No Olympics, No Problem: New York City’s Political Regime after the Bid for the 2012 Games

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Abstract

For American cities wishing to host the Summer Olympic there is heavy competition on both the national and international level. The city’s bid committee staff, advertising, and logistics all cost millions of dollars. Even if the city is successful in winning the right to host the Games, there is no guarantee of making a profit. A recent example is the 2006 Torino Games where the $32,000,000 debt is now being paid for through the city’s public funds. Regime Theory, pioneered by Clarence Stone, Stephen Elkin, and others, provides a framework for understanding this phenomenon. A regime, or non-formal coalition of business and government interests, is a group which accepts a pro-development agenda. But regimes are informal coalitions, so a problem faced by scientists studying this phenomenon is how to study regimes directly.

My honors thesis offers a solution to this dilemma through a case study of New York City’s unsuccessful bid for the 2012 Summer Olympics. Due to Olympic requirements, the regime is forced into a formal organization, the bid committee. This committee produced two major publications outlining its development plans to the Olympic officials. When compared with other recent American Olympic bids, that regime’s bid planned on spending the most on such development. Also, 44% of the venues have since been developed after the bid failed. These results indicate that New York contains a strong regime which promoted its growth agenda through an Olympic bid. This study also provides insight into Chicago’s fairly similar reasons for bidding.
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Introduction

The modern Olympics began in 1896 in Athens, Greece. Only fourteen countries sent athletes to those Games (IOC "Olympic Games"). The sporting event was new and back then few might have guessed that the Olympic Games would be continuing on so strongly over a hundred years later. Yet, the path of the Olympics has never been a straight one. If one were to go back a few decades, the Olympics were on the verge of demise. Over time, the Olympics have repeatedly reinvented itself and that is why the Games have endured and thrived. Each Games has been shaped and molded by the politics of the host governments. Some used the Games to elevate the city’s place in the world. Others used the Olympics to promote personal beliefs or government ideologies.

Each Olympiad has been well documented through official reports and photographs by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In cities that have more recently hosted the Games, social scientists have published commentaries on the politics, the economics, and the social impact of the Games on the local cities. But what is lacking in the literature is the study of cities that have lost bids for the Olympics. As of present, 21 cities have played host to the Summer Games. In the past 30 years alone there have been 41 failed bids for the Olympics\(^1\) on the international level. This figure does not even include the many serious bids by cities that, for a multitude of reasons, did not make it to the international level.

As of yet, I have found only one research study covering a failed bid attempt. This was Harry H. Hiller’s article on Capetown, South Africa’s bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics.

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\(^1\) Please note that references in this paper refer to the Summer Olympics, unless otherwise marked. In principle, however, similar conclusions should apply to lost bid attempts for the Winter Olympics.
Olympics. Hiller provides an excellent look into the city politics by looking at the bid plans. The author uses the case study to raise the concept of a mega-event as part of a humanitarian agenda of the city’s elite (Hiller).

Otherwise, failed Olympic bids are underutilized. Like Hiller, I argue that studying an Olympic bid will give an insight into the political decision-making process of the city in question. Though the IOC has increasingly regulated the way the Olympics are to be held, there is still much variability, city to city, in how they would host the Games. The Olympics acts like a lens, focusing the energies of a city in the direction in which they would like to proceed. As I will show in this paper, this is apparent in my case study of New York City’s bid to host the 2012 Olympics (NYC 2012).

What makes failed Olympic bids so useful is that the IOC keeps boosting the amount of information required in its bid process. Cities on the international level must submit in-depth reports running to hundreds of pages in length. In America there is even more first-hand documentation in the form of “bid books” with similar details that are sent to the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) even before the competition on the international level begins. Add to this the fact that the Olympics maintain a certain altruistic aura that makes Olympic bids very popular in the press and thus there is a surprising amount of information out there waiting to be researched. As such, the Olympic bids are among the most documented policy proposals made by a city.

As I will explain more thoroughly in the section devoted to theories of urban politics, there are many ways that have been used to model the decision-making process within different cities. All these theories indicate that legal, formalized processes of a city are only a part of the decision-making process. The processes also have an informal element. The city government must deal with different influences that may pull in
contradictory directions. How these are settled and how policy is actually made are often the parts of the process least seen by an observer. In fact, recent theories of urban politics, such as Growth Machine and Regime Theory, highlight informal coalitions. The informal nature makes direct study of policymaking hard to accomplish.

Another advantage of failed Olympic bids is that they can force the metaphorical giant squid out from the ocean depths. Each city must form a bid committee to present their bid. NYC 2012’s structure can be seen in Chart I, below.
Chart I: Bid Committee Organizational Chart from NYC 2012 Candidature File
What you see is a rarity: NYC 2012’s structure is a formalization of an informal public/private coalition. The government is represented by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg. The private component from industry is led by the founder of the bid, Dan L. Doctoroff. Within this paper, I will use my own data, as well as existing resources, to explicate how the bid committee provides a bridgehead to understanding the informal coalition. Many private supporters of the bid are also important, although not shown on the chart. Together these public and private interests have a united interest in transforming the city through physical redevelopment. Perhaps this analysis will not work in all cases, but with respect to serious American bids within the last thirty years, understanding bid committees can have important consequences to understanding political theory.

Within this thesis, I focus on New York City as a case study. I picked New York in particular because in the aftermath of losing its bid for the 2012 Olympics, the City has redeveloped a sizable number of the venue sites, some for the same reasons as had been detailed in the bid book. Perhaps this could have easily made sense if the city were preparing for a bid for the next Olympics. If so, it might be logical to create some more venues so that the bid committee could then announce to the IOC how many more existing sports facilities they have. This might potentially help ones chances for a subsequent bid. But New York announced it had no intention of pursuing the 2016 Olympics.

The real reasons behind the redevelopment are more complex, but with the help of the documentation from the bid committees, we are able to understand them more thoroughly. The NYC 2012 bid and its predecessor in 1977 both provide a gateway into
understanding New York City policymaking. By comparing this bid with other recent American bids, it becomes clear that the reasons New York has pursued the Olympics is heavily motivated by the desire for new development in venues, parks, and infrastructure. Comparing the two bids themselves indicates that New York’s regime or public/private coalition has grown stronger politically and more focused on the private element in the years since the first bid. This well-maintained regime both during and after the bid has allowed it to continue to pursue many of its development projects even with the Olympic plans no longer having any meaning. To present such a case, I introduce the new development of Queens West that is nearly identical to the proposed Olympic Village on the same site. There are also sites where the limits of politics and alternative coalitions have required alternate development plans such as the proposed West Side Stadium. As a third possible outcome after the bid’s loss, I introduce the proposed velodrome. This would have been a multi-million dollar facility in the heart of the poorest areas of the entire country. Without being forced to make the facility as part of an Olympics, the velodrome lacked any real support. However, the regime has been able to use the Olympics as a way to jumpstart another more pragmatic development project on the same site. Finally, there are sites such as the proposed yacht marina where no further development is likely even with a strong developmental regime, due to intrinsic characteristics of the sites. In each case the combination of a regime intent on transforming the city and a legacy of the Olympic bid have shaped sites to what they are today or will be soon.
Understanding the Olympics as a Socio-Political Construct

Mega-Event Politics and the Olympic Games

Many cities promote urban development and change through the hosting of major events. This concept is known as the “urban spectacle” (Harvey). These events, whether they are fairs, major sporting events, or convention centers, are all seen to be part of a new city government that is more proactive and entrepreneurial (Essex and Chalkley). This is a result of myriad changes in the socio-economic nature of American cities during the late twentieth century. As traditional industry has waned in most large cities and gone abroad, the cities have had to try to find a new role. Without the industry tax-base, cities began to search for new ways to promote growth. Successful cities in this new era are proactive, searching out potential commercial and tourist activities. The spread of communication technology and the opening up of trade to much of the world after the end of the Cold War, sometimes referred to as globalization, provide incentive for cities to be proactive. When location means less to a company, it is more likely to move elsewhere where there are more favorable economic conditions. City leaders see themselves in a constant struggle to expand development, both in new physical infrastructure development and by bringing more companies into existing space. They often do so through intense lobbying and tax breaks. However, there is no denying that competition among cities for resources has its limits given that businesses are not liquid
assets that can be transferred at the push of a button. To move from a location to another takes both significant money and time.

These cities have harnessed large events known as urban spectacles as one method of being proactive. In more recent years since Harvey’s groundbreaking work, there has been a focus on “Hallmark Events” or mega-events (Essex and Chalkley 188). I will refer to these occurrences as mega-events throughout the thesis. Mega-events include a wide range of events that include large fairs, festivals, expositions, and cultural and sporting events that can be held once or on a regular basis. These events in and of themselves are not a new phenomenon, dating at least as far back as the Great Exposition of 1851 in London. Mega-events are meant to provide “an opportunity for international commerce, competition, co-operation and/or celebration” (Essex and Chalkley).

