concealed body-subject without clear and precise points of demarcation for the
various aspects of his being. Merleau-Ponty asserted that:

Matter, life, and mind could not be defined as three orders of reality or three sorts of beings, but as three planes of signification or three forms of unity. In particular, life could not be a force which is added to physico-chemical processes; its originality would be that of modes of connection without equivalent in the physical domain, that of phenomena gifted with a proper structure and which bind each other according to a special dialectic. (18:p. 201)

To study man as an embodied subject, is to study him as a unity of physical, biological, and psychological relationships. This "structured form" is borrowed from the Gestalt psychologists; it is not simply the sum of its components (each of which has different properties when separately investigated), but rather the context of dialectical relationships which is not determinable or perceivable by "objective" means. These relationships are greatly influenced by the intentional awareness of previous developments and also by considerations of the future.

Barral emphasized the inadequacy of simple causal explanations of human behaviour:

It is not by causality of stimuli and reflexes that behaviour can be explained--or understood--but rather that there is a certain ambiguity in the corporeal nature; we can see that there is interaction at the various levels--physical, psychological, etc.--but we can only assign meaning to the global activity as a whole. If we attempt to localize and sectionalyze the various activities which manifest themselves at the bodily level, we lose the signification of the action itself--we lose sight of the structure of behaviour itself. (3:p. 94)

The components are necessarily interrelated and only meaningfully investigated when analyzed as a whole. "All that we know is the process as it is taking place; we cannot look at the forces which go into its actualization." (3:p. 158)

The body is the locus of a dialectical relationship with the world. Man's being-in-the-world is given a viewpoint in the world through the body; it is the centre of expression and meaning-producing acts. Merleau-Ponty stated that:

My body is the seat or rather the very actuality of the phenomenon of expression (Ausdruck), and there the visual and auditory experiences, for example, are pregnant one with the other, and their expressive value is the ground of the antepredicative unity of the perceived world, and, through it, of verbal expression (Darstellung) and intellectual significance (Bedeutung). My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'. (19:p. 235)
The dialogue of the body with the world implies a necessary dialectic. In the same manner as a Gestalt cannot be reduced and analyzed into its specific components without important loss of its significance, man and the world must remain united. The body is openness and intentionality, but it is unthinkable without the world and, conversely, there is no world without the body.

The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. (19:p. 146)

Through his corporeality man is open to the world and it is by means of this dialogue that meaning arises. Meaning is not something that lies previously constructed and clearly formulated merely awaiting man; rather, it is created and constituted only by the interaction of the "body-subject" and the world. "Meaning, therefore, is always worldly and always human." (13:p. 68) It is worldly because man is the unveiling and fashioning of the world (the world appears through him), and it is human because the world appears only through the openness which he is.

It is important to note that, contrary to Descartes, the imposition of meaning is not caused by a universal constituting consciousness, but rather by bodily experience. The body involves man and gives him foundation in and a point of view on the world.

That the body is a subject, a meaning-giving existence, is deduced by Merleau-Ponty from the fact that there are many forms of meaning which, on the one hand, do not have the character of a reality existing independently of us but, on the other, do not result from a free and conscious giving of meaning. It follows, therefore, that man must already be a meaning-giving existence on the preconscious and not-yet-free level, on the level of bodily existence. (13:p. 21)

In this manner, the body is itself already in dialogue with the world and therefore gives it meaning in numerous preconscious ways. "We live in a visual field, a sonorous field, a tactile field, a field of odors and flavors...We are a manifold question and make the world reply in many ways." (13:p. 25) For example, if we use vision as our means of perception we are presented with a visual field; if we use hearing our field is one of sound. Thus the body has already established a relationship with the world that is preconscious; the world has perceptual meaning at a level prior to reflection and also impenetrable by reflective consciousness. Therefore, the body is a preconscious subject which is the source of meanings.

It is important to emphasize that the source of the "meaning-giving"
cannot be identified with consciousness or freedom since it is at the level of body situation-in-the-world.