An archetypal mega-event is the Olympic Games. When cities bid for the Olympic Games\(^2\), they are pursuing an event of giant proportions. It holds the prospects of not just higher occupancy in hotels and more tourism dollars (often referred to as economic impact), but of drastic changes to the city’s structure. In fact, it can be fit into a large number of different agendas as the next section on the history of the Olympics will showcase.

\section*{An Olympic History}

The Olympic Games have a history that is important to understand in the big picture of the NYC 2012 bid. Though the sporting triumphs and drama provide most of

\footnote{\textsuperscript{2} As I will explain in the section on bid committees, it is more correct to say “when bid committees bid for the Olympic Games”.
}
the press interest, equally as fascinating is the politics behind the scene. There have been several distinct eras in the Games.

The modern Olympics began in 1896 in Athens, and for the Olympics’ first few decades it was not exceptionally large on the world scene. As late as 1932, the Los Angeles Games had only one-tenth the number of athletes as the Sydney Games of 2000: rising from 1,332 to 10,651 athletes (IOC "Olympic Games"). Thirty-seven countries were represented in 1932. By the 2000 Games that number had reached 199 (IOC "Olympic Games"). During the early twentieth century, much more influential mega-events for a city and its host country were the World Fairs (Essex and Chalkley). In fact, when St. Louis hosted both events in 1904, the Olympics, by the IOC’s own account, “were lost in the chaos of a World’s Fair” (IOC "Olympic Games").

This began to change with the Berlin Olympics of 1936 and the selection of Japan to host both the Winter and Summer Olympics in 1940 (IOC "Olympic Games"). Though the 1940 Games were cancelled in Japan due to its war with China and then the start of World War II, the Tokyo Olympics would probably have played out like those of Berlin. The Games grew in scale and took on a nationalistic undertone. While athletes competed on the field, they became representations of their national ideologies. Adolf Hitler attempted to use the Olympics to validate Nazi ideology and the superiority of the Aryan race. Famously, African-American Jesse Owens beat out the supposedly racially superior German athletes on his way to four gold medals. The Games were held on a more massive scale than ever before and the first use of television broadcasts allowed German people on the street to watch the Games (IOC "Olympic Games"). Combined, these efforts indicated a new level of nationalistic pride in hosting the Games.
After the war, the nationalistic theme returned. But political, security, and financial troubles began to plague the Olympics. In 1968, massive riots occurred in Mexico City during the same summer that the city played host to the Olympics. The infamous 1972 Munich Games are well known for the terrorist infiltration and murders of the Israeli contingent in the Olympic Village. Perhaps the lowest moment in its repute was the 1976 Montreal Olympics which ran billions of dollars over budget (CBC). The Games of the 1960s and 1970s had left a legacy in the form of buildings and stadiums. But many of these buildings had only a one time use and had little practical purpose after the games. In a way, these Games were not far off from the aims of older Games except instead of showcasing the country, Montreal focused on the province of Quebec. But there had just been too much done in the city with no real economically sensible plan behind. Thus the result was a US $1,500,000,000 debt following the Games. A recent article recently put just how disastrous the Olympics had been managed in perspective. Over thirty years after the closing ceremony of the Montreal Olympics, the Games are still being paid for through tax revenue (CBC). Holger Preuss noted these extravagant, publicly-financed Games demonstrated “the growing gigantism of the Olympics” (Preuss 7).

That same year, the IOC-approved host of the Winter Olympics dropped out. My beloved hometown of Denver held a referendum to approve a $5,000,000 bond issue to finance the Games. A majority of the voters opposed the use of public funds and made it impossible for Denver to play host to the Winter Games. Thus, it dropped out. This embarrassed the USOC and led to a stricter application process, including proof that the citizens of a bid city are favorable to hosting the Olympics (LAOOC). The Olympics appeared to cities to be unprofitable and a drain on public revenue.
Yet as we all know, the Olympics did continue. This represented yet another reinvention by host cities about what the Summer Olympics’ goals were to them politically. Some improvement was seen with the 1980 Moscow and Lake Placid Winter Games, but the real breakthrough came with the 1984 Olympic Games. At first this should seem out of place. As seen on Chart II, that year the number of cities submitting bids to the IOC had fallen all the way down to one bid – Los Angeles.

Chart II: Number of Cities Submitting Bids for the Summer Olympics, 1976 to 2008

Los Angeles produced an Olympics that was almost unprecedented in both financing sources and profitability. It broke many of the rules on how to host the games. The fundamental change for the event was that the bid came almost exclusively from the private sector through the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games (SCCOG). Started in 1939 with the goal of bringing a return of the Olympics to Los

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3 Due to IOC rules, only one city per country can be put forward. New York City also applied for the Games but lost the U.S. nomination to Los Angeles. Thus New York City’s bid was never submitted to the IOC.
Angeles, the SCCOG had bid for the Games nine times unsuccessfully before winning on their tenth attempt in 1978 (SCCOG). Though the city government was not opposed to the bid, its commitment to fiscal support was very minimal. A referendum that prevented Los Angeles from using any of its tax revenues to organize the games passed overwhelmingly in November 1978 (LAOOC). This served as an extreme contrast to previous bids especially the Montreal Olympics⁴, which had been led by government officials and heavily used public funds (CBC).

As soon as Los Angeles became the USOC approved bidding city, it gained leverage over the IOC because, as seen in Chart II, Los Angeles was the one and only bid for the Olympics on the international level. For instance, the IOC had voted in its 1977 session meeting in Prague that future host cities and their national governments would have to commit themselves contractually to assuming all financial liability for hosting the Games. Yet, the IOC made a major exception to this rule to allow Los Angeles to host the Games with no guarantees of financial liability from any level of government (LAOOC). Additionally, the IOC typically chose a bid from amongst a group of applicants each trying to outdo the other, in terms of facilities and services. Without such competition, the IOC was left to approve facilities that typically would not have been considered. Thus the opening and closing ceremonies and track and field were held in the same stadium built for Los Angeles’ 1932 Olympic Games (Andranovich, Burbank and Heying).⁵

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⁴ The bid process for the 1984 Olympics actually was held in 1977 and 1978. This means that Montreal was a recent and disastrous event in the eyes of many, making LA’s desire for the bid seem even the more extraordinary.

⁵ This was not because the Olympic committee wished to use the stadium again. Rather, as Andranovich 2001 mentions, the city actively limited public expenditure forcing the committee to reconsider their idea of a new stadium.
Also an important change in these Olympics was the massive expansion of private sponsorship and TV rights. Indeed, Chart III shows that there was more than a three-fold increase in revenue from these sources compared to the Moscow 1980 Games. This change made it easier to plan Olympic financing because Los Angeles had more knowledge of the underlying money that the committee would receive for the Olympics. Overall, the Los Angeles bid represented the first bid to go by modern urban policy, whereby a city uses the bid to increase investment and business (Essex and Chalkley).

**Chart III: Revenues from Sponsorships and Television Rights**

The combination of concessions by the IOC, private sponsorship and television rights led to the success of the Los Angeles Olympics. Instead of massive debt, the
Olympics actually made a profit of over $200,000,000\textsuperscript{6}. The profits were split with 20% going to the USOC and 20% to the IOC. The remaining 60% “to be used for the general benefit of sport” (Philip Hersh). This portion of the Los Angeles Olympics’ profits were used to endow the Amateur Athletic Foundation (AAF). The AAF is a non-profit institution that supports youth sports programming in Southern California. The AAF also operates the Paul Ziffren Sports Resource Center where on an Undergraduate Research Grant I found a variety of information on both recent bids by New York City, in addition to their information on the 1984 Olympic Games (Amateur Athletic Foundation).

Those Games began a new phase of Olympics: development and financial success. The Olympics became a massive affair, generating large amounts of development in the 1988 Games in Seoul, 1992 Games in Barcelona, and the 1996 Games in Atlanta. In each city, the Olympics left a large legacy of Olympic facilities. For example, Barcelona used the Olympics as an opportunity to invest in new transportation systems and to redevelop a run-down coastal area of the city through a new marina, leisure facilities and sandy beaches (Malfas, Theodoraki and Houlihan). Atlanta also experience intense development in the form of an Olympic Stadium that is now where the Braves, a major league baseball team, play. Also, they created an Olympic Park that is still often a major venue for events (ACOG). As Chart II shows, the number of bids for the games has increased almost without fail since Los Angeles. While even 10 bids for the 2004 or 2008 Games may not seem to matter much compared with the one bid in 1984, it must be underscored that this constitutes a massive reversal of fortunes for the IOC. In 1984, the IOC allowed Los Angeles to host the Games without obeying the

\textsuperscript{6}This was quite large given that the total earnings were projected according to the original financial plan in 1979 to equal only $21,000,000 liquid assets. At the time though, even this modest profit was criticized in the press as unrealistic.
IOC’s own rules. It also allowed the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) to use pre-existing existing venues, even when new facilities would have been preferable to the IOC. In 2007, a city unable to fulfill IOC rules would not make it very far competing against several cities that do qualify. Also, with the possible exception of Los Angeles’ current bid for the 2016 Games, most cities attempt to outdo their competition through plans for new venues and infrastructure.

Already it appears that the Olympics is returning to its nationalistic tendencies, based on the 2004 Games in Athens and the planned 2008 Games in Beijing. In both cases, the Games are costing the host governments billions of dollars (they are much more expensive than Los Angeles’ 1984 Games) and are causing massive change to the physical urban landscape in the form of venue and hotel construction and infrastructure improvements, similar to what Montreal and Berlin experienced.

As the history indicates, the modern Olympic Games have not been static in nature. Not only have cities pursued the games for different reasons, but there have also been major changes in the very nature of the Games: the size, the influence of technology and the power relationship between the IOC and city-organized bid committees. The Olympics should be seen as the mega-event of mega-events. It is so big and its impact so diverse that the intentions of a city wishing to host the Olympics play a larger role in the consequences of the Games than in other mega-events.

The Olympic Bidding Process

To become the host of the Olympics, a city must win IOC approval through an extensive bidding process. In recent years, the bidding process winning the Olympics has
become an extremely complicated affair for bidding cities. Not only has there been more competition among cities, but the process has become more formalized, relying on more complete, complicated bid materials. The IOC asks each city’s bid committee to create a bid book, from which a working group of IOC administration members and external experts can assess each city’s ability to host the Games. These bid books are not small affair and require that the bid committee have expertise not just in the financing and coordination of the Games, but also in such remote details as why local weather is conducive to sports and how Olympism and culture interact in that location. Altogether, each bid book is analyzed along 16 technical criteria. Based on this assessment, the cities are ranked, and all but the top five cities are cut from the running. Then each of those final cities files another application called the candidature file, which is then scrutinized by another IOC committee. The candidature file answers the same or a similar set of questions as those answered in the bid book for the USOC. The main difference is that the answers are generally more in depth and contain updated information. Only then does the full IOC membership convene and vote for a host (IOC "London 2012: Election"). Following the Salt Lake City corruption scandals, there have been radical efforts to reduce corruption by increasing the technical details of the bidding process.

If I had been referring to Moscow, Paris or Madrid’s failed bids, then the description above would have told the full story. However, for New York City or any other city in the U.S., the bid required an even longer, more technical process. The American bids must first be selected by the USOC. Since the 1984 Los Angeles Games, almost all American bids have followed a similar format. Each individual city’s bid committee is a non-profit organization composed of local business leaders, elected officials, and economic development bureaucrats (as was the case with NYC 2012). Due
to escalating competition in the bidding process, many cities have begun advertising the
bid to the city’s citizens and lobbying the USOC and the IOC. To finance the advertising
and lobbying, American bid committees rely heavily on support from corporate donors.
Also, to compete for the USOC’s approval, the city government must approve of the bid
committees efforts for the Games (Andranovich, Heying and Burbank).

The bidding process for the Olympics is the most complicated and longest of any
modern mega-event that a city might attempt to undertake. The process also indicates
that American bid committees must of necessity be a regime or public/private
partnership. Within almost every bid is a private component outside of the city
government. When combined with the public element, a bid committee is created. Thus,
the bid committee is a dual-faceted coalition of public and private interests. This is
understandable given that:

1. For the United States, neither the city nor the national government gives any sort
of legal financial guarantee for the Olympics.

2. For both the bid and the possible Olympic Games to be successful, cities need to
search for a resource that they do not possess: financial backing.

Thus, the city government forms a regime in which private industry support enables the
government to pursue its interests.

For an American city, the bid committee acts as a more complete regime than is
the case elsewhere. In most countries, bids are supported directly by the national
government. Here, at least since the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Games, no government
on any level will offer a guarantee of monetary support. This was introduced by the US
following the Montreal Games huge deficit-spending which was mostly paid for at the
last moment by the provincial government of Quebec. The American government wished
to avoid promising to pay the bills for an Olympics which had up to that point been seen as a deficit-creating venture. The result has also meant that the funds must be insured through other sources. These include both local and state funds and a large amount of private donations. Though after the terrorist attack at Atlanta the federal government has provided tens of millions of dollars in security funding, this is very much the exception that proves the rule (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)).

Finally, the time frame of the Games is essential to understanding its politics. As will be discussed in a later chapter, the bid committee for New York hosting the 1984 Olympics lasted less than a year from start up to its loss to Los Angeles. Currently the framework for bid committees has increased to years, not months. Also, once selected, the city has but seven years to put together the entire Olympic Games. It provides the city with a definite deadline for completion of all of its projects. As the author realizes with this thesis, deadlines are highly effective at making projects, long ignored, suddenly appear in short notice.

If some of the political concepts discussed in the last few paragraphs are new, despair not. The next section, Theories on Urban Politics, will illuminate the subject further.
Theories of Urban Politics

Modern urban theories began to take shape in the 1950s. The theory of elitism was a result of the work of Floyd Hunter and his book *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers* published in 1953. Here Hunter discussed his research into power relations concerning an anonymous “Regional City”\(^7\). In his research he used the reputational method, by which Hunter compiled a list of people in society and then had people identify who they saw as the “Top Leaders”. Hunter is asserting that having a reputation for power is where real power lies. The result was that out of the 40 most powerful people in the city, only four were members of government. Most “men of power” were actually from a private elite group of citizen policy-makers (Hunter 76). Since Hunter, other political scientists have introduced other theories that hold the general principle of an elite group within the decision-making process.

Another theory of urban politics is pluralism. One of the first social scientists to advocate this theory was Robert Dahl whose case study was New Haven, Connecticut. For Dahl the city was fragmented and no elite could control local politics (Dahl). Over the years this theory has been expanded. There are several necessary components to the theory as stated by Grant Jordan in his well received article in 1990. First like Dahl originally theorized power is decentralized and fragmented within a city, and no person or oligarchy can ever execute total control of a city. Expounding upon this idea, Jordan points out that in any major city there are so many bureaucratic boards, public input forums, and political players vying for power that no small group of actors can ever fully control the political process. Additionally there are dispersed inequalities among all the

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\(^7\) It was well-known, however, that “Regional City” was Atlanta, Georgia.
groups. This means that each group has some resources (money, media, voting power) to rely on to achieve its interests in the political process (Jordan). All groups possess some level of resources even when their demands are not necessarily acted upon or acted upon successfully (Judge, Stoker and Wolman). Jordan also points out that pluralism holds a belief that political outcomes are a result of “different processes, different actors, and different distributions of power” within a number of institutions. Also important is that many of the processes being used by the various actors are actually outside the legislative institutions and the formal structure of elections in liberal democracy. This brings up the idea that accountability may not be present as most decision-making is made outside the realm of the public in general.

In recent years, the pluralist ideology has produced offshoots called neo-pluralism and hyperpluralism. Neo-pluralism asserts that indeed the various interests have input into policy-making but that private business interests have a privileged position in the bargaining process (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 29). Hyperpluralism asserts that competition and diversity among interests has increased. Such increases have led to more fragmentation, instability, and chaos in the bargaining process. This has also made it more difficult for any one interest to hold a privileged role (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 24).

Another theory, growth machine, suggests that these previous theories do not take seriously enough the impact of land development in urban politics. Growth machine theory’s main premise is that land development issues are not simply one issue of concern to an elite coalition but the essential, formative agenda. Because most major cities are now surrounded by other smaller, incorporated, cities, the room for outward expansion is very limited. Additionally, even for private elites, modern metropolitan
have a shortage of vacant land in suitable locations. Thus land within a city takes on a
greater meaning for political elites because redevelopment ends up being often the only
way to gain new parks, sports venues, or real estate. For Harvey Molotch, the pioneer of
growth machine theory, the visions of pluralism and elitism did not take into account
power relations and resources underpinning the formation and development policies of
cities. At the center of city policies are the powerful rentier class, which consists of the
developers, realtors, and banks that have a fundamental interest in the exchange value of
land as property. Helping the growth machine are auxiliary players who support the
actions of the rentier class, driven by a similar desire for growth. These may include the
media, universities, utility companies, professional sports franchises, chambers of
commerce, and others. Not only is the rentier class interested in generating money from
increasing property values, but it also wishes to instill a pro-development ideology into
the general population. Molotch suggests that parades and advertising for development
plans are meant to create a “we feeling” among the community (Molotch; Jonas).

Despite efforts to create a community within the city, there are still conflicts over
development plans. Such conflicts, however, tend to follow set interest groups. There
are those who gain monetarily from the exchange value of land, and there are those who
gain through the land’s use. In these conflicts between growth and use interests, the
growth interests usually win, since the activism against the rentier class is usually one
level of government higher than the level of government where the oppositional activists
are petitioning. The growth machine in any city must also compete against the growth
machines of the other cities. Thus, the theory understands regional interplay of cities as
competitive and zero-sum in nature. There are winners and losers (Jonas).
Researchers have suggested growth machines in several American cities. Some researchers since Dahl have reevaluated New Haven using newer data suggesting that policy-making is not done through pluralism, but by a growth machine because development decisions were made by an alliance of the mayor, planning office and the downtown business interests (Jonas 74). This may indicate the reason that the African-American civil rights agenda was not usually addressed. The government and downtown business leaders were much more interested in profitable land development than in social agendas.