Freedom and consciousness play no role in this assumption of a situation, for we do not at all know what takes place in and through our body while we are seeing. There is no question here of instinctive actions or of reflexes in the traditional sense of the terms. An action is instinctive when a ready-made pattern is executed, but in the case under consideration the body adapts itself to a situation in such a way that a meaning can arise. A reflex means a reaction to a stimulus, but here a reply is sought that is adapted to the situation. The body is more than a mechanism endowed with ready made patterns of action which would operate as soon as the external stimulus makes itself felt. The body seeks its way in the world, and in this sense we may say that it 'understands' its world provided this term is not conceived as expressing conscious knowledge. (13:pp. 26-27)

The world is taken up by the body and the body produces meanings in a dialogue with it. These form the basis for conscious and free life. Man inhabits the world as one familiar with its ways and by-ways; his being-in-the-world is the possibility of his being open to all things both on the preconscious and conscious level.

The body is not only achieved meaning; it is also a self-transcending subject. By its actions and dialogue with the world it appropriates centres of meaning which go beyond itself and transform it.

Whenever the body moves to take an attitude, a meaning is incarnated in matter, a sense inscribed in things, so that anyone who witnesses a particular gesture will immediately recognize its meaning and the sense it casts on the surrounding world. Within the totality of the material world, the gesture brings about a certain polarization as it stretches out in space a comportment which radiates a signification that modifies the sense of the whole world for those present. (14:p. 125)

Meanings arise through the body's power of expression. In the laugh of a child, a gesture of a hand, or the work of an artist, meaning is manifested. The lived-body always possesses the possibility of unfolding more projects and participating in more meaningful activities. In this manner the preconscious intentions of the body are taken up by man's conscious intentions. Intentional acts destroy objective boundaries between the body and world since they pervade and encompass man's entire field of open and worldly existence. Intentional endeavors of this nature demand an interweaving with the world, not a spiritual superimposition upon it.

Man's modes of intentionality and his different stances in the world are not objectively describable experiences, rather, they must be lived. Luijpen, for example, described how different modes of intentionality dictate different perceptions of the concept of water in the following manner:

What is water for me? It is that which is regularly used
for washing and drinking. Let us suppose, however, that I love bathing. In this case water would show itself quite different for me. I would refer to it as 'the cooling waves'. If I were a fireman, water would again be something else--an extinguisher. I would never be able to affirm the meaning if I did not know what a fire is and what is meant by extinguishing a fire. For a fireman water is neither a cooling wave nor an extinguisher, for a fireman faces water with a quite different intention, so that it has an entirely different meaning for him. Anyone who in the wintertime has the misfortune to break through the ice and is carried underneath the frozen surface sees the most fearsome aspect water can show. No one, however, ever froze to death in 'the cooling waves'. (16:pp. 31-32)

Thus our stance in the world and our intentions concerning it dictate our perception of it--it is a lived not objective experience. Man dwells within a world of perspectives; all events and all perceptions of these events form structures which make up his experience, projects, and life. Everyday he is so affected by his environment that he must take a definite stand toward it. His position is determined by his personal attitude and interpretations of both the situation and its import--in other words, his intentions. The perceptual situation is dependent upon the particular circumstances surrounding the individual's actions; it is therefore necessary to take both the action and its milieu into account. The solicitations of the concrete situation shape the perceptual field.

Merleau-Ponty rejected the traditional argument that the body is merely a passive receiving station for data emanating from objects. He stated that the body is "form-giving"; it gives objects their significance. Only through the active function of perception, which is a sense-bestowing function, can there be "sense-data."

Merleau-Ponty defined perception as the process of rendering "...oneself present to something through the body. All the while the thing keeps its place within the horizons of the world, and the structurization consists in putting each detail in the perceptual horizon which belongs to it." (20:p. 42) Perception is thus the investigation of, and interaction with, the phenomenal field of the world from the incarnate perspective of the body.

Perceiving consciousness is 'sensitive' to reality: I find things; they are given to me, but only through and in my perceiving glance. Perceiving consciousness and perceiving reality constitute a dialectic unity. The act of consciousness (noesis) which my perception is cannot be cut loose from the reality of the perceived (noema), and the noema cannot be cut from the noesis. Knowledge is, on the one hand, the wonderful mystery of man's openness to reality and, on the other, it is the mystery of reality's being-for-man. (16:p. 96)

The theory of the body is implicitly a theory of perception and vice versa. Man can only learn to know this "expressive unity" by being involved in its actions as it relates to the sensible world. Vision, for example, which is a type of primordial contact with the world made without conscious efforts,
opens up a system of visible entities for man with which he relates. It is a
prereflective relation that is always limited; things beyond the visual hori-
zon and things which are invisible are precluded.