Others have found that until the recession in the 1990s, Los Angeles emphasized a growth machine unparalleled in American cities. In William Fulton’s book The Reluctant Metropolis, he suggested that developmental policy of Los Angeles has been centralized, not in City Hall, but in the Chamber of Commerce because of their close ties to business executives who control the growth machine of developers, bankers, publishers and to City Hall (Fulton). However, the theory and the book seem unclear how the deal with metropolitan areas as opposed to just the central cities. For instance, in the case of the Olympic committee that pursues bids for Los Angeles, the organization’s name is the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games. Another example is the Better Business Bureau of the Southlands. Both of these titles indicate the complexities of a metropolitan area. Though Los Angeles may be seen as the major city of the region, a growth machine would need to incorporate various business interests from other cities in the region. For example, in both Los Angeles’ current bid and the 1984 Olympics, several venues are planned outside of Los Angeles city limits. In Long Beach where the current bid plans to place a new temporary swimming pool and diving well, as well as thirteen venues in existing facilities (Phillip Hersh). The tax revenue and
influx of income to construction firms would lead to a positive gain for Long Beach. But in no way is this detrimental to Los Angeles, because it gains from finding a place to hold the event that was not possible to hold in Los Angeles. The result is positive for both cities, and the city in this case does not seem to act as a zero-sum game.

Another theory is Paul Peterson’s city limits thesis. In this theory, there is mutual recognition that developmental policies are the most important. Such policies are more important than allocation policies (those that provide equal public services to all residents) and redistributive policies. Redistributive policies are very limited on the local level and are greatly eclipsed by even modest actions by the federal government. Thus, nearly everyone within the city agrees on this ideology in the face of competition among cities (Peterson).

But the theory used in this paper that has supplanted other theories for many urban theorists is regime theory. It is a theory that attempts to explain a factor about which both elitism and pluralism were unclear: understanding the informal political relationship between public and private forces (Judge, Stoker and Wolman). The theory was also developed in response to the assumption by Peterson that there was a “mutual recognition” that developmental policies were most important in politics. Regime theory counters that different interests within the city do fight for very different goals. Development’s success and failure was not a result of some sort of benevolent reciprocal agreement, so the theory goes, but it is based on the political maneuvering of a public/private coalition. The core of development policy-making in the city is within this loose coalition of pro-growth interests, known as the regime (Judge, Stoker and Wolman).
Regimes form out of an inability of governments to achieve policy goals, thus public actors form informal coalitions with private actors having resources essential to overcoming obstacles for the city (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 59). For a coalition to be and remain successful in promoting its agenda it must follow the “Iron Law” – it must mobilize resources to achieve its goals. This law suggests that within the coalition there are a set of goals agreed upon by all parties in the coalition. While the regime is usually successful, Clarence Stone argued that the resultant public policy within a city is usually defined as the result of three dimensions (Stone):

1) composition of a community’s governing coalition
2) the nature of the relationships among members of the governing coalition
3) the resources that members bring to the governing coalition

To better understand the regime, I will go into a little more depth about its composition. Participants include elected officials and members of business. However, the public/private partnership does not end there. In many regimes, other players may include community leaders whose power is influence over minority areas such as neighborhoods or even organized labor. Regimes may also include technical professionals such as bureaucrats, though this is more common in Europe than in America (Judge, Stoker and Wolman). Throughout this work when the term regime is used, I am referring to the following definition: A regime is a non-formal organization of both public and private interests that pursues a pro-development agenda. In this paper, New York City’s regime will refer the local city officials and powerful developers that set the city’s pro-development agenda.

Each theory presented provides a way of explaining public policy at the city or possibly regional level. While no one theory can perfectly model the behavior of any one
city or for that matter all American cities, there are clearly theories that better explain behavior. As will be seen throughout, the regime theory does the best job of explaining city politics both during and after the bid. It avoids the Marxist tones of similar theories such as Molotch’s growth machine. With a literature review of urban political theories complete, the next step is to move on to understanding New York’s two Olympic bids in the context of its underlying control by a political regime.
Comparing Two New York Regimes Through Olympic Bid

Documents: 1977 and at Present

The Regime of 1977

While there have been regimes for a long time, these regimes and their compositions have changed immensely. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than with a comparison to New York’s last great bid attempt in 1977, for the 1984 Olympics. This comparison will show that not only was the development of the Olympics facilities not seen in the earlier bid, but that the Olympics too have changed its own format. A combination of a more government-heavy regime and the nature of the Olympics in 1977 both indicate that the construction boom seen today is based on different input than occurred in the last bid.

References to this bid are surprisingly hard to come by, considering that this bid attempt was the closest that New York City has ever come to actually hosting the Olympic Games. There are a number of reasons for this. For one, the bid, from formation to its loss was measured in months not years like NYC 2012. It never really received long-term press coverage. Also, NYC 2012 was created over a half decade before the IOC made its final selection in Singapore in 2005. When the City of New York decided to pursue the 1984 Olympics, the final vote by the USOC\(^8\) was only one year away. Also, this came during one of the lowest points of the Olympics popularity. New York is only 320 miles away from Montreal as the crow flies (Encyclopedia

\(^8\) As will be explained shortly, the winner of the USOC nomination would essentially be given the IOC nod to host the games.
New York was lobbying to host the Olympics that only a year earlier had been a financial disaster for its northern neighbor. Not only that, but the citizens of Denver, Colorado had been so scared that the Olympics would ruin the quality of life in the region and would spend exorbitant amounts of taxpayer money that they had turned down the Winter Olympics even after they were given the chance to host them. Rather than simply a fiscal vote, the election seemed more a referendum on Denverites’ opinions of the Olympics. The result as discussed earlier was a condemnation. Whether referring to Americans or New Yorkers, the attitude towards the Olympics was at a very low point.

As the reader is aware, Los Angeles won their bid, but what is important to emphasize in this section was that New York City bid to host the Olympics as well. In fact, for all the money, time, and energy spent on the 2012 bid, the closest that New York ever got to hosting the Games was runner up in the bid for the 1984 Games. Originally six American cities, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, Los Angeles and New York, indicated their interests in hosting the Games to the USOC. However, by the time the USOC met to decide the winning city on September 25, 1977, only New York and Los Angeles remained. Los Angeles won USOC approval winning by a vote of 55 to 39. Given that there were 94 voting delegates, New York had only been nine votes away from hosting the Olympics (LAOOC).

In the end, New York’s bid was unsuccessful but an analysis of the politics along the way shows a government-centered bid, as opposed to the equal public/private partnership of NYC 2012. One method of looking into this difference is by analyzing each bid’s respective bid book and possibly the candidature file. I will focus on how these documents show differences in the political form of the bid committee. The first major difference is the role of members of government. For the bid committee for the
2012 Games, the book contains guarantees in the form of letters of support for the Games from both the mayor and governor, but is clearly being submitted by NYC 2012, a private non-profit organization. The city had given its right to submit the book to this private group. This is suggestive of a regime, in which the city is using the private sector to produce the bid book, because the private interests have the money and resources to devote to publishing the work. The Olympics is in both their interests, and this method is thus beneficial to both parties.

By contrast, the bid book for the 1984 Games was heavily influenced by government on multiple levels. While the book notes the origins of the bid in “several early, independent conversations involving many of New York’s civic leaders” (Carey et al. 0.1), their role was minimal, as if private interests were amenable but not necessary for the bid. All official action for the bid came from both the State and City of New York. Their big organization for the bid took the form of “a joint State and City feasibility study” to determine whether New York City could hold the Olympics (Carey et al.). Finally, the bid was formally submitted not by any one entity or even just the city itself. It was submitted by the State Speaker of the Assembly, Minority Leader of the Assembly, President Pro-Tem of the Senate, Minority Leader of the Senate, the Governor and the Mayor (Carey et al.). While the regime was present in the bid, the role of public government on multiple levels played a larger role. Not only was the influence of private agents much smaller than in the NYC 2012 bid, the bid also was heavily supported by the State government.

The budget of the bid book for 1984 also shows how different NYC 2012’s detailed plans were. The NYC 2012 Bid Book was extremely detailed, separating

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9 As will be seen in the section concerning the West side stadium, state support was more conditional under the bid for the 2012 Games
out all venues and discussing their costs, sources of funding (private, public, mix, etc.), and the venues current state (existing, planned, new for the Games). The bid committee then had a whole page detailing all expenses and their expected monetary price and all revenues and their amounts (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)). Back in 1977, New York’s bid committee did have to answer IOC mandated questions in their candidature file on their budget. Instead of ledger lines and hard numbers, the budget section consisted of a total of two paragraphs of description. Thirty-five percent were to be funded through the sale of television rights and promotional and licensing rights, tickets, programs, and commemorative coins stamps, and medals, internationally. The rest would be funded through “several possible sources of public funds” (Carey et al.). The budget argues that New York City, along with “Federal and State recreation, transportation, public works and housing fund programs” could be fund sources. It even suggested direct federal funding and a special Olympic Lottery program as further sources (Carey et al.). The budget information for the 1984 Games was clearly less precise, but it can still be seen that the emphasis was much more heavily on the use of various public funds to promote the Games than in the 2012 bid\textsuperscript{10}. So there is less private influence in both the bid committee and in the sources of funds. Whether a public/private coalition existed is not in question, but by comparing the bid books it can be seen that they played a more minor role, at least in official documents.