The body's dialectical relationship with the world gives rise to the sub-
ject's perception of, to cite one example, spatiality. The lived-body is de-

defined in relation to its environment, including its spatial relationship.
However, the spatiality of the body is one of situation; it is a lived spa-
tiality, directed towards the world, rather than an objective spatiality. In
a similar manner to his discussion of the body as being the condition for
there being objects, Merleau-Ponty stated that the body is the condition
or source of space. It is the source of significance of all space.

Man engaged in sport, for example, creates a unique field of lived-space,
the significance of which fluctuates constantly in accord with the perceptual
forms apprehended. For the active player on a football field, this field does
not remain a static object, rather it assumes the shift of his intentions.
Each maneuver modifies the character of the field in relation to the proximity
of the goal and the obstacles to be overcome in its attainment. (19:pp.
168-169) Through the oriented space of the body the spatiality of objects takes
on a meaning. Intentionality, thus, enters into all man's relations with his
world.

In contrast to Descartes' stripping of his existential character in an
attempt to arrive to reflective knowledge of his essence, Merleau-Ponty stated
that man cannot be removed from his contingency. Man is only man through his
direct involvement with the world. His essence is not to be a spiritual
thinking substance but rather being-in-the-world.

Merleau-Ponty also criticized and reinterpreted Descartes' "cogito." Merleau-Ponty had previously shown that in any act of perception it is im-
possible to disunite the act itself and the object of perception. "Percep-
tion and the perceived have necessarily the same existential modality: it is
impossible to disassociate from perception the consciousness which attains
the thing perceived." (3:p. 242) The question then arises that if the object
of perception can be doubted, as Descartes states was possible, why not the
subject also? If perception is impossible without its object, the certainty
of perception cannot be maintained if the object of the perception is rejected.
On the other hand, if man knows his own thoughts with certitude (and this can
only be based upon the certitude of perception of the object involved) the
existence of the perceived objects is mandated. Thought or perception neces-
sitates objects with which to be unified; they are contingent operations.
Therefore, Descartes' contention that, although his own existence could not
be doubted, the existence of the objects of his perception could is stren-
uously repudiated by Merleau-Ponty. The cogito was then reformulated
by Merleau-Ponty to assert that the "I am" precedes the "I think." The act of
being immersed in the world leads to the possibility of reflection whereas
the leap from thought to existence, as Descartes attempted, is questionable.

Merleau-Ponty also stated that a comprehension of the lived-experience
of the body is not possible through the polarized glasses of the natural sci-
entific or mechanistic frameworks which accord the body solely the status of
object. The testimony of the subjective consciousness and the experience of
the lived-body are inadmissible to behaviouristic experimental psychology
which attempts to reduce the dialectic between man and the world to a stimulus-
response structure functioning invariably in accordance with its mechanical
"laws." Merleau-Ponty's objections to such a model are summarized in the fol-
lowing statement:
It is impossible to foresee the response of an organism to a given excitation when only the nature of the stimulant is taken into account. The organism has at its disposal a flexibility such that in fact its response is a function not only of the nature of the stimulant, but also of the total situation of the organism at the moment of stimulation and of its 'intention' when it undergoes the stimulation...The same excitant may, according to the situation of the organism which receives it, provoke different, even opposite, reactions.

(30:p. 155)

In both of his major works (18, 19) Merleau-Ponty expended considerable effort demonstrating that the pure reflex action (an isolatable stimulus pattern) is a great rarity among living organisms despite the fact that it is accorded significant status in scientific explanations of action behaviour. It is impossible to attribute an inflexible, direct reaction pattern to the same stimulus; the causal stimulus viewed as distinct from the lived situation and the organism's orientation cannot account for the resulting actions. The intentional experience of the actor must be taken into consideration. Merleau-Ponty thus rescued free and creative human responses from the rejection of the mechanistic framework and bestowed new awareness to the study of man's incarnation.

The phenomenological analysis of Merleau-Ponty depicted man in a radically different manner than the classical philosophic analysis of Descartes. The Cartesian bifurcation, which "portrays man as ontologically schizophrenic," (5:p. 156) was declared inadequate, deceptive, and harmful, and thus, was thoroughly rejected. Descartes' dualism and his idealistic hypothesis of attaining apodictic knowledge through purely rational means without the attainment of the effective state and the intentions of the subject was also termed unacceptable.