While the political structure and the make up of the regime were different from today, there was still an emphasis on development that was present even back in 1977. The largest and most controversial of these projects is the Roosevelt Island-based

\textsuperscript{10} This may appear surprising given that this bid is being made right around the time when New York City went bankrupt! Nevertheless, as will be discussed, the vote for the bid city was still relatively close. So perhaps, the USOC delegates knew things unavailable in the bid book.
Olympic Village. Here a public corporation, the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), had been trying since the 1960s to build another large housing complex on the island called Southtown (Martin). And while the UDC had been successfully been building public mega-projects during the 1960s and early 1970s, in 1975 their “moral obligation” bonds defaulted. Defaulting on these bonds did not lead to legal-issues since the bonds were only back by a “moral” rather than legal obligation, but obviously sources of revenue for new projects stopped coming into the UDC offices. It was just one year after the defaulted bonds that an Olympic Study Project (OSP) found that not only could New York host the Games but that not yet built Southtown would be the ideal location for the Olympic Village (Carey et al.). Perhaps it was only coincidence that the head of the OSP happened to be the former head of the UDC (Martin), but I would go so far to believe that the choosing of Southtown as the Olympic Village had everything to do with bringing a stalled mega-project to completion and not chance. The Olympics offered an opportunity for the UDC to overcome their recent inability to get the project off the ground. The bid committee suggested a special Olympic Lottery pay the cost of the Village which amounted to just over a $100,000,000 when proposed in 1977 (Martin). Imagine an entire lottery just for fundraising one mega-event -- for the UDC the Olympics must have seemed a gold-mine for supporting development.

Development did not stop there. Flushing Meadows was to be an Olympic Park, while the 63rd Street Subway was to, after many failed attempts, add a stop on Roosevelt Island, better connecting it to the rest of the city (Carey et al.). Several physical development projects were meant to be completed by use of the Olympics and the ability of the Olympics at the time to loosen up the pockets of many public governments.
The emphasis on development through public funds may have been a consequence of Robert Moses upon New York politics. Moses, while never an elected official, was able to personally develop large swaths of land under the auspices of bureaucratic positions. In 1957, towards the height of his 44 years in power, his agency was investing twice as much in urban renewal as the entire United States excluding New York City (Caro 13). His longevity may well have left marks still present in New York politics nearly a decade after he left his final political office.

The Olympics and the Regime of Today

Why a city would bid for a sporting event has been studied within a number of frameworks. A study by P.R. Emery contacted 46 different cities that had bid for various sporting mega-events. From these interviews, Emery made a list detailing the reasons that the different cities pursued hosting mega-events. The most common were personal
reasons. For example, a political leader might get involved in hopes of increasing his chances of being re-elected in the next election. The second most common reason was to develop and promote a particular sport in the region. Next most common was the desire to use existing sports facilities to their maximum potential. Tourism was then cited as another reason some cities chose to bid for a sports event. Then, and only then, did regional economic development show up on the list of reasons. Though noted the least, sustainable development was also cited as a reason for hosting an event (Brighenti et al.; Emery). Emery’s results show just how multi-faceted a bid could be. No bid was entirely straightforward nor could it be pigeonholed in any one avenue that those authors suggest.

With the Summer Olympics’ historical trajectory in mind, it is easier to understand what the Olympics meant to the NYC 2012. Noam Shoval provided an analysis of the London and NYC 2012 bids during the competition on the international level (Shoval). He suggests yet another reason was present for these recent bids: competition in the “hierarchy of the world’s cities” (Shoval). New York and London are both near the very top of the hierarchy of cities both economically and culturally, but city governments still feel pressure to host these event lest they lose footing vis-à-vis other cities on the hierarchy. This has been described as a consequence of the beginning of a new phase within the realm of mega-events. To explain why world-class cities would pursue the Olympics, the answer was in the fact that they were competing for resources and thus found the Olympics as an effective way of fighting for corporations and tax revenue (Shoval). However, in the article this theory applies more to the case of London, using many quotes and information from the London bid committee. New York is included in the theory through a limited number of references and some generalizations.
One major problem is that Shoval diminished the fact that New York, unlike London, had relatively limited support even by its USOC on the international level. The USOC did not sign a formal approval of New York City as the American bid for hosting the Olympics until only hours prior to the final IOC decision (Kriegel). But the biggest problem was that London did not face the scrutiny and competition amongst cities on the national level. The national acceptance from the start of London as the bid city, indicates that it was never in a competition among cities, only among countries. Shoval’s thesis doesn’t seem to correspond well to the politics of bidding for the Games in the United States.
The Olympic Bid as a Tool for a Pro-Development Regime

The Olympic Bid as a Catalyst

When the next generation of historians looks back on the 1970s and 1980s, they will agree that these decades represented a major turning point in American economic, social, and technical history and that New York City was at the leading edge of this transformation (Noyelle).

New York was not the only city to believe ardently in using the Olympics as a means to development and change within a fixed, short time frame. The use of this idea also came into play in the bid submitted by Cape Town for the 2004 Olympic Games.
Here, too, the Olympics was seen by the local business elites and civic leaders as a facilitator, cutting through diverse opinions and red tape and creating economic, as well as social, change in a very orderly, short amount of time. Within a wider context of hosting the Games, Harry Hiller argues that “the key words in linking development with the Olympic bid are ‘catalyst’ and ‘acceleration’.” The author assert that every bid will have some transformation inherent in that bid (Hiller).

What sets the New York City bid apart from most bids is not the sheer extent of its associated urban development; cities such as Montreal have had even more development associated with the Games. Instead, it is the importance that this development played in the city’s desire to host the Games. As the executive director of NYC 2012, Jay Kriegel mentioned, development was “the major reason” for the Olympic bid. The Olympics were seen to “offer a unique opportunity to transform a city”. It offered a “seven year timetable to do major changes to the city” (Kriegel).

Indeed, in the City Hall Library in New York, I was able to find out exactly how much physical development was required for the Games. The results provided insight into the games, as tabulated in Chart IV (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)). The bid book makes clear that over 51% of the venues had to be developed from scratch for the purpose of the Olympic Games. When existing venues that require permanent upgrades are included, the number goes up to nearly 2/3rds of the total venues for the Games required at least some substantial upgrade. This information provides a couple of significant pieces of information about the bid. First, it shows that for some reason, nearly two out of every three venues would have either been created from scratch or given permanent improvements to handle the

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11 Book 2, pages 118-119
12 For clarification these upgrades are not insignificant amounts. The smallest upgrade is $2,600,000, while the largest upgrade will use both bid committee and outside sources for a total of $513,500,000.
Chart IV: NYC 2012

- 35%: Existing Venues
- 34%: Existing Venues with Permanent Upgrades
- 17%: New Venues-Permanent
- 14%: New Venues-Temporary
Chart VI: SCCOG (2016)

Existing venues: 77%
New venues: 23%
Chart VII: Atlanta (1996)

56% Existing venues
44% New venues

- Existing Venues: 54%
- Existing Venues with Permanent Upgrades: 0%
- New Venues-Permanent: 27%
- New Venues-Temporary: 19%
Games. This may be simply that New York did not have a large number of sports facilities. If so, this would lend credence to the argument that the Olympics in New York was about development in areas that had previously not gotten funding.

In the following pages I have taken data from several Olympics to see where NYC 2012 lay within US bids. How much was the bid really about development relative to other bids? To compare the emphasis on construction of venues by each bid committee, pie charts were made that were divided up into existing venues and new venues proposed by the bid committee itself. Information about each bid came from bid books or from newspaper articles from the respective time reporting on the bid book or candidature file (when a bid book was no longer available). When information in bid books was fairly complete, I was able to further divide results into: existing venues, existing venues with permanent upgrades, new venues-permanent, and new venues-temporary. Chart IV is my breakdown of the NYC 2012 bid. Charts V through IX are corresponding analyses of five other major recent bids by U.S. cities to host the Games. Those bids are the following: SCCOG (1984), SCCOG (2016), Chicago (2016), Atlanta (1996), and New York City (1984)\(^\text{13}\). If any other cities would have the political clout to have a developmental policy such as New York it would be in this group. Comparing New York’s 2012 bid with its bid for the USOC nomination for the 1984 Games is a way of seeing if development and policy-making are new or a continuing factor.

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\(^{13}\) The year in parentheses after each city or Olympic committee is the year of the desired Olympic Games.
As can be seen from the pie charts, New York City did indeed focus on new venues more than any other bid committee’s plans, except Atlanta’s. The bid committee with the thirdmost new venues by percentage was Chicago’s current bid. This suggests that there may be a coalition of developmental interests was at work in Atlanta and Chicago. In the case of Atlanta, this lends additional evidence that a pro-growth regime regulates politics in Atlanta. Clarence Stone argued that Atlanta was not governed by “formal machinery of government” but by an “informal partnership between city hall and the downtown business elite” (Stone 3). Additionally, information from the Atlanta bid indicated that development was mostly centralized in the downtown area. Concerning the physical location of the majority of venues, an Atlanta Journal-Constitution writer described their locations as in a “tight belt around central Atlanta” (Newton). The location of the majority of the venues and development is confined to the area where the downtown elite could benefit the most from construction money spent during the Games, and the Games’ legacy. Such supports leads this author to feel that there maybe a general trend between the proportional number of proposed new venues and the influence of the regime.

But the result that is even more intriguing is that following closely behind Chicago 2016 was Los Angeles 1984. The Games that the SCCOG President John Argue once called “Spartan” in nature ended up having a number of new venues for sports. At the time of the bidding process, Los Angeles announced it needed only a few new venues, but it soon realized others were needed. Thus, since I used data from after Los Angeles won the bid, this number maybe skewed a bit high. Still, New York’s previous bid in 1977 for the 1984 Olympics planned on only 29% new venues. NYC 2012 was with 51% new venues, nearly double that of the previous bid.
Charts IV through IX are only one way to research the influence of the regime in the Olympic bidding process for American cities. What if the 51% of venues in NYC were really cheap while the one major project in Los Angeles was very expensive? To explore this possibility, I have located the data on the costs associated with construction and development of venues from my five bid committees. I then took these numbers and, when necessary, adjusted the monetary amounts to inflation to 2006 using DollarTimes.com Inflation Calculator (Hostetler). Below is the result, Chart X.
Chart X: Costs in 2006 Dollars for Construction and Physical Redevelopment by Bid Committee

- **New York City (1984)**
- **SCCOG (1984)**
- **Atlanta (1996)**
- **Chicago (2016)**
- **SCCOG (2016)**
- **NYC 2012**

**Planned Cost for Construction and Physical Redevelopment**

- **Series1**
- **Series2**
For the bid committee of New York City there were even more improvements to parks and infrastructure that had been tied into the Olympic band wagon (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)).

In the case of New York City, this emphasis on redevelopment is unlikely to change. In a move that merges the private and public components in the regime, the Mayor hired Dan Doctoroff, president of NYC 2012. This move from the private sector to the public sector occurred during the bid; however, Doctoroff remains a Deputy Mayor. Doctoroff is, in fact, the Deputy Mayor of Economic Development and Rebuilding. The Deputy Mayor acts as a source of continuity for redevelopment even after the Olympic bid was unsuccessful. As will be seen in the next section, under his leadership, many of the planned venues have indeed been redeveloped.
Queens West as it currently looks; it takes up most of the peninsula in the center of the photograph. Redevelopment would place subsidized housing, commercial space and parks where old factories and open space currently stand.

**No Games, No Problem: Development of the Olympic Village**

Directly across the East River from the headquarters of the United Nations lies a peninsula of prime New York City real estate that until a decade ago was filled with dilapidated factories and rotting wharves. The area was an eyesore when compared to the glittering skyscrapers just a half mile away. It had simply remained untouched and unfixed. Change finally began to arrive with the influx of new low-rise restaurants in the late 1990s and early 21st century. But the big change is yet to come as the City of New
York is planning to build a 24 acre affordable housing development complete with retail and 18 acres of open space. This marks the largest development by the city of its kind in over thirty years (Cave). Already two skyscrapers, containing 1,457 apartments, and two parks have been built on the site. Additional apartments, condominiums, retail space, and parkland have all been approved within the development plan (Flinn).

But the reason I bring this idea to the reader’s attention is that such plans seemed to be *déjà vu*. The bid book plan is very similar to the current development plan for Queens West. Each planned on placing thousands of affordable apartments. Each planned on recreational facilities and parks. Each planned for retail space (at least, after the Games concluded). In NYC 2012’s recently defeated bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games, the same project was proposed as the site of the Olympic Village. Complete with sports facilities and thousands of apartments, the Olympic Village was to transform the underdeveloped area. With nearly all of the $386,300,000 coming from private developers, after the Games the Olympic Village was meant to be converted into private condominiums (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)).

In fact it became apparent that something intriguing was happening when we look at what has happened to the venues since the bid’s loss to London. On the following pages you will find two NYC 2012 proposed venue maps. This map indicates where different sporting events will be held, as well as logistics like media buildings, the Olympic Village, and the ferry and road transportation networks for athletes to use to get to events. Map I comes directly from the final candidature file handed in by New York. The only changes in Map I from the one in the candidature file are the use of a larger font.
for the text. It was necessary to remove the French versions of each caption to increase the legibility of the maps. In Map II, each venue was color-coded to indicate its current state of development. These results were then compiled into Chart XI.

In Chart XI, there are several facets worth discussing. One is that when one combines the sporting events venues that have been improved and venues that are being redeveloped, one has a significant percentage of the venues that were proposed in the NYC 2012 Olympic bid. The chart is slightly skewed because there were a few venues that I simply did not find information on but may indeed be redeveloped or improved. Additionally, what is missing from the chart are the many infrastructure improvements that also got developed even without the Olympics. There had long been talk about extending the subway system to far western Manhattan, but it is only being constructed post-bid. The plans of the bid had an effect; the unsuccessful Olympic bid actually has left a large legacy.
NYC 2012 Planned Venues By Type

- Existing: 26%
- Existing with Improvements: 30%
- Redevelopment in line with the bid: 16%
- Redevelopment unrelated to the bid: 12%
- No development or unable to confirm status: 16%
The railroad yards at center were to be transformed into the West Side Stadium. Courtesy of transalt.org

The West Side Stadium: An Alternative Regime Enters the Foray

The West Side Stadium was to be built on the Far West Side of Manhattan, south of the Javits Convention Center. Like the Olympic Village, the stadium was meant to transform the area bringing new life to that part of the city. At the time of the bid, the Far West Side was underdeveloped. The area was filled with factories, parking lots and warehouses (C. Bagli). A rail yard stood in the location of the proposed stadium. The stadium also was not to be built just for the Olympics; it would have had a long-term utility as the new home of the New York Jets, a professional football team. Not only

14 NYC 2012 planned to host six Olympic sports venues in the Javits Center.
15 City official recently changed the name of the area from the Far West Side to the Hudson Yards district. For consistency and historical accuracy, all references to this area will be by its older name, the Far West Side.
were the Jets to play there, but New York was given the right to host the 2010 Super Bowl, with only the condition that the stadium be built (PlanNYC). So from this one venue, New York City government could help revitalize the Far West Side and host two major athletic competitions, the Super Bowl and the Olympics. For many business leaders, the stadium sounded like a good idea. New condominiums would be put up. New businesses and shops would move into the neighborhood. And it would be people in the private elite that would be developing the Far West Side. Even for those not interested in developing the Far West Side, business leaders would at least be supportive knowing that what is good for New York is good for business too.

Yet out of the 18 new venues NYC 2012 planned for the Olympics, only this one single project failed to win government approval and had to be dropped from the bid only a month before the IOC’s meeting in Singapore. How is it possible that the stadium which seemed so helpful to both the city and private interests could have come to such an early end? Why was the regime not able to allow for something that was so central to its agenda of development and to getting the Olympics? Two major reasons appear evident. First, one member of the business elite had financial interests that would have been put in direct conflict with the building of the West Side Stadium. Secondly, the regime coalition is composed of city officials, but the stadium required state approval. Members of the state government have separate agendas than the city’s regime.

For the Cablevision Systems Corporation, the West Side Stadium would have lowered profits for its own arena only blocks away, Madison Square Garden. The company viewed the new stadium as a potential threat to its share of concerts and sporting events. Its agenda was opposed to that of the regime. Indicating how severe this
opposition was to the bid, Cablevision used everything in its power to force the
destruction of the stadium deal. While many advertisements against the stadium
appeared to be from groups of ordinary citizens against the development, Cablevision
was heavily financing their campaign. In an article in the New York Times a month after
the defeat of the West Side Stadium, the journalist reported that a study by the New York
Public Interest Research Group found that Cablevision had spent $22.1 million lobbying
and advertising against the proposed stadium over a 2.5 year period (Sandomir). To give
the reader a frame of reference, the amount spent by all the telephone and cable
companies of California over the years 2003 and 2004 on state and local government
lobbying and advertising was $14.4 Million (Schachter). To have such a large amount of
financial resource dedicated to fighting this project is indicator of it being highly
undesirable to Cablevision. Not only was the company financing a massive advertising
campaign against the stadium, Cablevision also would not accept pro-stadium
advertisements on its cable\(^\text{16}\) (Rutenberg). By the time the stadium was finally rejected
by a state board on June 6, 2005, Cablevision had spent nearly half as much money
financing opposition to the proposed Olympic stadium as NYC 2012 would end up
spending lobbying and advertising for the entire Olympic bid of dollars.