Rather than delineate man as composed of two diverse and distinct substances, with the reified body susceptible to the direction of the unextended mind, Merleau-Ponty wished to "...express the idea of corporeality as an entity with two faces or two 'sides'." (21:p. 129) Man is characterized as embodied consciousness without clear and precise points of demarcation for the various aspects of his being; the distinction between the subjective and objective poles is blurred in the experience of the lived, meaning-bestowing body. Man is an open and engaged being dwelling in the world capable of developing personal meaning in the process of actively manifesting himself. The personal image which man formulates for himself largely structures his conceptions of his objectives, potentials, abilities, and limitations and, subsequently, what he makes of himself.

Although the previous comments concerning Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the "body-subject" were by no means exhaustive, it is hoped that some meaningful indications of the positive directions he advocated have been transmitted. It appears legitimate to state that his philosophical analysis may indeed provide a significant resolution to the mind-body problem.
realms of human enterprise, the particular areas of the philosophy of sport and theories of physical education would be the most enlightened in regard to the nature of man's corporeality and thus predisposed to advocate and actively support an image of man consummate with the phenomenological analysis of the lived body in the philosophical works of Merleau-Ponty and other existential phenomenologists.

However, such an assumption would be most imprudent. The philosophy of sport is replete, both in theory and practice, with implicit and explicit restatements and affirmations of Cartesian dualism, despite occasional assertions to the contrary. The flight to the respectability and acceptability of the natural and social scientific frameworks and the appropriation of stimulus-response schema and behavioristic characterizations are much in evidence, with the ensuing result that man's incarnated being is more often objectified and reduced rather than expressed or celebrated.

This section of the present study will attempt to fulfill three objectives: first, to delineate briefly some representations of such previously mentioned conceptions to be discovered in sport philosophy; second, to discuss the implicit Cartesian assumptions; and third, to investigate the more enlightened conceptions of Merleau-Ponty which permit man engaged in sport to experience his full and meaningful humanity.

In Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry, one of the first two books to investigate sport in considerable detail, Paul Weiss characterized the fundamental task facing the athlete as that of eliminating the dissonance and disequilibrium between mind and body by struggling toward unification and harmony. Although he "starts with a separated mind and body," (31:p. 221) "the athlete becomes one with his body through practice" (31:p. 218) and "comes to accept the body as himself." (31:p. 41)

To fully comprehend the preceding statements it is necessary to depict very briefly Weiss' conception of man. In a manner similar to Descartes, he divided man into two diverse substances—an extended "voluminous" body characterized by "tendencies, appetites, impulses, reactions, and responses" and an unextended, non-corporeal mind, "a tissue of implications, beliefs, hopes, anticipations, and doubts." He asserted further that the two substances are linked by man's emotions which are at once "...bodily and mental, inchoate unifications of mind and body." (31:p. 38)

Much akin to Descartes' postulation of the pineal gland as the locus of interaction between mind and body, recourse to the emotions, the nature of which remains largely unspecified, elicits rather than diminishes difficulties. Weiss asserted further that the emotions require control and to supply this regulating force he postulated the existence of a "self." (31:p. 54) Unfortunately, he declined the opportunity to elaborate and clarify the intriguing distinctions and relationships among mind, body, emotions, and self. The inevitable result is a rather bewildering and confusing characterization of man in general and the athlete in particular.

Of specific interest to the present study is Weiss' extensive and active support of a hierarchical, dualistic conception of man. He strongly and repeatedly emphasized the power of mind over body throughout his analysis of the athlete and his body. Weiss asserted that an athlete, on his journey toward the attainment of excellence in sport, engages in a rigorous training program designed "to correct" or "to alter the body" by means of "adjusting the way in which the body functions," (31:p. 41) until it proceeds in accord with the mind's expectations. (31:p. 46)
To be fully a master of its body, a being must make it act in consonance with what that body not only tends to, but what it should, do. This is an accomplishment possible only to men. Only they can envisage what is really good for the body to be and to produce. Only men can impose minds on bodies...Man uses his mind to dictate what the body is to do. (31:pp. 40-41)

Whether young or old, all must learn not to yield to the body, not to allow its reactions and responses to determine what will be done. The body is to be accepted, but only as subject to conditions which make it function in ways and to a degree that it would not were it left to itself. (31:pp. 53-54)

[Man] should use his mind to quicken and guide his body...Only if he so structures and directs his body will he have a body that is used and not merely worked upon by what is external to it. (31:p. 54)

The dualistic structure immediately evident in the preceding statements is reinforced continuously in Weiss' analysis: the mind uses, controls, and alters the body; the mind must "...restrain, redirect, and protect the body"; (31:p. 40) and, finally, the body is an entity to be restructured, disciplined and conquered. (31:p. 217) The precise and pointed terminology in evidence throughout Weiss' investigation demonstrates rather clearly that, for him, the athlete utilizes the body as an object; the athlete must subdue and control his corporeal aspects. Weiss' orientation, thus, depicts the athlete as "possessing" a body rather than fully "being" a body.