And while Cablevision provided the money behind the anti-stadium cause, other
activists who were opposed to redevelopment used this funding to promote their agenda.
At odds with Molotch’s growth machine theory, the use interests were able to effectively
help stop the building of the stadium. However, even with the support of Cablevision,

\(^{16}\) Cable providers have the right to deny advertising space on their channels, according to the Federal
Communications Commission in Rutenberg’s article.
such interests would have been unsuccessful at stopping the stadium had they not had allies in power up in Albany.

The other issue that made the stadium hard to get was that it required both the approval by the state legislature of $300,000,000 for the stadium’s retractable roof and the approval of the State Public Authorities Control Board (SPACB) (C. V. Bagli "Pataki Agrees to Delay Vote on Stadium for 2nd Time"). Politics in Albany are an entirely different affair than in New York City. The system is fixed around a tripartite of power held then by Governor George Pataki, Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno, and Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver. This three-way system of power has been around for decades and there is nothing to indicate this system will change in the near future (Pecorella). For the stadium to pass, proponents would have to get the state-financed portion of the stadium approved by the SPACB which consisted of three members, each named by their respective member of the state’s tripartite. Since Governor Pataki had stated early on his support for the West Side Stadium, support from his representative was all but guaranteed. However, Senator Bruno was a different matter. With much of his conservative political support coming from upstate and the NYC suburbs, there was little motivation for him to authorize hundreds of millions of dollars in the center of the liberal stronghold of the state. As for Assemblyman Silver, he feared that the plan would undermine redevelopment in his district, Lower Manhattan (Bagli, Cooper and Rutenberg).

When, after multiple delays, the SPACB finally made its decision on June 6, 2005, only the governor’s representative voted in the affirmative. The rejection by SPACB doomed the stadium in that form and made it impossible for NYC 2012 to use
their planned Olympic Stadium. In a politically masterful stroke, the Mayor’s Office and NYC 2012 were able to make a deal with the primary owner of the Mets, Fred Wilpon. The Mets would pay for the cost of a new stadium adjacent to their current facility, and the city and state would pay for surrounding infrastructure improvements and necessary alteration for the stadium to host the Olympics. All of this was accomplished in 72 hours. When asked about the price tag of the new stadium, Wilpon did not even know a cost for the stadium because a design had not yet been chosen (Zinser and Cooper). While it is true that this stadium brought dissention amongst the regime and encountered trouble on the state level, the public/private partnership was able to come through with a large redevelopment plan in its darkest hour. Without the deal with the Mets, NYC 2012’s chances at the IOC vote in Singapore would have been nonexistent. The power of regime politics in New York can be seen in its ability to progress even after its first attempt failed.

As seen from this case study, there is the possibility that alternative regimes may also develop within a city. Although the interests involved did not form a true regime as defined by regime theory, the anti-stadium interests had several elements of a regime. The opposition was composed of diverse private interests from the Cablevision corporation to private citizens. In addition, the opposition also had public interests in the forms of Senator Bruno and Assemblyman Silver. Though Cablevision saw the stadium as a threat to profits, other actors may have held their own pro-growth agenda. For instance, Assemblyman Silver did not oppose the stadium because he was against redevelopment. On the contrary he was entirely for the redevelopment of Lower Manhattan. The only reason for his opposition to the stadium was that he felt it
threatened his own pro-growth agenda by diverting funds and attention. The only
difference between this opposition and a regime is the absence of an established
connection between the public and private interests. The participants were all opposed to
the stadium. However, there is nothing to indicate that they worked together in their
opposition to the stadium. Nevertheless, this example indicates that powerful alternative
regimes within a city are a real possibility – something rarely discussed within the urban
political theory literature.

Despite the rejection of the stadium, the city is going ahead with all sorts of
development in far west Manhattan. For example, the Metropolitan Transit Authority
(MTA) has been authorized to move forward with construction of the extension of the
Number 7 subway line into far west Manhattan. Although the extension is less than half
a mile in length, in the political arena this construction is a large victory. The subway
line extension had been proposed several times before but never materialized.

Additionally, the attitude of private business can be summed up in a headline by the New
While the stadium was not built, the Mayor’s Office was able to pass rezoning for 42
blocks on the West Side. With this change in zoning, the area is now finally open to
large-scale development. Many residential developers are planning new high-rises in the
area. A 1,500 room hotel is being planned and commercial development is also being
considered (C. V. Bagli "No Stadium? No Problem"). Just up the road, the Javits Center
has its own planned expansion, making it more viable for any sort of convention. Even
with no stadium and no Olympics, the public/private regime has continued to push
redevelopment forward. The city government is providing the infrastructure like the
subway extension and the legal backing such as rezoning of the area. In exchange, private interests are willing to back commercial ventures in the area. The city revitalizes an underutilized part of Manhattan and the developers earn a profit.
Redevelopment at Planned Venue Locations Unassociated with the Olympic Games

The velodrome arena was to be built for a cost of $76,000,000 (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)). As a velodrome is used only for international indoor cycling competitions, it would have likely ended up beautiful but mostly useless in the long run. For the city of New York, a velodrome is not a priority. But as part of the Olympics, the facility for bicycle racing could be justified as necessary to facilitate more commercially viable redevelopment at other venue sites. Hosting the Olympics does not allow cities to choose venues. The Olympic Games would have provided New York City with a package deal. Had the Olympics come to New York, a newly formed OCOG composed of civic leaders and private industry elites would have gotten to develop the Olympic Village and the Bronx riverfront for long-term future use. However, the OCOG would also have to raise hundreds of millions of dollars to fund the development of venues for such sports as bicycling, whitewater, and equestrian activities. Building venues with limited long-term use that cost millions of dollars would not please everyone in the city, but under the NYC 2012 bid book, the OCOG would be paying for most of these facilities anyway17.

17 Had the New York won the bid, the venues would have been paid for by the OCOG. The velodrome would have been privately funded, and the only effort the city would have needed to make was to secure the land and zoning for a velodrome. Under current conditions, however, redevelopment would be almost entirely through the use of public taxpayer revenue.
After the bid failed, the entire Olympic plan could have been taken off the table and filed away in the archives next to the 1984 bid. Yet, as I have made clear using Appendix A, many of the venues were redeveloped. Some are being constructed as intended for the bid, but other such as the velodrome are being reexamined and made to fit better within the city government’s priorities. A velodrome is a very special facility, one that has a very limited clientele, and whose impact on the community would have been questionable. The location of the proposed velodrome was in New York’s Sixteenth Congressional District. Located in the South Bronx, the Sixteenth has 42% of the individuals are in poverty, the white population is 2.4%, and out of a district of nearly 500,000 voters only 132,117 voted in the 2000 Presidential election (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swamstrom 5). This community is one of the most poverty-stricken, non-white areas of the country, having both the lowest median household income and highest poverty rate of any district in the United States. It seems one of the worst places in the country to place a velodrome given its riders and audiences are disproportionally white and middle to upper class.

Take the interviews conducted by Seth Kugel, a New York Times reporter, from the day that London was announced as the 2012 Olympics Host. Kugel traveled to the Bronx to interview local citizens about how they felt that the velodrome would no longer be created in their neighborhood. What he found was a lot of puzzled faces. One interviewee summed it up with the statement, “I have never heard of that word” (Kugel). Even when the reporter talked with the owner of the nearest fairly humble, bicycle shop, the owner did not see much potential impact of having a state of the art facility down the block. The world of elite class athletes seems very far away from that day’s clientele of...
two tweens getting their bikes fixed (Kugel). A world class velodrome had little to no support in the neighborhood it was being placed. The only thing that would have made the money and support possible for the facility was the Olympics as a catalyst. But after the unsuccessful Olympic bid, the location of the would-be velodrome remained, “a trash-strewn parking lot and no-man’s land just north of...the Harlem River” (Kugel).

Yet, it now appears times are changing for the site and that development may finally be coming in a way that improves the site and interacts with the community more than a velodrome would have. This new development will take the form of a large mall with an adjacent city park. The city is planning redevelopment of the crumbling Bronx Terminal Market by a private developer, Related Companies. In total, 1,000,000 square feet of retail space will be opened up along with restaurants along tree-lined streets (Bagli and Shulman). At the heart of this deal is none other than Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff, who has given Related $14,000,000 in cash grants. It is typical for the city to give tax incentives and low-interest loans to developers to redevelop struggling neighborhoods. However, direct government subsidy of the project is unusual (Bagli and Shulman). This may indicate the limits of the interests involved in the regime. Smaller, less well-connected private actors do not get the same help from the city. Compare Related’s treatment to the way city the seems to treat the medium-sized wholesalers being displaced. The city was going ahead with their redevelopment plans before a replacement location for the wholesalers could be found.

The velodrome site was originally not part of the project, but with the loss of the bid it was then offered to Related to buy. In the meantime, Related transferred 7.5 acres of waterfront land to create a city park in exchange for $2,500,000 rent credit (Bagli and
A new phase in this rundown area of the Bronx has finally arrived; however, there is no velodrome in sight.