In much of modern sport theory and practice, the human body is reified and reduced to the status of an object to be altered and manipulated or an obstacle to be surmounted. To utilize Sarano's suggestive metaphor, the body is perceived as an entity which "...must be bridled as a restive mount." (26:p. 63) Thus, in preparation for athletic endeavours the body is drilled, trimmed, strengthened, quickened and otherwise trained to improve its fitness and functioning and often handled as an instrument or utensil to be appropriately directed and mastered.

In accord with such an orientation, the anatomical, kinesiological, biomechanical and physiological sciences are intensely and tenaciously pursued and granted almost exclusive sanction to scrutinize, analyze, and manipulate man's corporeal nature and his participation in sport. As a result of this orientation, the athlete is regarded as "...capable of being completely understood by means of stimulus-response conditioning, laws of learning, transfer of training, and neurological brain wave analysis." (12:p. 176)

However, as the investigation of Merleau-Ponty's insightful phenomenology of the body, conducted in the previous section of this paper, demonstrated objective approaches are inappropriate and inadequate to fully comprehend the nature of man's embodied being. The "body-subject" not only is sensed but also does the sensing:

It can be seen and it can see itself; it can be touched and it can touch itself, and, in this latter respect, it comprises an aspect inaccessible to others, open in principle
only to itself. The body proper embraces a philosophy of the flesh as the visibility of the invisible. (21:p. 129)

The body perceived totally as object is, in a very legitimate sense, drained of its humanity; it is a dead body devoid of its vivifying, expressive and intentional abilities and qualities. The rejection of the Cartesian conception of the objectified body permits man to attain an increasing awareness of the depth and riches of his lived body and to approach it as a diverse and dynamic reality. Rather than perceiving human action as depersonalized movement largely comprehensible through external quantification, the manner in which much of contemporary sport is characterized, such activities may be openly apprehended as configurations inscribed with shapes and qualities expressive of the texture of the being of the participant.

"Nothing is more expressive than the human body, our hands and fingers, our dancing feet, our eyes, our voice, in joy and sorrow." (23:p. 114) It is through the gestures and actions of the lived body that man discloses, establishes and broadens the personal meanings of his pre-objective being in the world. (27:p. 143) Beyond rendering present the previously hidden, unexpressed, and inaccessible, man directly creates and projects new meanings and values through the dialogue between his embodied consciousness and the world.

Meanings arise through the body's power of expression. The moments of "intense realness" available to man in sport provide opportunities for the creation of new worlds and the restructuring of previous perceptions. Totally immersed in sport, man formulates and extends his powers, sense of self, and personal expression. The unfolding of meaningful activities unfolds man; through instances of dynamic individuation and self-discovery, man creates and affirms himself in sport.

Merleau-Ponty acknowledged that "...the body is the vehicle of an indefinite number of symbolic systems." (21:p. 9) Sport as a vibrant form of human enterprise, capable of embodying, exhibiting, and transmitting affective states and meanings, may be viewed as a symbolic language and potentially artistic activity releasing and celebrating the subjectivity of the participant.

Man is anchored and centered in the world through his body. By means of its pre-reflective interactions with the world, the body places man in an oriented situation and provides him with a locus for action and projection. The preconscious intentions and meanings of the body are taken up by man's conscious intentions. Engagement in sport reveals the body in its lived concreteness. Through such sojourns and bodily endeavors man discovers the depth and nature of his own character and resources. New awareness, self-perceptions, and meanings are elicited during participation in sport situations.