Perhaps the loss of the Olympics actually helped redevelopment take a more appropriate route given the location. The regime is still in charge, giving subsidies only to certain well-connected developers and seeking growth in the area. However, by focusing the land on a mall with such stores as Home Depot and Target and placing curbside restaurants and infrastructure improvements such as parks and smoother highway exits nearby this may actually help the local community significantly (Bagli and Shulman). The million feet of retail space opening up in the area will provide thousands of additional jobs\textsuperscript{18}, which might bring locals out of poverty. Also important to a community where over a third of the residents are under eighteen, will be the new park that provides open space for children to play in.

For the regime, this is a good situation because it can say it is helping the poor, while filling its own coffers. The corporate businesses that move in will do well and generate tax revenues from the new sites. Given its close location to Yankee Stadium, redevelopment could turn the area into New York’s equivalent of Wrigleyville, filling the streets with sports fans looking for drinks, food, or even possibly a sixteen piece ratchet set from Home Depot after the game.

\textsuperscript{18} I did not find any guarantee that these jobs would be from the local community as opposed to people commuting into the neighborhood.
Why No Redevelopment?

There were some cases where proposed venue sites never led to any development. One example of this is the marina proposed for the Olympics. Here, there was to be a marina built for yacht-racing. In New York City, space for such a facility is hard to find and expensive. The Olympics would have accomplished this goal, but even without the Games, there seemed a relative demand for such facilities.

However, the likely absence of a marina in its planned Olympic location brings up additional limits to the regime and developmental politics. Like the stadium, the marina would have required approval on other governmental levels. This is because the marina currently sits in the Gateway National Recreation Area. For any development to occur would require the approval of the National Park Service. Such large-scale development would be hard-pressed to find support in the conservation-minded park service. Their emphasis in their lands is two-fold: “To conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” (The United States Congress). Without a mega-event, a marina would be less foreseeable as necessary development, if it might negatively affect future generations.

Another example of non-development is the proposed Canoe/Slalom course in Queens. This would have transformed a section of Flushing Meadows Corona Park in Queens into a series of whitewater rapids (NYC 2012 New York City 2012: Candidature File for the XX Olympiad (Bid Book)). However, like the velodrome
discussed in the previous section, there was little need for such a facility. Except for rare
events like the Olympics, many whitewater competitions are on natural courses rather
than costly man-made ones.

Though the regime can initiate some of the development without the Olympics, some venues will simply never get developed. The legacy from an Olympic Games will always be greater than that of an unsuccessful bid, even with a strong public/private coalition. That is to say that the importance of a mega-event is that they bring through necessity that push that makes deals happen and different authorities come together in a way that will rarely happen without it. Some legacies will remain unfulfilled, legacies of a set of Games that was never to be.
Conclusion

In the words of Clarence Stone, “I do not expect the concept to be frozen at the version presented by me. The interaction of concept and observation is ongoing, and none of us does more than offer a guidepost in the journey” (256) (Stone). No quote better illustrates the transient nature of my research findings. The writing provides a spotlight on one aspect of the urban studies, but it leaves others in the dark. No report can take in the full picture, and new research is always appearing altering the theories. I have tried to understand and analyze the relationship between the Olympics and the city, and traveled to both New York and Los Angeles on an undergraduate research grant to conduct research in archives, libraries, and interviews.

Studying the NYC 2012 and other bids has enabled analysis of trends in the political process of a pro-development regime in a way not often possible given the transitory, informal nature of the regime. The paper looks at the realms of the Olympics and of politics through a different framework than many other previous social scientists. Instead of studying politics of the Olympics, this researcher studies Olympic bids as a symptom of deeper political trends within these U.S. cities. Few cities seriously apply for the Games, so when they do there are usually very important reasons why. The large paper trail left behind by the bid in terms of documents for the USOC and the IOC, as well many reports by the local media is very large, improving the chance of accurately understanding the regime.

This research in the most direct sense was about explaining why after the unsuccessful bid for the Olympics, venue sites are still being redeveloped. One part of
the explanation is that the bid for the Olympics was but one action taken by the pro-
development regime in place in New York City. This coalition of public and powerful
private interests used the bid for the Games as a chance to change New York City in big
ways that had been nigh impossible since the days of Robert Moses. Things like
bureaucratic red tape, state and metropolitan level government involvement, and budget
deficits had left many of these projects unmaterialized. Suddenly the Olympic came
along as the perfect opportunity for the regime. The Games brought a clear, relatively
short timetable to complete a number of sticky development projects. In addition the
Games hold a certain emotional appeal allowing for less citizen, private, and
governmental opposition. This was seen in every venue except for the West Side
Stadium. The stadium was the exception that proved the rule. Cooperation or at least
passive acceptance appeared the norm for the other proposed venue sites.

But then July 6, 2005 came and went and no longer did it appear that the regime
had a mega-event to fall back on as a source of support for their development goals. Yet,
this research shows many of the projects did get developed similarly to the plan for the
Olympics. Others proposed venue sites were also redeveloped, though in a form different
than in the bid. Queens West is buzzing with construction as the whole place is turned
into a vibrant mixed residential and retail community where not very long ago run-down
factories and rotting wharves made up the majority of the area. The far west side of
Manhattan is also exploding as major developers, often well-connected within the regime
take advantage of new zoning laws put in place by Mayor Bloomberg and former chair of
NYC 2012 and current Deputy Mayor Doctoroff. Across the Harlem River from
Manhattan, retail stores, restaurants, highway on-ramps, and a park are being built as part
of a large-scale redevelopment where an Olympic velodrome might have been. The Olympics acted a catalyst. It helped enable the bid committee to open up hard to reach land. The NYC 2012 bid book was also instrumental, because it contained detailed plans for many of the proposed venues. With the details of the venues already made available to the city, there was one less obstacle in the way of development.

While some sites experience no development such as the marina and the canoe/slalom course, these typically indicate either unavoidable laws or development that is not of great interest to the developers involved in the regime. These venues were only really proposed as part of Olympic bid. As a packaged bid, the only way to get other projects developed was to construct as few fairly useless ones such as an elegant velodrome in the center of one of the poorest neighborhoods in the country.
Postscript: Implications for Chicago 2016

The results are in, and Chicago has won the USOC nomination to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. Now it begins its two year odyssey to convince the IOC vote for their bid over the other interested cities from around the world. But whether or not their efforts result in an IOC vote in the affirmative in 2009, an educated guess can be made as to the way Chicago will be run. Judging by Charts IV through IX, Chicago’s proposed bid in similar to NYC 2012 and Atlanta. It plans to build a lot of venues, and it plans on spending a lot to construct them. This is similar to what was proposed by the regime in New York City.

Now, in principle, all costs are to be paid for through private sources rather than the public coffers. How close actuality will come to this will depend a lot on the honesty and frugality of the leaders of the Olympic Committee. Will they be frugal like Atlanta, making both a profit and a large physical impact on their downtown or will they end up paying the bills for the next thirty years like Montreal? If you look at the more recent travails of Olympic hosts, the indications are fairly negative. The Athens Games cost much more than expected and required the Greek government to pay for the billion dollar plus overrun on funds. The Turino Olympics, apparently due to new tax codes, ended up with a $33 million deficit. In Bejing, when all improvements for the Games are added up, the local and national governments have spent over $40 billion. Finally, in London, they are installing new improvements to transportation that have so far quadrupled the planned price for the Games.

Yet fear not, as Chicago and most bids announce, the Games do provide an economic impact. An economic impact is supposed to show the amount of money gained
from new jobs and money pumped into the economy due to hosting the Games. This analysis, however, has come under fire in recent years as economists including Holger Preuss and Allen Sanderson have found that there are hidden costs in hosting the Olympics that minimize the overarching impact of the Games. For instance, prior and after the Games, cities experience unusually low occupancy in hotels and fewer conventions are scheduled. Fearing price-gouging associated with the Olympics, many simply avoid the city for months.

What are left are the Olympics’ legacies on communities. A legacy of the Los Angeles Games was the AAF, an organization that without which, much of this paper’s research would not have been possible. There are also legacies as stadiums such as is the case in Atlanta. It is in this framework, the physical change to the city, that the Olympics could have potentially the best impact on Chicago. Take another recent mega-project in Chicago, Millenium Park. It was built at greater than $150 million dollars more than its projected cost and was not finished until nearly three years after the event it was supposed to commemorate. Yet, very few seem to remember such details. Today it has become one of the biggest tourist attractions in the city. And unlike other tourist attractions like the Sears Tower, native Chicagoans flock to the park to skate its rink and take pictures with its sculptures (Campbell). Perhaps best of all for improving the reputation and knowledge of the city of Chicago, the park has been featured around the world as it also environmentally-friendly, being the largest green-roof in the world. This is the future likely to be seen with a Chicago Games. The Windy City is unlikely to break the recent trend in overspending on the Games. But at the same time, if Chicago can provide a physical legacy for all to share and enjoy long after the Olympic torch is
doused then it will have been successful for not just the interests of the city’s regime but also for many of its citizens. But, if only one thing is taken from this research on the NYC 2012 bid, it is that Chicago need not get the Olympics to transform the city: their bid already has enough information and political clout to turn many proposed venues into reality.

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