The open athlete apprehends and experiences his body neither solely as an object or instrument to be manipulated nor externally as others view him, but rather, as a structured entity totally, uniquely, unwaveringly and indelibly himself. "In sport, man is his body...when one is hit by tackle after tackle, or when one soars through the air on his skis, there is the realization that the 'I' and the 'body' are indeed united." (28:p. 41) The comportment of the body is the manner in which man exists for himself. He discovers his adroitness, skill and capabilities and also his limitations; he becomes aware of what he is and what he is not.

Sport also reveals to man that, although he is integrally a being-in-the-world, he is simultaneously distinct or marked off from it as an active,
conscious being asserting and structuring himself. In sum, sport permits man to attain acute insight into the mettle and depth of his basic existence as incarnate consciousness. It affords him the opportunity not only to openly perceive the nature of his embodiment, but it also "...multiplies, extends, consolidates, and confirms this insertion." (26:p. 154) The participant knows and experiences his body, and therefore himself, as he is, immediately and directly through concrete intermingling with the world in projects which express his unique being.

At this point it must be noted that the preceding analysis of the meaning of phenomenological anthropology for man's engagement in sport is by no means exhaustive. Although obviously fruitful for the task at hand, many concepts and areas of concern worthy of detailed thought and study were of necessity not included. To claim that all pertinent issues were discussed would be simultaneously presumptive, inaccurate and futile. The intent of the present investigation, rather, was to convey an indication of the positive directions to be derived from a phenomenological investigation of man in sport.

VI

The purpose of this study was to investigate the basis of contemporary perceptions of the ontological structure of man and, subsequently, to clarify some of the essential components of man's engagement in sport in relation to the formulated characterizations. To fulfill this task, the study addressed itself to the investigation of three themes: first, Descartes' philosophical work on the nature of man, particularly his formulation and attempted resolution of the mind-body problem; second, Merleau-Ponty's delineation of a phenomenological anthropology analyzing the same topic; and third, the meaning of the radical shift in the two ontological structures for man's participation in sport.

The preceding investigation attempted to demonstrate that the question of the interaction of mind and body develops into a problem of the magnitude faced by Descartes and his followers largely through postulation and categorization rather than human nature. "There is a mind-body problem because we think of minds and bodies in such a way that what is largely admitted to be a factual reality--a conscious body--almost inevitably turns out to be a theoretical impossibility." (5:p. 144)

Following an extended and diverse analysis of the interrelationship between mind and body, it was concluded that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of incarnated consciousness was a more adequate characterization of man than Descartes' dualistic conception. The objectified, mechanized view of the human body and the notion of mental and physical disparity, promulgated to a large extent by adherence to Cartesian categories, was replaced by a delineation of the lived-body emphasizing the inherent unity of man. In his efforts to rescue the malign and maltreated body, Merleau-Ponty expended considerable effort to restore man to an awareness of the basic nature, richness and value of his corporeal being and his various physical enterprises and manifestations.

The meaning of this radical shift in philosophical anthropology in relation to man's engagement in sport was discussed at some length. It will perhaps prove beneficial to present, instead of a detailed summary of the
results of this facet of the investigation, some selected concluding com-
ments in relation to man in sport.

Rather than continued repetition and support of hierarchical mind over
body conceptions of interaction (positing the mind to be totally dominant
over the simple, objectified, and mechanical body), it appears to be more
fruitful to transcend such notions and orientations. If mental and physical
polarieties are eliminated and reductive orientations altered, it is possible
to accord the physical aspects of man due respect as integral facets of man's
nature and subsequently rejoice in the total aspects of the conscious body.
Merleau-Ponty's description of the body as a work of art provides an approp-
riate summary of this orientation:

A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that
is, beings in which the expression is indistinguishable from
the thing expressed, their meaning, accessible only through
direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal
and spatial situation. It is in this sense that our body is
comparable to a work of art. It is a focal point of living
meanings, not the function of a certain number of mutually
variable terms. (19:p. 151)

If such a characterization is accepted, the distinctive potentialities
of man's participation in sport may be vigorously explored. Rather than
concentrating solely on the objectified, treadmill image of sport, predom-
inantly centered upon the development and attainment of physical strength,
motor skills, and technical efficiency, it appears legitimate and fruitful
to focus upon the full and meaningful lived experience of sport.

Through free, creative and personally significant movement and meaning-
bestowing bodily expression in sport, man asserts his uniqueness and affirms
himself. Man's actions in sport represent, express, and identify his
powers, intentionality and being. In sum, sport may be characterized as the
celebration of man as an open and expressive embodied being.

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